Derrida is completely wrong. Both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. Besides doing field research on Amazonian languages that lack any form of writing, I have written extensively on language evolution. I have heard Derrida’s unfortunate claim before. https://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/0307386120/ref=dbs_a_w_dp_0307386120
https://www.amazon.com/How-Language-Began-Humanitys-Invention/dp/0871407957 Dan Everett Sent from my iPhone > On Aug 13, 2018, at 16:40, Mary Libertin <mary.liber...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Jon A S and list, > > I find this discussion interesting. I have no thesis, instead just some > observations for possible discussion. > > Peirce in EP 2:488, as previously quoted, writes that the tinge/tone/mark > precedes the token/type. Are three senses possibly being alluded to: sight, > sound, and touch? > > In regard to the sound and touch, I recall Peirce’s use of the utterer and > the graphist. > > The latter two suggest more agency. Saussure discussed the > signifier/signified relation in terms of the phoneme and speech, and rarely > the grapheme and writing. Speech can not be removed or erased, and it > assumes permanence with quote marks. > > Derrida argued the grapheme preceded the phoneme, the written vs the spoken. > How relevant that is remains to be seen. Frederick Sternfelt in the title of > his insightful book _Diagrammatology_ makes implicit reference to Derrida’s > _Grammatology_, whose work is given short shrift. It may be that preceed-ence > is not an issue with the decisign, or not relevant. > > I do recall Peirce using tinge with regard to existential graphs, and tinges > perhaps served a purpose, perhaps with reference to layering and > juxtaposition in logic, that could not achieved with the spoken or written. > > It may be possible that Peirce ultimately chose mark rather than tinge or > tone because it is more permanent. > > I apologize for lacking a thesis and any mistakes, and I look forward to your > responses. > > Mary Libertin > > >> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 1:45 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> John S., List: >> >> JFS: I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues. >> >> It is a direct quote from Peirce (EP 2:303; 1904), and the point of the >> thread is to explicate it. >> >> JFS: Since mark is his final choice, I'll use mark instead of tinge or tone. >> >> In the referenced passage, Peirce stated, "I dare say some of my former >> names are better than those I now use" (EP 2:488; 1908). In fact, less than >> two weeks earlier, he had asked Lady Welby specifically about Tone vs. Mark >> (SS 83; 1908); and if I remember right--I do not have a copy of her >> reply--she found Tone preferable because a tone of voice is a paradigmatic >> example. Peirce also used Tone in what I think is one of his clearest >> passages about this division of Signs (CP 4.537; 1906). >> >> JFS: General principle: In any occurrence of semiosis, there is always a >> perceptible mark that is interpreted by some mind or quasi-mind as a token >> of some type. >> >> This may be a case of hair-splitting on my part, but I would suggest instead >> that in any Instance of a Sign, the Tone is the character (or set of >> characters) by which the interpreting Quasi-mind recognizes the Sign-Replica >> to be an individual Token of the Type. Acquaintance with the system of >> Signs (Essential Information) is necessary and sufficient for this. It is >> analogous to the role of the Immediate Object as that by which the >> interpreting Quasi-mind identifies the Dynamic Object of the Sign, for which >> Collateral Experience (Experiential Information) is necessary and sufficient >> (cf. CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909). >> >> As a Possible, the Tone can only have an Immediate Interpretant--"its >> peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter." As an Existent, >> the Token is what produces the Dynamic Interpretant--"that which is >> experienced in each act of Interpretation." As a Necessitant, only the Type >> has a Final Interpretant--"the one Interpretative result to which every >> Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered," >> which corresponds to the correct Habit of Interpretation (Substantial >> Information). In other words, "The Immediate Interpretant is an >> abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. The Dynamical Interpretant is a >> single actual event. The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual >> tends" (SS 111; 1909). >> >> JFS: In summary, semiosis turns real possibilities into real actualities. >> >> I agree, and would add that semiosis also governs Real actualities in >> accordance with Real regularities. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >>> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 1:15 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: >>> I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues. >>> >>> In various writings over the years, Peirce wrote about >>> real possibilities. He also wrote about laws as real. >>> >>> In writing about modality, he distinguished three universes: >>> the possible, the actual, and the necessitated. Actual >>> existence is just one of the three ways of being real. >>> >>> He also distinguished logical possibility and necessity >>> from real possibility and necessity. A theory is logically >>> possible if it's consistent by itself. It's a real possibility >>> if it's also consistent with the laws of nature. >>> >>> Given the above, apply the principles to signs. For that, >>> consider Peirce's Letters to Lady Welby in 1908, in which >>> he wrote about signs and the three universes (EP 2:478-480). >>> >>> In EP 2:488, he wrote that the triad Potisign (possible sign) / >>> actisign (sign in act) / and famisign (familiar or general sign) >>> might be called (tinge or tone or mark) / token / type. Since >>> mark is his final choice, I'll use mark instead of tinge or tone. >>> >>> General principle: In any occurrence of semiosis, there is >>> always a perceptible mark that is interpreted by some mind or >>> quasi-mind as a token of some type. >>> >>> Prior to semiosis, the perceptible thing exists in actuality. >>> But it's only a possible mark. It doesn't become an actual mark >>> until it is sensed by some mind or quasi-mind. Then as soon as >>> it's recognized, the actual mark becomes an actual token of some type. >>> >>> In summary, semiosis turns real possibilities into real actualities. >>> >>> John > -- > null > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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