Gary F, list:
I am saying that I understand [I think] your interpretation of the
rheme as lacking an Immediate Object- and it makes sense to me -
which is why I said it was a logical analysis. After all, if the
semiosic interaction is not direct [indexical] - then, one does
indeed have to ask: Where's the DO? It could be hidden! And how
could there be an IO? But- if a rheme [Interpretant in a mode of
Firstness] also exists - then, one has to ask: how did such an
Interpretant emerge? What's its informational base? Therefore - -
my question has been whether the informational stimulus for this
rheme can be found in the future of the semiosic process. This would
enable abduction. I note that you have not replied to this question.
As for your rejection of the triad of IO/R/II - which you say is
non-Peircean, I reject your conclusion. Since we know that the
Peircean semiosis is triadic - and is usually defined as O-R-I
[Object/Representamen/Interpretant] - then, to clarify this set into
its six parts: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI is quite valid- and most certainly
has been thoroughly and extensively analyzed by Peirce. And- to
separate this set of six 'nodes' into the external and internal
processes is equally valid. Peirce himself was quite specific about
the fact of external and internal processes. The set of IO-R-II is
INTERNAL to the Receiver/Site B - or whatever you want to call it in
this semiosic interaction. I consider the full semiosic Sign - which
thus is dialogic and interactional - to be this full set - made up
of three internal, [IO/R/II]; the other three are external processes.
But - my definition of 'the Sign' is not confined to this internal
set of IO/R/II. I have always [unlike Jon] included the DO as
necessary within the semiosic process. There need not be a DI - at
this current time. And there need not be an FI - at this current
time. However, the semiosic process must, at some time, provide for
all aspects of the full six parts of the semiosic process.
Edwina
On Sun 24/06/18 5:49 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Gary R,
You appear to have reacted to my post without reading it to the end
— otherwise you couldn’t have said that I “ completely ignore
here that Peirce writes that a Rheme will perhaps "afford some
information."” This is simply not true, as you will see if you read
the latter part of my post. You on the other hand appear to ignore the
crucial part of Peirce’s definition of a rheme, namely that “it is
not interpreted as doing so.” This is crucial because Peirce’s
third trichotomy of signs in the Syllabus (rheme/dicisign/argument)
is defined by Peirce in terms of their interpretants, not in terms of
the nature of their objects.
I might add that Jon’s (and Edwina’s) notion of the “Sign”
as IO/R/II, a notion not found in Peirce, is another source of
confusion for the inquiry into what an Immediate Object is. But I’d
rather focus on Peirce’s own definitions.
Gary F.
From: Gary Richmond
Sent: 24-Jun-18 16:33
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object
Jon S, Gary F, list,
I've just discarded the greater part of a draft of a response to
Gary F which I was formulating as you, Jon, say much better than I
would have, and you include more pertinent analysis than I was
considering in this matter. So for now I will only note that I fully
concur with your analysis.
Gary F wrote:
Your discussion of rhemes in your response to Jeff includes a quote
(from the Syllabus) which I think could throw some light on the
distinction between dynamic and immediate objects. It’s Peirce’s
definition of the rheme:
[[ A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of
qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such
and such a kind of possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford
some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. ]]
That last sentence clarifies the rheme/dicisign distinction, because
dicisigns, sometimes called by Peirce “informational signs,” are
interpreted as affording information, while rhemes are not. The
crucial point here is that in order to convey information, a sign
must have an actual object, i.e. must have breadth as well as depth,
extension as well as intension. The reason that a rheme is not
interpreted as affording information is that it is not interpreted as
directing attention to an actual object, as a dicisign is, by
definition.
You completely ignore here that Peirce writes that a Rheme will
perhaps "afford some information." Again, as I, Jon S and, I think,
Jeff have argued contra your assertion above (that "a sign must have
an actual object"), Rhemes may offer possible information about the DO
which later may be interpreted. Rhemes much less frequently than not,
it seems to me, are parts of dicisigns
.
(In reading one of Edwina's recent posts, I thought that for
biosemiosis that the Rheme is probably never
found apart from a dicisign
.)
Still, at least for Anthroposemiotics, the information which they
might afford as rheme is real enough and will possibly--even
probably--be of considerable significance when the rheme or term
finds its place in a proposition. Indeed, because of the rheme's
vague connotations (if that's the right word) the pertinent
information that it contains will not be clear until it is included
in a proposition. But that doesn't mean that there is no information
in the Rheme whatsover, and a close reading of the snippet we're
discussing strongly suggests that there is information perhaps to be
interpreted later.
In my view, the reason that the rheme is not interpreted as
affording information is principally because that information is
vague until it is contextualized (typically for Anthroposemiotics, in
a proposition). My example of the quite varied possible information
that the rheme '-is a book' holds suggests that vagueness, I believe.
To assert, as you have, that it offers no information, is not
supported by the Peirce quote.
And while I earlier had some little doubts concerning the language
you used, Jon, to express this basic description of a Sign (one
question remains: see below), I have come to a greater appreciation
of your expression of what a Sign does.
JAS: ". . . a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns),
signifies some of that Object's characters/qualities
(Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitute its Immediate
Object--and determines its Interpretants to represent the unity of
Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns)."
That little remaining doubt: Peirce says that the Object (within the
sign, the Immediate Object) determines the Representamen which, in
turn, determines the Interpretant. In the quotation above you omit
the Representamen in your analysis. This would seem to conflate the
IO and the R (which may be the case as in consideration of triadic
semiosis we are not discussing three units any more than we are in a
discussion of the flow of Time such that we absolutely separate
Past/Present/Future). But would you explain why the Representamen is
not included in your formulation whatsoever?
