Edwina, List: 1. Defining "God" and "Real" as Peirce did in CP 6.452-453, which of my premises is false, such that the conclusion is false?
2. The subject at hand is not what one *can *say, but what Peirce *did *say; he believed in God, *and *affirmed His Reality. 3. It is demonstrably false that "Peirce denies God as the Creator"; on the contrary, he explicitly affirmed it, over and over. Jon S. On Mon, May 14, 2018 at 4:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > JAS, list: > > 1] Your argument may be logically valid as a basic syllogism but its > premises could be false. The problem is: the terms: God, Real - are vague > and therefore, can mean anything that one subjectively wishes. > > 2] Yes - I suggest that one can say "I believe in god' and yet, deny god's > reality - since the terms are vague [god, reality]..Furthermore, such vague > beliefs are, in themselves, without anything other than emotional meaning > and strictly personal and subjective. > > 3] Peirce denies God as the Creator - instead, his complex semiosis means > that matter is always being created, Mind-as-Matter. > > Edwina > > On Mon 14/05/18 4:41 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina: > > This is one of two posts that I am sending more or less simultaneously; > please read the other one first. > > Here is the only formal argument that I offered below; note that it is > deductively valid. > > Someone who believes that God is Real is a theist. > Peirce believed that God is Real. > Therefore, Peirce was a theist. > > > Since you deny the conclusion, which premise do you deny? The first is a > straightforward definition, and the second is something that Peirce > explicitly affirmed. > > 1. Are you seriously suggesting that someone can say, "I believe in God," > and yet deny that God is Real? That strikes me as completely incoherent. > > 2. Again, I stated quite plainly, " a theist is by definition someone > who believes in God." Are you operating with some other idiosyncratic > definition of "theist"? > > 3. Peirce explicitly defined both "God" and "Real" at the beginning of "A > Neglected Argument," and plainly described God (so defined) as being " in > my belief Really [so defined] creator of all three Universes of > Experience" (CP 6.452-453). "Theistic God" is redundant; what kind of God > could possibly be "non-theistic"? If what you are really questioning is > whether Peirce believed in a personal God, then there is likewise no need > to speculate. > > CSP: The mere carrying out of predetermined purposes is mechanical. > This remark has an application to the philosophy of religion. It is that a > genuine evolutionary philosophy, that is, one that makes the principle of > growth a primordial element of the universe, is so far from being > antagonistic to the idea of a personal creator that it is really > inseparable from that idea; while a necessitarian religion is in an > altogether false position and is destined to become disintegrated. But a > pseudo-evolutionism which enthrones mechanical law above the principle of > growth is at once scientifically unsatisfactory, as giving no possible hint > of how the universe has come about, and hostile to all hopes of personal > relations to God. (CP 6.157; 1892, emphasis added) > > CSP: A difficulty which confronts the synechistic philosophy is this. In > considering personality, that philosophy [synechism] is forced to accept > the doctrine of a personal God; but in considering communication, it > cannot but admit that if there is a personal God, we must have a direct > perception of that person and indeed be in personal communication with him. > Now, if that be the case, the question arises how it is possible that the > existence of this being should ever have been doubted by anybody. The only > answer that I can at present make is that facts that stand before our face > and eyes and stare us in the face are far from being, in all cases, the > ones most easily discerned. That has been remarked from time immemorial. > (CP 6.162; 1892, emphasis added) > > CSP: But when a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just > as sure of their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a > metaphysical theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego. In like > manner, when a man has that experience with which religion sets out, he > has as good reason--putting aside metaphysical subtilties--to believe in > the living personality of God as he has to believe in his own . Indeed, > belief is a word inappropriate to such direct perception. (CP 6.436; 1893, > emphasis added) > > > 4. There has to be some common denominator that warrants categorizing all > theists as theists; such is the nature of any general term. Peirce's > point was that this common denominator is necessarily vague, rather than > definite. Demanding "evidence of what exactly a 'vague concept of God' > specifically means" is self-contradictory; "vague" is the opposite of > "exact" and "specific." > > 5. The Five Ways are indeed deductively valid, but this merely entails > that their conclusions follow necessarily from their premises. Can you > provide evidence that all Christians subscribe to every single one of > those premises? On the contrary, I am a Christian, but neither a Roman > Catholic nor a Thomist; consequently, while I certainly embrace some of > Aquinas's premises, I do not hold to all of them. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Mon, May 14, 2018 at 1:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> JAS, list: >> >> Those are all circular and thus invalid arguments. >> >> 1] To equate someone who says: 'I believe in God' with a claim that this >> person is also saying: 'God is Real' - is an invalid argument - both >> syllogistically and informally, [the latter since the terms of 'real' >> and god are undefined'.] and syllogistically since thee are only two terms >> :god/real] >> >> 2] To equate someone who says: 'I believe in God' to be a 'theist' is >> also an invalid argument, since yet again, the terms 'theist' and God are >> not defined. >> >> 3] You can't claim that the use of the terms '[God, Real] are the same >> for everyone - so, your assertion that Peirce's 'God' is a theistic God - >> is unfounded. >> >> 4] Please provide evidence for your assertion that 'a vague conception of >> God that is common to most or all theists". I am not aware of such evidence >> and await your proof. Please also provide evidence of what exactly a 'vague >> concept of God' specifically means! >> >> My understanding of Peirce's equation of God with Mind is a very specific >> equation. Nothing vague about it at all. >> >> And please provide evidence that the Five Ways - which is a famous >> argument which you seem to be unaware of - is held by only a certain subset >> of Christians and held only by the use of Authority rather than Reason. >> [Note - I don't accept the Five Ways - but, that doesn't take away from >> their deductive validity]. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Mon 14/05/18 1:19 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> When someone says, "I believe in God," it is bordering on the >> ridiculous to assert that the person is not saying that God is Real; and it >> is completely ridiculous to claim that the person is not a theist, since >> a theist is by definition someone who believes in God. It gets worse >> for your position, though--in Peirce's case, he stated not only that he >> believed in God, but also--quite explicitly--that he believed God to be >> Real. There is simply no getting around this--someone who believes that >> God is Real is a theist, and Peirce believed that God is Real; therefore, >> Peirce was a theist. >> >> The allegation that there is "a multitude of descriptions" of God is a >> red herring. Again, Peirce quite deliberately argued for a vague conception >> of God that is common to most or all theists, while the Five Ways advocate >> a definite conception of God that is held only by a certain subset of >> Christians. The latter do not at all deal with "different subjective >> descriptions of the term 'God'," but a very specific definition; and they >> are strictly "Authoritative" only for Roman Catholic Thomists. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSch midt >> <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 9:16 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Hey, John - you forgot: Happy Mother's Day. >>> >>> [mutter, mutter, seethe, fume...if my kids ever did that..mutter, >>> mutter]. >>> >>> By the way - I fully agree with your comments. I think it is bordering >>> on the ridiculous to declare that because someone says: >>> >>> "I believe in God'..that this means that 'God is Real'..and that this >>> person is also a theist...[That's a reverse and invalid Argument]...\\ >>> >>> ..and then, when asked to define the term. people.come up with a >>> multitude of descriptions which differ from those of other people - So, we >>> cannot conclude, as some would like to conclude: That God is Real. Nor can >>> we conclude that these people are all 'theists'. >>> >>> That's what the 'Five Ways' was meant to deal with; the different >>> subjective descriptions of the term 'God'. It certainly set up the >>> Authoritative definition of the Church, but as purely rhetorical it >>> doesn't, in my view, have any validity as an Argument. >>> >>> So- I think it remains; belief in God is subjective and the definition >>> of God is equally subjective. Therefore - to move from the subjective to >>> the objective [ie to declare that God is Real]...can't be done. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Sun 13/05/18 9:41 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent: >>> >>> On 5/13/2018 8:50 AM, John Collier wrote: >>> > I am afraid I do not find these arguments coherent with anything >>> > I was taught to be God. >>> >>> I recall a survey some years ago in which the interviewers asked >>> people two questions: (1) Do you believe in God? (2) How would >>> you describe God? >>> >>> What they found: No two people described God in the same way. >>> The descriptions by believers and non-believers showed the same >>> amount of variation. And from the way God was described, they >>> couldn't reliably distinguish believers from non-believers. >>> >>> This was not a statistically reliable survey. And very few >>> of the people they surveyed had studied any philosophical >>> or theological arguments. >>> >>> But from my own experience, I find it convincing. And from hearing >>> or reading what people who have studied philosophy or theology say, >>> I suspect that the results would have been the same, independently >>> of how much they had thought, read, or studied. >>> >>> Happy Sunday, Sabbath, Meditation Day, or Picnic Day to all, >>> >>> John >>> >>>
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