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On Wed 25/07/18 5:45 PM , Gary Richmond [email protected]
sent:
Edwina, Helmut, Gary f, Jon S, list,
1] GARY R I've hesitated writing this as we've been through it
before on the list, and I don't expect my observations to change
anyone's mind. However, I think some points warrant comment as, in my
view, they impact at least on the progress of list discussion and,
perhaps, on inquiry more generally.
Edwina wrote:
My view is that we, all of us, are operating in the 'DI phase of
analysis'. The Dynamic Interpretant. None of us, are at the FI, Final
Interpretant, or 'ultimate truth' phase - and, as Peirce pointed out -
that's rarely reached.
But Peirce also pointed out that science makes undeniable progress
and that there are many signs and actual examples of this progress in
the laws it has discovered. These have, for example, made myriad
technologies possible. Such laws at least--and the fruits of
them--have been firmly established through experimental testing and,
beyond that, by their providing the basis for these aforementioned
technologies.
So, for example, even if it is true that Newtonian physics has been
at least partially superseded theoretically, the laws that Newton and
his followers discovered made possible useful technologies that are
still being invented based on them to this day. So while you are
quite correct in suggesting that arriving at the 'ultimate Truth' in
science is rarely--I'd suggest, never--reached from one standpoint,
from another real-world standpoint, many minor 'truths' (for example,
those mechanical laws which have resulted in the development of
technologies) have been discovered and will continue to be
discovered.
EDWINA: I'm not talking about hard science, i.e., the natural laws
of physics, etc - where indeed, 'ultimate Truth' about issues in
physics, chemistry, etc exist and can be finalized. I'm talking about
the theoretical outlines of Peircean thought dealing with philosophy,
metaphysics, pragmatism etc - none of which can be said to operate
within Natural Laws. The analysis of these theories is necessarily
always, in the 'DI phase of analysis'. There may ultimately be
consensus - which is not the same as an acknowledgment of an
Objective Natural Law - but, this consensus, following Popper, has to
be kept open to fallibility.
2. GARY R: Edwina continued:
Therefore, none of us can claim to act as 'the gatekeeper', as the
ultimate accepted articulators and explainers of The Real True
Peirce. And therefore, none of us can claim that we alone are using
Peirce in an 'ethical manner' - since we are each equal in our
exploration of his work.
From my vantage point as moderator of Peirce-L, no one here is ever
prohibited from expressing opinions in the forum; rather, everyone
here is indeed encouraged to express and defend reasonable opinions
regarding Peirce's writings. In my view this ought include there
being no prohibition against some list member expressing his or her
considered judgment that another list member is, say, misusing
Peirce's terminology or even misinterpreting Peirce's writings. After
all, not all opinions and views can sustain intense examination. That
is, some may need some tweaking, or may even be essentially
incorrect. Another way of saying this is that Peirce-L is intended to
be a forum for discussion and dialogue, and no statement made here
ought be treated as immune from substantive challenges by members of
the forum.
EDWINA; Agreed - no statement should be immune from challenges. The
key is: the nature of the challenge. There should be, of course, no
prohibition against someone saying: "I consider that you are misusing
Peirce's terminology or misinterpreting Peirce's writings". The key
wording is the phrase: I consider. This sets up the interaction as
one between two individuals, each with a different perspective. Other
equally valid phrases that convey the same intention of individualism
would be: "In my view..you are not using Peirce's view correctly';
Or, "I feel that;....Or..."My own view differs from yours'.
But- when a poster instead sets up their view as representing the
Final Truth - and instead says, conclusively: "Your outline is
unPeircean'. Or "Your outline violates the ethics of Peirce's
terminology"......that rhetoric sets up the poster as self-defining
his view as The conclusive Truth. All that is needed, is a step down
from hubris..and a sense of equality - so that the poster can say:
"In my view, your outline is unPeircean'. That's all. Not a huge
change in words, but a HUGE change in perspective.
3] GARY R Edwina continued:
Most certainly, as such, we can adamantly agree or disagree with the
'DI Interpretations' of others on this list and elsewhere - but, in
all cases, I think that such agreement/disagreement remains at the DI
level - i.e., all one can say is: ' I disagree with your
interpretation; I have a very different interpretation' - and never
move into the FI level where one says: - 'you are unPeircean and not
using his terms in a correct manner'.
Edwina, it seems to me that you have missed the irony that you
yourself are setting yourself up as "gatekeeper" in, for example,
seemingly prohibiting anyone making the case that someone's use of
Peirce's terminology is inconsistent with Peirce's own. It seems to
me--and not only from list discussions, but also from my reading in
the Peirce secondary literature over the years--that it is not the
opinion of many, at least, that Peirce's definitions of certain terms
are so vague that virtually any interpretation of them is valid. (This
is in no way to suggest that it is not the case that all symbols are
indeterminate to some degree.)
