Edwina, Helmut, Gary f, Jon S, list, I've hesitated writing this as we've been through it before on the list, and I don't expect my observations to change anyone's mind. However, I think some points warrant comment as, in my view, they impact at least on the progress of list discussion and, perhaps, on inquiry more generally.
Edwina wrote: My view is that we, all of us, are operating in the 'DI phase of analysis'. The Dynamic Interpretant. None of us, are at the FI, Final Interpretant, or 'ultimate truth' phase - and, as Peirce pointed out - that's rarely reached. But Peirce also pointed out that science makes undeniable progress and that there are many signs and actual examples of this progress in the laws it has discovered. These have, for example, made myriad technologies possible. Such laws at least--and the fruits of them--have been firmly established through experimental testing and, beyond that, by their providing the basis for these aforementioned technologies. So, for example, even if it is true that Newtonian physics has been at least partially superseded theoretically, the laws that Newton and his followers discovered made possible useful technologies that are still being invented based on them to this day. So while you are quite correct in suggesting that arriving at the 'ultimate Truth' in science is rarely--I'd suggest, never--reached from one standpoint, from another real-world standpoint, many minor 'truths' (for example, those mechanical laws which have resulted in the development of technologies) *have* been discovered and will continue to be discovered. Edwina continued: Therefore, none of us can claim to act as 'the gatekeeper', as the ultimate accepted articulators and explainers of The Real True Peirce. And therefore, none of us can claim that we alone are using Peirce in an 'ethical manner' - since we are each equal in our exploration of his work. From my vantage point as moderator of Peirce-L, no one here is ever prohibited from expressing opinions in the forum; rather, everyone here is indeed encouraged to express and defend reasonable opinions regarding Peirce's writings. In my view this ought include there being no prohibition against some list member expressing his or her considered judgment that another list member is, say, misusing Peirce's terminology or even misinterpreting Peirce's writings. After all, not all opinions and views can sustain intense examination. That is, some may need some tweaking, or may even be essentially incorrect. Another way of saying this is that Peirce-L is intended to be a forum for discussion and dialogue, and no statement made here ought be treated as immune from substantive challenges by members of the forum. Edwina continued: Most certainly, as such, we can adamantly agree or disagree with the 'DI Interpretations' of others on this list and elsewhere - but, in all cases, I think that such agreement/disagreement remains at the DI level - i.e., all one can say is: ' I disagree with your interpretation; I have a very different interpretation' - and never move into the FI level where one says: - 'you are unPeircean and not using his terms in a correct manner'. Edwina, it seems to me that you have missed the irony that you yourself are setting yourself up as "gatekeeper" in, for example, seemingly prohibiting anyone making the case that someone's use of Peirce's terminology is inconsistent with Peirce's own. It seems to me--and not only from list discussions, but also from my reading in the Peirce secondary literature over the years--that it is *not *the opinion of many, at least, that Peirce's definitions of certain terms are so vague that virtually any interpretation of them is valid. (This is in no way to suggest that it is not the case that all symbols are indeterminate to some degree.) So, taking up a recent post of Gary Fuhrman with which you were in general disagreement, I would say that it is a fact that Peirce never called the Sign itself a triad--what is *triadic* is its relation to its Object and Interpretant. In addition, Peirce never characterized the Representamen as a part of the Sign, but rather as equivalent to it; or, in places, as a generalization of it which doesn't necessarily have a mental Interpretant. Further, he never described the Dynamic Object as a component of the Sign, but rather as something that is external to the Sign and independent of any Sign meant to represent it. So, it is not only Gary's but also my opinion that your position *in these particular matters* is contradicted by Peirce's clear usage. Further, it was the view of Peirce and is the view of many Peirce scholars--including several here--that it is important to maintain a distinction between semeiotic (or logical) analysis and metaphysical analysis. Only the latter concerns the Reality of Signs/Objects/Interpretants, while the discussion in this and related threads has rather strictly concerned the former, that is, logical analysis. Finally, I am not the only one who has found your labeling of Jon Schmidt's analysis as "mechanical" completely unwarranted; I have argued in the past that it is not that at all and won't rehash those arguments. Indeed, I and others have pointed out that your describing your own approach as "dynamic" or "interactional" implies that your approach may be more dyadic than triadic (as Peirce used these terms in his semeiotic). However, my guess is that you may be using those expressions in a more metaphysical than a logical way. Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Jul 23, 2018 at 3:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > List - > > Helmut - Of course your outlines are based on your own analysis - and as > such, are open to the examination and approval or disapproval of others as > well as yourself. > > My view is that we, all of us, are operating in the 'DI phase of > analysis'. The Dynamic Interpretant. None of us, are at the FI, Final > Interpretant, or 'ultimate truth' phase - and, as Peirce pointed out - > that's rarely reached. > > Therefore, none of us can claim to act as 'the gatekeeper', as the > ultimate accepted articulators and explainers of The Real True Peirce. And > therefore, none of us can claim that we alone are using Peirce in an > 'ethical manner' - since we are each equal in our exploration of his work. > > Most certainly, as such, we can adamantly agree or disagree with the 'DI > Interpretations' of others on this list and elsewhere - but, in all cases, > I think that such agreement/disagreement remains at the DI level - i.e., > all one can say is: ' I disagree with your interpretation; I have a very > different interpretation' - and never move into the FI level where one > says: - 'you are