Jon, list,
I may be wrong, but there seems to be a bit of cherry picking by you in
your selection of the snippets you've chosen from Peirce's *New Elements*
to support your argument.
*New Elements* concerns itself, in my view, first and foremost, if not
mainly with legisigns and symbols, most of its examples being symbols,
indeed words, especially nouns. So when Peirce speaks of signs in *New
Elements *he is mainly speaking of symbols (and, perhaps, other legisigns).
Nonetheless there are in that piece separate discussions of degenerate
signs *qua *signs, that is, icons and indexes. Peirce even explicitly says
that there are important things these signs can do that genuine signs
cannot (it's late so I'll get the EP page reference later).
I suppose that what most prompted me to respond as I did was your denying
that there even are Qualisigns and Sinsigns--JAS: "There are no Qualisigns
or Sinsigns, only Legisigns"--and so, while in *New Elements* it is true
that JAS: "Peirce did not say that *Symbols *are Entelechies, he said that
*Signs *are Entelechies," nonetheless, once you've denied that Qualisigns
and Sinsigns *are* signs at all, then it pretty much amounts to the same
thing (although I should have written "Legisigns" rather than "Symbols").
You wrote "This substitution of Symbol for Sign on your part--illegitimate,
in my view--seems to pervade your entire response." But I think that you
may have it backwards--at least if I more properly say "legisign" rather
than "symbol" (I hedged a bit on that in my earlier post since I wasn't
sure exactly what the scope of your term "general sign" was, especially as
you'd written things like the pre-linguistic girl needing "at least *some *kind
of internal Symbol-system." This is to say that, since in your view there
are *only* legisigns, such as symbols, the only Entelechies are these
legisigns (and, mutatis mutandi, I pretty much was just paraphrasing you in
that "substitution" while completely disagreeing with your basic premise).
I apologize for suggesting you that you had any theological intent in any
of this. My 'guess' was most likely based on your assertion that a "natural
sign" was the "replica" of a general sign. If that's the case then, I asked
myself, What is the underlying general sign in any case of a "natural
sign"? My tentative answer was that it had to be Mind, or for a theist such
as you or me, the Mind of God. But perhaps this hints more at my own
theological views than your own, ones which I haven't considered very
deeply enough yet. But, again, I was most certainly wrong to suggest that
you had some hidden theological. Mea culpa.
JAS: "I am not at all seeking to *eliminate *characters and qualities from
semiosis--I am suggesting that their *metaphysical *role is that of Form,
whereas a Sign is an Entelechy. Qualities are indeed everywhere, but they
are not (in themselves) Signs."
Well, and again, it seems to me that Peirce thought otherwise, that he
posited, and as vitally important, qualisigns and sinsign. And if one takes
the top down approach that Gary f has suggested, it seems to me that one
will arrive at an understanding of Sign (3ns) that indeed* requires* (as
Peirce states in *New Elements*) Indexes (2ns) and Icons (1ns) as being
involved in all general signs, that is, legisigns and, perhaps especially,
symbols (rhemes, dicents, arguments).
So, the entelechy which Peirce discusses in *New Elements* is, in this top
down view, would seem to require degenerate signs, icons and indices, in
the movement of this entelechy (this how I understand your saying "the
alignment of the three Categories with Form (1ns), Matter (2ns), and
Entelechy (3ns)."
You wrote:
JAS: Please note that I have *never*--not once--used the phrase,
"metaphysics of *semeiotic*," which would indeed be a conflation of two
distinct sciences in Peirce's architectonic. Instead, I have consistently
referred to the metaphysics of (concrete) *semiosis*; i.e., the primary
subject matter is the *Reality *of Signs, the other Correlates, and their
Relations.
You are correct that you never used the phrase "metaphysics of semeiotic,"
and I apologize for suggesting otherwise. And, yes, "metaphysics of
semiosis" offers an entirely different emphasis at very least. But
returning then to the important, and I'd say, vital role that Peirce gives
to icons and indexes in *New Elements*, what constitutes the "concrete" in
your "metaphysics of (concrete) semiosis"?
And as to "the *Reality* of Signs," I'm fine with that as long as one
allows for "existential reality" or 2ns (*concrete* reality), and the
possibility (1ns) of the introduction of new patterns and habits (in
biological evolution Peirce calls this "sporting," a 1ns) within an
evolutionary teleology.
So, in sum: my principal disagreement with you is in your writing: "There
are no Qualisigns or Sinsigns, only Legisigns." I am beginning to see the
logic of your argumentation, but I don't agree with it. I also find your
use of "replica" in consideration of "natural signs" illegitimate.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 10:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> wrote:
> Gary R., List:
>
> Peirce did not say that a *Symbol *"is of such a nature as to exist in
> replicas," he said that a *Sign *"is of such a nature as to exist in
> replicas" (EP 2:303; 1904). Something that exists in any way *other *than
> in Replicas is *not *a Sign. Peirce did not say that *Symbols *are
> Entelechies, he said that *Signs *are Entelechies (NEM 2:295-300; 1904).