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
718 482-5690
On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 3:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Gary F., List:
GF: The real question for inquiry, in my view, is What is an
immediate object?
In simplest terms, the IO is "the Object as the Sign itself
represents it" (CP 4.536; 1906). Therefore, if a Sign does not have
an IO, then it does not represent its Object at all--which is clearly
absurd, since a Sign is defined as something that represents its
Object.
GF: The crucial point here is that in order to convey information,
a sign must have an actual object, i.e. must have breadth as well as
depth, extension as well as intension.
But the Dynamic Object of a Dicisign/Pheme need not be actual
(Existent), it can also be general (Necessitant); and the Dynamic
Object of a Rheme/Seme need not be Possible, it can also be actual
(e.g., a proper name) or general (e.g., a common noun). So the
difference between a Dicisign/Pheme and a Rheme/Seme is not solely
to be found in the nature of the Dynamic (or Immediate) Object, since
the only difference in that regard is that a Rheme/Seme can have a
Dynamic and/or Immediate Object that is merely Possible.
The issue, or at least a key aspect of it, seems to be whether the
depth of a Sign belongs to its Object or to its Interpretant. You
(and Bellucci) apparently ascribe only the breadth to the Object and
the depth to the Interpretant. My view is that breadth (Matter) and
depth (Form) are two different aspects of the Object, while
information as their product belongs to the Interpretant--i.e., the
two dimensions are only brought together in and by the Sign
(Entelechy).
I see this as evident in Peirce's concept of the continuous
predicate--the purely logical relation that is left over when
everything that fills its blanks is "thrown into the subject." This
is the end of analysis precisely because it fully isolates the
components of the Object (both subjects and predicates) from the
Interpretant that brings them together in a certain way.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 8:13 AM, wrote:
Gary R, list,
To clarify: I do think a debate over whether “every sign has an
immediate object” or “only dicisigns have immediate objects” is
pointless, for reasons I’ve already given regarding the importance
of context, but mostly because taking either side in the debate
presupposes a fixed opinion about what an immediate object is. The
real question for inquiry, in my view, is What is an immediate
object? — taking that to be a technical term, and an important one,
in Peircean semiotic. As Jeff has suggested, one fruitful approach to
that inquiry is to ask Why did Peirce find it necessary in 1904 to
make an explicit distinction between the dynamic and immediate
objects of a sign? That is the approach Bellucci has taken, and so
has Stjernfelt in Natural Propositions, 3.13 (p. 96 ff.) That is the
passage you (Gary) asked me to point to where Stjernfelt deals with
immediate objects. (There may be others, but I know you have a copy
of the book, and that passage will do nicely.)
You ask whether I agree “with Bellucci's characterization of
Peirce's dynamic object as being akin to Frege's Bedeutung
(reference) and his immediate object being akin to Frege's Sinn
(sense) ”. That of course is the interpretation that Bellucci is
arguing against in his paper; and I do accept that characterization
of “the Fregean interpretation,” and take it to be equivalent
with the position you and Jon are taking in the debate that I don’t
want to engage in. You may find, if you download and read the paper,
that it differs from your position in some respects. I just used it
as a convenient label for your position, that’s all — one that
you would recognize if you’ve read Bellucci on this issue.
Your discussion of rhemes in your response to Jeff includes a quote
(from the Syllabus) which I think could throw some light on the
distinction between dynamic and immediate objects. It’s Peirce’s
definition of the rheme:
[[ A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of
qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such
and such a kind of possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford
some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. ]]
That last sentence clarifies the rheme/dicisign distinction,
because dicisigns, sometimes called by Peirce “informational
signs,” are interpreted as affording information, while rhemes are
not. The crucial point here is that in order to convey information, a
sign must have an actual object, i.e. must have breadth as well as
depth, extension as well as intension. The reason that a rheme is
not interpreted as affording information is that it is not
interpreted as directing attention to an actual object, as a dicisign
is, by definition. This point is closely related to one that Peirce
makes in the Lowell Lecture 5 when he introduces graphs of graphs:
[[ It is essential to a graph or any other expression of a
proposition that it should be represented by its interpretant sign to
be true. But to say that it is true implies that it really is affected
by its object; and in order that this object should have a real effect
upon it, this object must be a subject of force, which is an
individual. Consequently, an adequate interpretant of a graph must
represent it as a sign of an individual. How, then, can there be a
graph of a graph , considering that a graph is a legisign, or sign
which has the mode of being of a general type, just as any word is a
general type, and not a single individual object in a single definite
place at a single instant. The answer is that a graph can only have a
graph for its object indirectly. Directly, it can only refer to a
graph replica. But it can assert what it asserts of any graph-replica
you please so long as it be equivalent to a given graph replica. ]R
470 CSP 126-8]
The point about a rheme is that it is not interpreted as being
really affected by its object, but only “understood as representing
such and such a kind of possible Object.” Give it an actual object
by making it a part of a dicisign, and it will afford the depth
component of the information conveyed by that dicisign. But in the
absence of some part of the sign indicating what that information is
about, it can’t be interpreted as informational.
I take this as relevant background to an inquiry into the nature of
the “immediate object.” Whether you choose to make use of it for
that purpose is, of course, up to you.
Gary f.
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