Helmut, Gary F., list,
Helmut wrote: "Now my guess about what is needed to call something "real"
or "being" or "ens" or "ontological" is a direct experience too."
I think that this is correct as long as one remembers that in Peirce's
understanding existential being is a matter of 2ns (so is *hic et nunc*)
while reality is a matter of 3ns (habituality, lawfulness, and so also has
its 'being' *in futuro*). So, what is "real" includes would-bes (3ns) as
well as is's (2ns) and may-bes (1ns).
Peirce uses the expression *lawfulness* as 3ns to suggest that those laws
which are embodied in existential structures will tend to be in effect in
the future, although, of course they may be modified and even evolve. The
idea that laws themselves (and not just biological structures) can evolve
is a relatively recent one which is being given more and more credence even
in physics.
So, to summarize: what is real (3ns) involves that which is existent (2ns)
which in turn involve characters, qualities, possibilities, etc. (1ns).
Consequently reality involves both existents and qualities, possibilities,
etc.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*
On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 12:01 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
>
> Thank you, Gary f., for correcting my use of the term "proof". I now
> recall, that K.O. Apel didn´t say "final proof", but "ultimate foundation"
> ("Letztbegründung") "of discourse ethics". He also wrote of
> "self-upstepping of reality" ("Selbstaufstufung der Realität") in this
> context. I think, this means a circular (retroductive) argument.
> I see that "proof of existence" needs direct experience. But I think, that
> this direct experience may also be in a premiss of a deductive argument- or
> even in a pre-premiss which has formed the premiss by a deductive argument,
> or a pre-pre-premiss...
> So the direct experience needed for calling something existent is a
> spatiotemporal one, I think.
> Now my guess about what is needed to call something "real" or "being" or
> "ens" or "ontological" is a direct experience too: The direct experience of
> fixation of belief by a retroduction ("self-upstepping of reality", maybe
> badly translated). Of course spatiotemporal direct experience does the job
> too, as existence is a subset of reality.
> Well, I am just trying to get the concepts in order. Existence is spatial,
> I think, and reality is functional.
>
> Best, Helmut
> 13. Mai 2018 um 17:07 Uhr
> g...@gnusystems.ca
> wrote:
>
> Helmut, since you ask,
>
> The only “proof of existence” is direct experience; no kind of reasoning
> is up to the task of verifying the genuine Secondness of anything that
> exists — as opposed to an *ens rationis*, which may or may not be *real*,
> but its reality is not that of an existing thing.
>
> Usually in logic, if not in religion, “proof” refers to a deductive
> argument, and that is the milieu in which a circular argument is invalid.
> Peirce’s “Neglected Argument” is much more retroductive than deductive.
>
> I think Peirce preferred not to use terms like “theism” or “theist” (or
> “deist”) because those are technical terms in theology. One thing Peirce
> apparently shared with William Fox is that they both became impatient with
> theology and simply avoided it as they grew older. “God” on the other hand
> is a vernacular term, and a supremely vague one (as Peirce pointed out more
> than once), so using “belief in God” rather than “theism” is a way of
> placing the matter in the realm of instinctive common sense, where he
> thought the concept of God belonged. If we regard his NA as deductive, we
> have to say that its premisses are that belief in a Creator is instinctive,
> and that such instinctive beliefs are more reliable than beliefs based on
> reasoning. Both of those premisses are questionable, in my opinion, but if
> we grant them, then the deductive argument has some validity. But the
> deductive argument is not the one that matters to Peirce anyway, as far as
> I can see.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } You can't depend on your judgment when your imagination is out of focus.
> [Mark Twain] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
> *Sent:* 13-May-18 04:22
>
>
> Gary, Gary, list,
>
> I understand that when it is about reality (of God), Peirce was a theist,
> and when it is about existence, not. Now i have a more general question
> about real versus existent:
>
> Is it so, that for the proof of reality a circular argument is valid, but
> for the proof of existence it is not?
>
> Examples for circular arguments that prove (or even create) a reality:
> K.O. Apel´s final proof of discourse ethics, Anselm´s God-proof.
>
> Best, Helmut
>
>
>
> Sonntag, 13. Mai 2018 um 06:35 Uhr
> "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *wrote:*
>
> Gary F, list,
>
>
>
> GF: After Gary’s post I did a quick search to see what Peirce might have
> to say about “theism” (the word). To the Century Dictionary he didn’t
> contribute a definition of it, but he did define an “atheist” as “One who
> denies the existence of God, or of a supreme intelligent being” (CD 1.362).
> Since Peirce consistently denied the existence (as opposed to the reality)
> of God, that would seem to make him an “atheist,” but I’m sure he never
> self-applied that term.
>
> On this list and elsewhere we've discussed how difficult it is (or how lax
> one can become) sometimes in discussing Reality without using words like
> 'is', 'existence', and so forth. Peirce sometimes expresses himself about
> matters pertaining to reality in such truly inappropriate existential
> language. So, you knowing this, I will assume that you are merely playing
> with words in what you wrote above. For if in Peircean terms one more
> properly defines an "atheist" as "One who denies the *reality* of God"
> Peirce was most certainly *not* an atheist.
>
> GF: I doubt that he self-applied the term “theist” either, though. Nor did
> I find him applying it to anyone else.
>
> That he did or did not self- or other-apply the word "theist" seems of
> little importance in my view. For, as Jon S. wrote today: "If Peirce was
> not a theist, then what other term should we use instead for someone who
> very explicitly, on more than one occasion, in no uncertain terms, affirmed
> his belief in the Reality of God? So, a theist, properly understood *in
> Peircean terms*, is simply one who believes in the Reality of God. In
> this sense Peirce was most certainly a theist.
>
> GF: So as Gary said, the “Peirce on God” page on my website probably tells
> us more about Peirce’s “theology” (he would not call it that!) than any
> other source I know of. The first sentence of the NA pretty well sums it up:
>
> “The word “God,” … is *the* definable proper name, signifying *Ens
> necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of
> Experience.” (I wish I knew more about *Ens necessarium* … )
>
> I too wish I knew more about *Ens Necessarium*. In his 1937 book, *Ends
> & Means, *Aldous Huxley offers a hint in remarking that a traditional
> theistic argument was "that if there is an *ens necessarium* it must be
> at the same time an *ens realissimum*."
>
>
>
> That certainly makes good sense for Peirce's theism!
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary R
>
>
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