> Something that is *not *an Entelechy--such as a quality, which is a Form,
> or something that exists (including a Replica), which is Matter--is *not *a
> Sign. This substitution of Symbol for Sign on your part--illegitimate, in
> my view--seems to pervade your entire response.
>
> In particular, I have no idea why you are suggesting that there is some
> kind of hidden "theological metaphysics" underlying my recent project. On
> the contrary, I have simply been emphasizing the Sign/Replica distinction
> and the alignment of the three Categories with Form (1ns), Matter (2ns),
> and Entelechy (3ns), as well as the indispensability of Quasi-minds for all
> *triadic
> *semiosis--i.e., where there are no Quasi-minds, there can only ever be
> *dyadic
> *action/reaction between Things.
>
> Please note that I have *never*--not once--used the phrase, "metaphysics
> of *semeiotic*," which would indeed be a conflation of two distinct
> sciences in Peirce's architectonic. Instead, I have consistently referred
> to the metaphysics of (concrete) *semiosis*; i.e., the primary subject
> matter is the *Reality *of Signs, the other Correlates, and their
> Relations.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 3:17 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list,
>>
>> JAS: 1. There is no Sign action, only Replica action--action requires
>> existence, and a Sign only exists in Replicas
>>
>> In my understanding I'd modify that to "a Symbol only exists in
>> Replicas."
>>
>> JAS: 2. There are no Qualisigns or Sinsigns, only Legisigns--which I
>> prefer simply to call Signs, as distinguished from their Replicas.
>> Anything that functions as a "natural sign" is a Replica of a general Sign.
>>
>> I see no basis for your claiming this. Peirce discusses Qualisigns and
>> Sinsigns at length, nowhere to my knowledge eliminating Qualisigns or
>> Sinsigns from his semeiotic analysis.
>>
>> To use "Replica" as you do for natural signs seems to me to hint at a
>> theological metaphysics not yet made explicit by you.
>>
>> How is a "natural sign" a Replica of a general Sign? What's the "general
>> sign" in, say, 'a spontaneous cry', one of Peirce's examples of a Sinsign?
>> So far, all I can make of your holding that every "natural sign" is "a
>> Replica of a general Sign" is that it is possibly a maxim of a kind of
>> theology which would make of the Universe a kind of symbol-system in the
>> mind of God, that only those symbols are real and that the entire existent
>> Universe exists as replicas of that symbolic-system (but Peirce says that
>> the symbols of the Cosmos have as well their integral icons and indexes).
>>
>> JAS: 3. Language and general Signs are not coextensive--in fact, language
>> consists entirely of Replicas, not Signs. "Man" in English and "homme" in
>> French are two Replicas of the same Sign, whose Reality is independent of
>> any actual language.
>>
>> I agree that "Language and general Signs are not coextensive" which would
>> seem to support the position I've been arguing as much as yours. So I must
>> be misinterpreting your meaning. Again you seem to reducing all semiosis to
>> the action of replicas of Legisigns, perhaps especially or primarily
>> Symbols. I find that hard to support in Peirce's semeiotic and in my own
>> thinking about it.
>>
>> I agree that "language consists entirely of Replicas"--not an issue.
>>
>> JAS: 4. That said, without language--or at least *some *kind of internal
>> Symbol-system--how could the woman in your "far out example" *cognize *her
>> fever as a "sign" that something is "off" in her body, rather than merely
>> react instinctively?
>>
>> Here you are again assuming that only Symbols (or at least Legisigns)
>> count in real semiosis. I would say that the woman has a continuum of
>> feeling which is interrupted by something, her headache, which breaks that
>> continuity, and that adverse feeling is to her a sign of malaise even if
>> she hasn't the language to express it as such. One could readily, I think,
>> find analogous examples in animals.
>>
>> But you say this "natural sign" is but a "replica of a general sign,"
>> using "replica" in a way in which I don't recall Peirce using it. I assume
>> that the "general sign" in question is, say, some law of nature.
>>
>> JAS: 5. I agree with you and Peirce that there is no pure 1ns, and also
>> that there is no pure 2ns--3ns permeates Reality, which is what I take him
>> to mean when he says that the Universe is "perfused with signs." That is
>> precisely why I affirm #2.
