Jon, just to clarify: In Peirce’s 1903 classification, some signs (being individuals, sinsigns) are replicas of other signs, those other signs being general in themselves (legisigns). But in your classification, no signs are replicas, no replicas are signs, and an index is not a sign, since it lacks generality. Although signs “exist in replicas,” replicas are not signs (i.e. a replica cannot be one of the three correlates in a genuine triadic relation). Is that right?
Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: 29-Mar-18 16:13 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Nature and Division of Signs (was Three Interpretants) Gary F., List: What I am suggesting is that all Signs are Real in themselves, but only exist in Replicas. A Sign is an inexhaustible continuum of potential Replicas, and a Replica is an individual instantiation of a Sign--as I have said before, analogous to the relation between a line and a point, and the semiotic counterpart of a law of nature as a Real general that governs the behavior of actual Things. Revisiting the 1903 terminology, all Signs are Legisigns, all Replicas are Sinsigns--but of a peculiar kind, such that they can still be Necessitant in subsequent trichotomies--and there are no Qualisigns at all, since a quality in itself cannot represent anything other than itself. As an example, in 1908 Peirce classified "beauty" as an Abstractive (EP 2:480) because its Dynamic Object is a quality, even though as a word it is obviously not a Qualisign. I am positing that the Mode of Being of this Sign is Necessitant, as it must be for every Sign, and the Mode of Being of each of its Replicas is Existent, as it must be for every Replica. However, its Mode of Apprehension or Presentation is Possible, such that it is a Tone; i.e., it appears in the Phaneron as a quality, rather than as reaction (Token) or mediation (Type). This entails that it must also be an Icon, perhaps in the sense that we colloquially describe as "knowing it when you see it." This analysis is admittedly a first attempt on my part, and presumably needs further working out. Thanks, Jon S.
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