Gary F., List: GF: Is the continuous predicate still a *rheme* when all the ‘matter’ has been extracted from its ‘form’, so that nothing is left but an infinitely recursive “is in the relation to”?
I would say no. A Rheme not only must have at least one blank *empty*, but also at least one blank *filled*; it must have *either *breadth or depth, just not *both*. That is one of the reasons why I see breadth (Matter/subjects) and depth (*qualitative *Form/predicates) as different aspects of a Sign's Object, and its *logical *form (Entelechy/continuous copula) as pertaining to its Interpretant. The presence of at least one blank in the latter is why a Rheme is, “for its Interpretant, a Sign of qualitative Possibility,” rather than "actual existence" (EP 2:292; 1903). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Jul 4, 2018 at 12:27 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, you asked, > > “How would you spell out the difference between a Rheme and a Seme? What > would be an example of something that is a Seme, but not a Rheme?” > > I think Bellucci gives a very lucid explanation of the two-stage process > of generalization that went from term/proposition/argument to > rheme/dicisign/argument and then to seme/pheme/delome. But while his > explanation of the difference between dicisign and pheme is all that could > be asked for, his explanation of the difference between Rheme and Seme is > perhaps less thorough, so I might have a crack at that. > > I see two focal points in Peirce’s discussion of the Rheme. One is the > definition in NDTR: “A *Rheme* is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is > a Sign of qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing > such and such a kind of possible Object.” The other arises in the context > of Existential Graphs as representations of propositions: > > [[ If we take any proposition, say > > A sinner kills a saint > > and if we erase portions of it, so as to leave it a *blank form* of > proposition, the *blanks* being such that if every one of them is filled > with a proper name, a proposition will result, such as > > ______ kills a saint > A sinner kills ______ > ______ kills ______ > > where *Cain* and *Abel* might for example fill the blanks, then such a > blank form, as well as the complete proposition, is called a *rheme* …. > If it has one blank it is called a *monad* rheme, if two a *dyad*, if > three a *triad*, if none a *medad* (from μηδέν). ] Lowell Lecture 2 ] > > [[ By a *rheme*, or *predicate*, will here be meant a blank form of > proposition which might have resulted by striking out certain parts of a > proposition, and leaving a *blank* in the place of each, the parts > stricken out being such that if each blank were filled with a proper name, > a proposition (however nonsensical) would thereby be recomposed. ] CP > 4.560 (1906)] > > Is this the same “rheme” which is defined in NDTR as “a Sign of > qualitative Possibility” which “is understood as representing such and such > a kind of possible Object”? The latter sounds much more like a *subject* > than a *predicate*, as far as the parts of a proposition are concerned. > In the ordinary analysis of propositions, the *rheme* corresponds to the > *predicate*, and the proper names that fill the blanks are *subjects*; > the -adicity of the predicate is the number of subjects. In EGs, the > “blanks” become “hooks” or “pegs”, and the filling of a blank becomes the > attachment of a line of identity (denoting an *existing individual*) to a > hook; that is why only *proper names* such as “Cain” or “Abel” can fill > the blanks. Common nouns, on the other hand, appear to be parts of the > rheme, i.e. of the predicate, rather than blank-fillers, because their > reference is general. The predicate signifies the form of the relations > among the subjects, and the linguistic expression of the predicate includes > both nouns and verbs. (This is the case in English, but according to > Peirce, this is a peculiarity of the group of languages to which English > belongs: “I have been led to believe that in very few languages outside the > Aryan group is the common noun a well-developed and independent part of > speech” (EP2:309; see also CP 8.337, a 1904 letter to Welby). The > representation of relations in *verbal* form is thus more universal among > languages than the nominalization we find in “the Aryan group”.) > > But that is not the only way to analyze a proposition, as Peirce explained > a 1908 letter to Welby: > > [[ When we have analyzed a proposition so as to throw into the subject > everything that can be removed from the predicate, all that it remains for > the predicate to represent is the form of connection between the different > subjects as expressed in the propositional *form*. What I mean by > “everything that can be removed from the predicate” is best explained by > giving an example of something not so removable. But first take something > removable. “Cain kills Abel.” Here the predicate appears as “_______ kills > _______ .” But we can remove killing from the predicate and make the latter > “_______ stands in the relation _______ to _______.” Suppose we attempt to > remove more from the predicate and put the last into the form “_______ > exercizes the function of relate of the relation _______ to _______” and > then putting the function of relate to the relation into another subject > leave as predicate “_______ exercizes _______ in respect to _______ to > _______.” But this “exercizes” expresses “exercizes the function.” Nay > more, it expresses “exercizes the function of relate,” so that we find that > though we may put this into a separate subject, it continues in the > predicate just the same. Stating this in another form, to say that ‘A is in > the relation R to B’ is to say that A is in a certain relation to R. Let us > separate this out thus: “A is in the relation R1 (where R1 is the > relation of a relate to the relation of which it is the relate,) to R to > B.” But A is here said to be in a certain relation to the relation R1. So > that we can express the same fact by saying “A is in the relation R1 to > the relation R1 to the relation R to B,” and so on *ad infinitum*. A > predicate which can thus be analyzed into parts all homogeneous with the > whole I call a *continuous predicate*. It is very important in logical > analysis, because a continuous predicate obviously cannot be a *compound* > except of continuous predicates, and thus when we have carried analysis so > far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it to its > ultimate elements. ] SS 71-2 ] > > Here not only the common nouns but the *verbs* (e.g. “kills”) get thrown > into the subject. What happens then to the *rheme*? Is the continuous > predicate still a *rheme* when all the ‘matter’ has been extracted from > its ‘form’, so that nothing is left but an infinitely recursive “is in the > relation to”? As far as I know, Peirce does not call that a “rheme” — in > fact he no longer uses the term in his classification of signs after 1906. > Perhaps that’s because a classification of signs tends to represent the > various parameters by which they are classified as if they were *discrete > signs in themselves*, each with its own object and interpretant, and this > doesn’t align easily with the analysis which arrives at *continuity* as > an “ultimate element.” > > The concept of *Seme*, on the other hand, “embraces the logical Term, the > Subject or Object of a sentence, everything of any kind, be it a man or a > scribed character, such as h or Pb, which will serve or is supposed to > serve, for some purpose, as a substitute for its Object. It is a Sign which > pretends, at least, to intend to be virtually its Object” (R 295 [Bellucci > 315-16]). This would, I suppose, include “a Sign of qualitative > Possibility” but also a whole lot more. Also, it is more Subject than > Predicate — perhaps the result of “throwing into the subject everything > that can be removed from the predicate,” as if Peirce was anticipating in > 1906 the result of a method of analysis he would spell out only later. > > In fact, Peirce may have vaguely anticipated this already in R 800, which > was apparently written *before* NDTR. The trichotomy which in NDTR is > rheme/dicisign/argument appears in R 800 as *substitute*/dicisign/argument. > > > [[ A *substitute* is a sign whose proper interpretant ignores all > difference between the sign and its object (and *a fortiori* all > difference between the sign and its interpretant). Thus, if I say, “King > Edward is ill,” the name “King Edward” is intended directly to raise the > idea of the man himself, and the less the interpreter thinks of the name as > distinct from the thing the more completely is his attention directed to > the intended meaning. ] R 800 (Bellucci 257) ] > > That sounds more like a Seme than a Rheme. Anyway, I hope this answers > your question, Jon, about the difference between and Rheme and a Seme, > though it may not be relevant to the other ground you covered in your post. > On those other matters I don’t seem to have anything much worth posting. > > Gary f. >
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