EDWINA; No, I am critiquing the action of gatekeeping. Again - see
my comment above. All that is needed from posters is a change in
perspective and rhetoric, where a poster can acknowledge that his
views - are his. They may be more intellectually and functionally
valid than my views are; they may be a much stronger and more
accurate interpretation of Peirce than my views are - but - the key
is, for each poster to acknowledge that they are HIS views, and not
the Official Interpretation of Peirce.
4] GARY R So, taking up a recent post of Gary Fuhrman with which you
were in general disagreement, I would say that it is a fact that
Peirce never called the Sign itself a triad--what is triadic is its
relation to its Object and Interpretant.
In addition, Peirce never characterized the Representamen as a part
of the Sign, but rather as equivalent to it; or, in places, as a
generalization of it which doesn't necessarily have a mental
Interpretant.
Further, he never described the Dynamic Object as a component of the
Sign, but rather as something that is external to the Sign and
independent of any Sign meant to represent it.
So, it is not only Gary's but also my opinion that your position in
these particular matters is contradicted by Peirce's clear usage.
EDWINA With regard to 'the Sign' as a triad - my view, as I have
frequently pointed out, refers to the whole set of interactions among
the three: object-representamen/sign [lower case 's'] and
-interpretant. The full triad, I refer to as the Sign [capital S]. I
do this because I consider that this triadic interaction creates a
specific singular Mind/Matter instantiation. So, not merely a word,
such as 'Hello' is a Sign, a Mind/Matter instantiation derived from a
triadic process, but so is a paramecium, an insect, a tree. I'm not
going to cherry-pick quotes from Peirce about this triadic
interaction, and its results and about the nature of Mind/Matter -
since his comments on these issues are found all throughout his work.
With regard to the Representamen - you and I are not understanding
each other: I am saying that the Representamen is the mediate process
in the triad - the full triad of the Sign - and again, such an
analysis of its mediation is found all through Peirce. That is, I am
emphasizing that the triadic semiosic process actually creates
some-thing. I refer to this some-thing that it creates as a Sign
[capital S]. I don't think enough attention is paid to the powerful
generative force that is semiosis.
And my view of the Dynamic Object - and this is also found
throughout Peirce - is that that triadic semiosic interaction doesn't
take place except when one unit of Mind/Matter interacts with another
unit of Mind/Matter...which latter is then defined as the Dynamic
Object. So- it is a necessary part/component of the full semiosic
triadic process.
5] GARY R Further, it was the view of Peirce and is the view of many
Peirce scholars--including several here--that it is important to
maintain a distinction between semeiotic (or logical) analysis and
metaphysical analysis. Only the latter concerns the Reality of
Signs/Objects/Interpretants, while the discussion in this and related
threads has rather strictly concerned the former, that is, logical
analysis.
EDWINA; I'm not sure of your point with the above comment.
6] GARY R Finally, I am not the only one who has found your labeling
of Jon Schmidt's analysis as "mechanical" completely unwarranted; I
have argued in the past that it is not that at all and won't rehash
those arguments. Indeed, I and others have pointed out that your
describing your own approach as "dynamic" or "interactional" implies
that your approach may be more dyadic than triadic (as Peirce used
these terms in his semeiotic). However, my guess is that you may be
using those expressions in a more metaphysical than a logical way.
EDWINA; My description of Jon Schmidt's focus on terminology, each
with almost one single use-definition, is my opinion. Gary F
describes it as 'flat'. That's his opinion. Others have different
opinions - yourself included. There's no problem with that! I don't
describe my approach as 'dynamic'. I describe Peircean semiosis as
'dynamic' - i.e. it's focus is on adaptive interaction - such that a
sound can become a meaning; a chemical can become a component of a
plant that repels caterpillars. This dynamic interaction operates
within a triadic semiosis, where the mediation of habits/Laws enables
both that particular meaning...and..an anti-caterpillar taste.
Edwina
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
On Mon, Jul 23, 2018 at 3:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
List -
Helmut - Of course your outlines are based on your own analysis -
and as such, are open to the examination and approval or disapproval
of others as well as yourself.
My view is that we, all of us, are operating in the 'DI phase of
analysis'. The Dynamic Interpretant. None of us, are at the FI, Final
Interpretant, or 'ultimate truth' phase - and, as Peirce pointed out -
that's rarely reached.
Therefore, none of us can claim to act as 'the gatekeeper', as the
ultimate accepted articulators and explainers of The Real True
Peirce. And therefore, none of us can claim that we alone are using
Peirce in an 'ethical manner' - since we are each equal in our
exploration of his work.
Most certainly, as such, we can adamantly agree or disagree with the
'DI Interpretations' of others on this list and elsewhere - but, in
all cases, I think that such agreement/disagreement remains at the DI
level - i.e., all one can say is: ' I disagree with your
interpretation; I have a very different interpretation' - and never
move into the FI level where one says: - 'you are unPeircean and not
using his terms in a correct manner'.
With regard to your adding a time concept, Helmut, I happen to
agree. I use Koichiro Matsuno's analysis of the three modes of time,
present, perfect and progressive [correlating with the three
categories] - and consider that they fit in well with the Peircean
description of the categories.