unPeircean and not using his terms in a correct manner'. > > With regard to your adding a time concept, Helmut, I happen to agree. I > use Koichiro Matsuno's analysis of the three modes of time, present, > perfect and progressive [correlating with the three categories] - and > consider that they fit in well with the Peircean description of the > categories. > > Edwina > > > > On Mon 23/07/18 3:02 PM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent: > > List, > I must admit that my usage of the composition concept is based on my own > considerations, see www.signs-in-time.de . But I guess or hope, that my > considerations are in accord with Peirce, they are based on the categories, > though I have added a time-concept to the categories concept´s explanation. > They are also based on Stanley N. Salthes distinction between subsumption > (related with classification) and composition. > Best, Helmut > > 23. Juli 2018 um 17:37 Uhr > "Edwina Taborsky" > wrote: > > List: > > I'm afraid I don't see the point of Gary F's post - for I don't see how my > outline, in support of Helmut's post, contradicts or denies Peirce's usage > of these terms - including 'analysis'. Therefore, I feel that I have > followed Peirce's 'ethics of terminology'. > > I note that Peirce defines the Dynamic Object as the "really efficient > but not immediately present Object". > > Exactly - the DO is part of the Sign's triadic relations; it is an > 'efficient force' - - and this is why I disagree with Gary F's view that > the DO is not part of the composition of the Sign .... “matter of the > sign’s composition” in the sense that it is “within” or “part of” the sign; > a dynamic object is not". After all, without that interaction with what is > called the DO - then, the IO wouldn't exist - nor the II or even DI or > even, the Representamen! > > And of course, I agree that" Logical analysis is not an analysis into > existing elements. It is the tracing out of relations between concepts on > the assumption that along with each given or found concept is given its > negative, and every other relation resulting from a transposition of its > correlates. ] CP 1.294, c.1905 ]" > > Exactly- and this is why I have a problem with JAS's microanalysis of > terms - which, in my view, is a mechanical outline that ignores the > dynamics of networked semiosic relations. > > So- we have some basic disagreements in interpreting Peircean semiosis. > Nothing wrong with that! > > Edwina > > > > On Mon 23/07/18 11:04 AM , [email protected] sent: > > Helmut, Edwina, > > Perhaps I should have specified that I was referring to Peirce’s usage of > these terms, including “analysis.” I know there are other uses of these > terms, but on the Peirce list I feel bound by Peirce’s ethics of > terminology, without bothering to say so. To make up for that omission from > my post, I’ll give it this time entirely in Peirce’s own words: > > [[ It seems to me that one of the first useful steps toward a science of > semeiotic (σημειωτική), or the cenoscopic science of signs, must be the > accurate definition, or logical analysis, of the concepts of the science. I > define a Sign as anything which on the one hand is so determined by an > Object and on the other hand so determines an idea in a person's mind, that > this latter determination, which I term the Interpretant of the sign, is > thereby mediately determined by that Object. A sign, therefore, has a > triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant. But it is necessary > to distinguish the Immediate Object, or the Object as the Sign represents > it, from the Dynamical Object, or really efficient but not immediately > present Object. It is likewise requisite to distinguish the Immediate > Interpretant, i.e. the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign, > from the Dynamic Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the mind by > the Sign; and both of these from the Normal Interpretant, or effect that > would be produced on the mind by the Sign after sufficient development of > thought. On these considerations I base a recognition of ten respects in > which Signs may be divided. ] letter to Welby, December 1908 (CP 8.343, > EP2:482) ] > > [[ Logical analysis is not an analysis into existing elements. It is the > tracing out of relations between concepts on the assumption that along with > each given or found concept is given its negative, and every other relation > resulting from a transposition of its correlates. ] CP 1.294, c.1905 ] > > [[ How much shall be embraced in the predicate and how many subjects shall > be recognized depends, for the ordinary analyses of logic, upon what mode > of analysis will answer the purpose in hand. ] EP2:172, 1903 ] > > [[ Everybody recognizes that it is no inconsiderable art, this business of > “phaneroscopic” analysis by which one frames a scientific definition. ] > EP2:403, 1907 ] > > Gary f. > > > > From: Edwina Taborsky > Sent: 23-Jul-18 09:15 > To: [email protected] > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification > > > > List: > > I consider Helmut's point as valid; I consider that a Sign, as a triad, > most definitely has a composition - of that triad. So, yes, an IO is part > of a Sign's composition, but, the DO is, I maintain, also part of the > Sign's composition. After all - the Sign, that triad, only functions when > it is in interaction/relation with a DO. > > And the DO only functions as a DO when it is in interaction with another > DO- in a triadic semiosic process. > > I don't agree that "the concepts of sign, object and interpretant are > products of the analysis of semiosic phenomena'. This suggests that they > are purely intellectual constructs of the human mind. I see them instead as > actual, real phenomena, as parts of a dynamic interactional process of > matter/mind that produces instantiations of matter/mind. > > Edwina > > On Mon 23/07/18 8:33 AM , [email protected] sent: > > Helmut, > > Sign, object and interpretant are the three correlates of a triadic > relation. They are not matters of a sign’s composition. An immediate object > could be considered a “matter of the sign’s composition” in the sense that > it is “within” or “part of” the sign; a dynamic object is not. The concepts > of sign, object and interpretant are products of the analysis of semiosic > phenomena. Object and interpretant can be further subdivided as their > categorial nature allows. The products of these analyses of semiosis are > the basis of Peirce’s classifications of sign types. > > Gary f. > > > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce > -l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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