>>
>> Saying that there is no "pure" 1ns nor "pure" 2ns is not, in my
>> thinking, to say that 1ns and 2ns are not real and that they do not figure
>> iconically and indexically in semiosis. Peirce argued that what he found
>> most problematic in Hegel was his too quickly leaping to 3ns, ignoring the
>> reality and inter-dependence of all three categories. He says that Hegel's
>> 'Aufheben' ('abolish', sublate, cancel) of 1ns and 2ns (thesis and
>> antithesis) in 3ns (synthesis) represents just this kind of error. Is it
>> possible that you are doing something analogous?
>>
>> I might tend to agree with you that *had* Peirce said that the Universe
>> is "perfused with *symbols*" (rather than, as he did, "perfused with
>> *signs*") that you might have a stronger case. But then my
>> interpretation would still be--given that Peirce seems to me to clearly
>> admit a *real semiotic role* for qualisigns and legisigns--that the
>> Universe is "perfused with symbols *and other signs*."
>>
>> JAS: 6. I am not at all seeking to *eliminate *characters and qualities
>> from semiosis--I am suggesting that their *metaphysical *role is that of
>> Form, whereas a Sign is an Entelechy. Qualities are indeed everywhere, but
>> they are not (in themselves) Signs.
>>
>> You had earlier written that "there are no Qualisigns at all, since a
>> quality *in itself* cannot represent anything *other than itself*." But
>> that is exactly what it represents--its own evanescent unique
>> character--albeit embedded in a Sinsign (which in turn may be embedded in a
>> Legisign).
>>
>> Again, I think you may be conflating the metaphysical role in semeiotics
>> (your thread title, "Metaphysics of Semeiotics" always seemed to me
>> somewhat misguided in doing just what Jeff has just suggested that it is
>> perhaps unwise to do). As I commented in my earlier post, I think that it
>> might be helpful to focus on the role that trichotomic phenomenology plays
>> in the development of Peirce's semeiotic, something which might allow you
>> to consider a significant role there for Qualisigns and Legisigns rather
>> than flatly stating "There are no Qualisigns or Sinsigns, only Legisigns."
>>
>> I would modify your comment "a Sign is an Entelechy" to "a Symbol is an
>> Entelechy." I am beginning to see a kind of logocentrism in your analyses
>> which, again, makes me think that your are trying to conform your
>> semeiotics (your "metaphysics of semiotics") to a theological view you hold
>> (not yet explicitly stated). Of course I could be completely wrong in
>> thinking that this might be the case.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 11:07 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Gary R., List:
>>>
>>> The following is how I see things right now, which is very much subject
>>> to change with further reading, thinking, and discussion.
>>>
>>> 1. There is no Sign action, only Replica action--action requires
>>> existence, and a Sign only exists in Replicas. I confess that I do not
>>> know enough about biosemiosis to address it specifically.
>>> 2. There are no Qualisigns or Sinsigns, only Legisigns--which I
>>> prefer simply to call Signs, as distinguished from their Replicas.
>>> Anything that functions as a "natural sign" is a Replica of a general
>>> Sign.
>>> 3. Language and general Signs are not coextensive--in fact, language
>>> consists entirely of Replicas, not Signs. "Man" in English and "homme"
>>> in
>>> French are two Replicas of the same Sign, whose Reality is independent of
>>> any actual language.
>>> 4. That said, without language--or at least *some *kind of internal
>>> Symbol-system--how could the woman in your "far out example" *cognize
>>> *her fever as a "sign" that something is "off" in her body, rather
>>> than merely react instinctively?
>>> 5. I agree with you and Peirce that there is no pure 1ns, and also
>>> that there is no pure 2ns--3ns permeates Reality, which is what I take
>>> him
>>> to mean when he says that the Universe is "perfused with signs." That is
>>> precisely why I affirm #2.
>>> 6. I am not at all seeking to *eliminate *characters and qualities
>>> from semiosis--I am suggesting that their *metaphysical *role is
>>> that of Form, whereas a Sign is an Entelechy. Qualities are indeed
>>> everywhere, but they are not (in themselves) Signs.
>>>
>>> Jeff's point about recognizing and respecting the boundary between
>>> normative science and metaphysics is well-taken, but exactly where to draw
>>> that line is not always clear. I have noted all along the way that my
>>> current inquiry is focused on the metaphysics of concrete semiosis, not
>>> logic as semeiotic, but I will try to do a better job of maintaining the
>>> distinction.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 8:57 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon S, list,
>>>>
>>>> JAS: My current position is that *every *Sinsign *is *an individual
>>>> Replica of a general Sign, because *only *a general Sign can mediate
>>>> between an Object and Interpretant in a *genuine* triadic Relation. A
>>>> fever is the result of dyadic physical processes, and is only
>>>> *interpreted *as a sign of disease by virtue of a habit developed by
>>>> means of Collateral Experience.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I can't follow you here. I don't see why "*every *Sinsign *is *an
>>>> individual Replica of a general Sign, because *only *a general Sign
>>>> can mediate between an Object and Interpretant in a *genuine* triadic
>>>> Relation"
>>>>
>>>> For one thing, why is it necessary that there be a "general sign" in
>>>> all cases of sign action (this sounds almost legalistic--Legisigns, perhaps
>>>> esp. Symbols rule?) How, for example, does this work in biosemiosis?
