Gary F., List: Yes, those are Peirce's own page numbers.
Jon S. On Sat, Jul 21, 2018 at 8:11 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, > > > > Thanks for this, I will add it … you cite “200:E94-E97” — does that refer > to Peirce’s own numbering of the pages in R 200? It is useful in its way of > bringing the “principle of contradiction” into the same context with > “direct experience.” > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 20-Jul-18 20:08 > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object > > > > Gary F., List: > > > > Later in the same portion of R 200 that I just referenced regarding > logical depth and signification, between CP 6.347 and CP 6.348--in fact, > immediately prior to the latter--Peirce provided this discussion of direct > vs. indirect experience. > > CSP: Direct experience is experience then and there. Indirect > experience is an indication by means of a relation to a direct experience. > Thus, if one speaks of yesterday, the interpreter will know what is meant > only by its relation to the time-date that is present to him. If a length > is expressed by its ratio to a metre, since it is very unlikely that the > interpreter is at that moment gazing upon the prototype metre in the > Pavillon de Breteuil, in the Park of St. Cloud,--and even if he were, mere > gazing would not be the experience required to acquaint him with, say, > 0.0254 of a metre, it seems to be quite impossible to make the experience > quite direct. For example, I once carried a yard-bar, which I had compared > with the particular interval on a certain brass bar called the "Troughton > scale," which had for generations been the basis of all American > specifications of lengths in the English system,--I carried this to > Westminster and compared it with the prototype yard. The operation > occupied some weeks; and after the observations were complete, it still > remained to make the necessary calculations. Clearly, there was no point > of time in which I was under a direct experience of the ratio of the > American to the British yard. If my result was published, as it must have > been in due time, it was the inferential result of the combination of > hundreds of observations each made under extraordinary precautions. All > scientific experience is of that kind. Indeed, it is not regarded by > scientific men as being satisfactory unless it combines the direct > experiences of different observers. Direct experience is far too vague or > uncertain to be admitted among the number of scientific results. Of > course, the most cogent experience, the experience that least violates the > principle of contradiction (I mean by this bizarre expression that, for > example, one of the least vague of scientific experiences is that an inch > is *somewheres* in the neighborhood of 2.54 centimetres; but any one > value from 2.53999 to 2.54001 was, at my last advices, about as true, > considered as the result of scientific experience, as any other, although > according to the *principle of contradiction*, but a single answer to any > single question can be true.). Indeed, *direct* experience is a sort of > figment, in one sense, although it is the basis of all certitude. If I am > making a chemical weighing, I set down a figure which goes a little beyond > the sensitiveness of my balance. According to the usual theory of errors, > which is, itself, only a convenient substitute for a knowledge that I do > not possess, the average of a hundred weighings (with a rider which enables > me to express the result considerably more accurately than any weighing can > be made,) should be ten times as accurate as a single weighing. Upon the > same principle, a scientific result that is regarded a single experience is > far superior to a direct experience, although it is derived from direct > experience by a process of which we know,--though we do not know much about > it,--that it is not strictly defensible. (R 200:E94-E97; 1908) > > I thought that you might like to add this to the collection on your > website. > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Mon, Jun 4, 2018 at 12:28 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > > List, > > While working on my transcription of Lowell Lecture 6 from the manuscript > on the SPIN site (https://www.fromthepage.com/j > effdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-472-1903-lowell-lecture-vi), I came > across what strikes me as a key passage in it, and what struck me as a key > term in it: *“direct experience”*. To get a more exact sense of what > Peirce meant by that term, I collected several passages where Peirce had > used it in other contexts and arranged them in chronological order (they > date from 1893 to 1903). I found the resulting collection so interesting > that I’ve now included it in the Peirce resources on my website: > http://www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm#dirxp. It throws a direct light, so > to speak, on Peirce’s phenomenology. > >
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