Edwina
On Mon 23/07/18 3:02 PM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] [2]
sent:
List, I must admit that my usage of the composition concept is
based on my own considerations, see www.signs-in-time.de [3] . But I
guess or hope, that my considerations are in accord with Peirce, they
are based on the categories, though I have added a time-concept to the
categories concept´s explanation. They are also based on Stanley N.
Salthes distinction between subsumption (related with classification)
and composition. Best, Helmut 23. Juli 2018 um 17:37 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:
List:
I'm afraid I don't see the point of Gary F's post - for I don't see
how my outline, in support of Helmut's post, contradicts or denies
Peirce's usage of these terms - including 'analysis'. Therefore, I
feel that I have followed Peirce's 'ethics of terminology'.
I note that Peirce defines the Dynamic Object as the "really
efficient but not immediately present Object".
Exactly - the DO is part of the Sign's triadic relations; it is an
'efficient force' - - and this is why I disagree with Gary F's view
that the DO is not part of the composition of the Sign ....
“matter of the sign’s composition” in the sense that it is
“within” or “part of” the sign; a dynamic object is not".
After all, without that interaction with what is called the DO -
then, the IO wouldn't exist - nor the II or even DI or even, the
Representamen!
And of course, I agree that" Logical analysis is not an analysis
into existing elements. It is the tracing out of relations between
concepts on the assumption that along with each given or found
concept is given its negative, and every other relation resulting
from a transposition of its correlates. ] CP 1.294, c.1905 ]"
Exactly- and this is why I have a problem with JAS's microanalysis
of terms - which, in my view, is a mechanical outline that ignores
the dynamics of networked semiosic relations.
So- we have some basic disagreements in interpreting Peircean
semiosis. Nothing wrong with that!
Edwina
On Mon 23/07/18 11:04 AM , [email protected] [4] sent:
Helmut, Edwina,
Perhaps I should have specified that I was referring to Peirce’s
usage of these terms, including “analysis.” I know there are
other uses of these terms, but on the Peirce list I feel bound by
Peirce’s ethics of terminology, without bothering to say so. To
make up for that omission from my post, I’ll give it this time
entirely in Peirce’s own words:
[[ It seems to me that one of the first useful steps toward a
science of semeiotic (σημειωτική), or the cenoscopic
science of signs, must be the accurate definition, or logical
analysis, of the concepts of the science. I define a Sign as
anything which on the one hand is so determined by an Object and on
the other hand so determines an idea in a person's mind, that this
latter determination, which I term the Interpretant of the sign, is
thereby mediately determined by that Object. A sign, therefore, has a
triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant. But it is
necessary to distinguish the Immediate Object, or the Object as the
Sign represents it, from the Dynamical Object, or really efficient
but not immediately present Object. It is likewise requisite to
distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e. the Interpretant
represented or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant,
or effect actually produced on the mind by the Sign; and both of
these from the Normal Interpretant, or effect that would be produced
on the mind by the Sign after sufficient development of thought. On
these considerations I base a recognition of ten respects in which
Signs may be divided. ] letter to Welby, December 1908 (CP 8.343,
EP2:482) ]
[[ Logical analysis is not an analysis into existing elements. It is
the tracing out of relations between concepts on the assumption that
along with each given or found concept is given its negative, and
every other relation resulting from a transposition of its
correlates. ] CP 1.294, c.1905 ]
[[ How much shall be embraced in the predicate and how many subjects
shall be recognized depends, for the ordinary analyses of logic, upon
what mode of analysis will answer the purpose in hand. ] EP2:172,
1903 ]
[[ Everybody recognizes that it is no inconsiderable art, this
business of “phaneroscopic” analysis by which one frames a
scientific definition. ] EP2:403, 1907 ]
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 23-Jul-18 09:15
To: [email protected] [5]
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification
List:
I consider Helmut's point as valid; I consider that a Sign, as a
triad, most definitely has a composition - of that triad. So, yes, an
IO is part of a Sign's composition, but, the DO is, I maintain, also
part of the Sign's composition. After all - the Sign, that triad,
only functions when it is in interaction/relation with a DO.
And the DO only functions as a DO when it is in interaction with
another DO- in a triadic semiosic process.
I don't agree that "the concepts of sign, object and interpretant
are products of the analysis of semiosic phenomena'. This suggests
that they are purely intellectual constructs of the human mind. I see
them instead as actual, real phenomena, as parts of a dynamic
interactional process of matter/mind that produces instantiations of
matter/mind.
Edwina
On Mon 23/07/18 8:33 AM , [email protected] sent:
Helmut,
Sign, object and interpretant are the three correlates of a triadic
relation. They are not matters of a sign’s composition. An
immediate object could be considered a “matter of the sign’s
composition” in the sense that it is “within” or “part of”
the sign; a dynamic object is not. The concepts of sign, object and
interpretant are products of the analysis of semiosic phenomena.
Object and interpretant can be further subdivided as their categorial
nature allows. The products of these analyses of semiosis are the
basis of Peirce’s classifications of sign types.
Gary f.
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