>>>>
>>>> And why can "only a general Sign," by which I assume you mean a
>>>> Legisign (unless you further restrict "general sign" to one of the last
>>>> three sign classes in the 1903 classification, viz, rheme, dicisign,
>>>> argument) bring about a "genuine triadic relation" where the Sign mediates
>>>> between the Object and the Interpretant? It seems to me that sinsigns (with
>>>> embedded qualisigns) for example, natural signs, can do this as well. And
>>>> this seems to me that this is so even if one restricts oneself to human
>>>> sign interpretation.
>>>>
>>>> But, for a rather far out example, one can imagine a time before humans
>>>> had developed language when a fever--to use that example once again--was a
>>>> sign* to the person having the fever* (not even, say, someone
>>>> else--her mother--interpreting the fever based on collateral knowledge)
>>>> that something was not right with her body, her being. Not only in this
>>>> hypothetical case is language not available, but language (general Signs)
>>>> are not needed. As to the matter of replicas, it may be be that this is in
>>>> fact the very first fever she'd experienced, and yet the fever, the Sign of
>>>> something being 'off' in her body, was clear enough to her even lacking
>>>> collateral knowledge (OK, an outlandish example; but imagine one then in
>>>> the animal world).
>>>>
>>>> JAS: "I am having a very hard time imagining anything that a quality
>>>> as pure 1ns could possibly represent, other than itself in itself."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> First, Peirce is at pains to explain that there is no pure 1ns, that a
>>>> qualisign must be embedded (?) in another sign. Joe Ransdell even argued
>>>> that there are no pure Icons, that one ought rather speak of the
>>>> *iconic*. To my mind qualities are most certainly signs despite their
>>>> degenerate nature and their needing necessarily to be part of a less
>>>> degenerate sign. Signs within Signs.
>>>>
>>>> So, while I agree with Jeff that when considering matters of
>>>> theoretical logic (logica docens) that it is probably best to 'let go' of
>>>> (or bracket, if you will) our* metaphysica utens*, I see no reason why
>>>> we should attempt to do so (following Jeff) as regards what one might call
>>>> our *phaneronica utens*. And, indeed, quite the contrary given that
>>>> triadic semeiotic employs trichotomic phenomenology in an *essential*
>>>> way (there are a vast number of triadic relations in Peirce's semeiotic).
>>>> Phenomenology precedes Logic as Semeiotic as Metaphysics follows it in
>>>> Peirce's Classification of the Sciences.
>>>>
>>>> If the Universe is indeed perfused with signs, how in the world can one
>>>> pretend to eliminate all the characters and qualities and possibilities
>>>> which are the 1nses of this Cosmos in consideration of semiosis? Indeed,
>>>> they are probably the most prominent signs of all (when imbedded in
>>>> sinsigns), not only for human sign interpreters, but perhaps even much more
>>>> so for nature more generally, for plants and animals. I do not believe that
>>>> Peirce was wrong in positing the Qualisign as a Sign category, and I don't
>>>> see that he ever gave up the notion that it was indeed a Sign, albeit
>>>> degenerate in the extreme. Some practical phenomenology may be needed here,
>>>> in my opinion: Look at, smell a white carnation. Look at the colors of a
>>>> sunset on the horizon, bracketing off as much though as you can of your
>>>> thoughts (get into a meditative state of musement). *Feel some part of
>>>> your body*! Qualities are everywhere part of the semiosis happening in
>>>> the world, and abstract analyses have no power to convince me otherwise. My
>>>> semiosic experience includes qualisigns in an essential way.
>>>>
>>>> I agree with much of what Jeff said regarding the metaphysica utens
>>>> danger as he expressed it; I think it is quite real and possibly a serious
>>>> threat to research in the theoretical science of Logic as Semeiotic. But
>>>> so, in a kind of opposite way is the phaneronica utens danger: that we may
>>>> become so logically anthropocentric that our generalizations and
>>>> abstractions can take all the qualitative life out of our semiosic
>>>> experience. Indeed, as I see it, of the two, the latter may be the greater
>>>> danger.
>>>>
>>>> But, at least in some abstract sense, I applaud your inquiry, Jon,
>>>> including your latest diagram, as complex and, shall we say, 'ambitious' as
>>>> it and your inquiry is. It may yield important insights into the nature of
>>>> the extraordinarily complex semiosic process, at least from the theoretical
>>>> standpoint.
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>> Gary
>>>>
>>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>>> *Communication Studies*
>>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>>>
>>>
>
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