Hi Gene I do not have an individualistic perspective. In How Language Began I make clear that language is a cultural invention and no individual could have invented it. My theory of culture is developed in my U of Chicago Press book, Dark Matter of the Mind: The Culturally Articulated Unconscious.
As for my (dis)agreement with Peirce, I am currently working on a book for Oxford U Press on his empiricism (Peircean Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Empiricist Thought). While he was open to the idea of evolutionarily acquired “habits” of thought, these are not required by the archetectonic of his theory. Dan Sent from my iPhone > On Aug 13, 2018, at 22:45, Eugene Halton <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dear Daniel, > > I read your introductory chapter for the book that you linked in your > post last week. Many interesting ideas. But I wonder why you seem to be > arguing for a purely individual perspective on learning, if I understand you > correctly, and why you claim there is no inborn social influence on the self, > especially given your interest in Peirce. Do you reject Peirce's ideas on > these points? > I also wonder what your opinion would be on another investigator > of Amazonian peoples, who like you went there with a completely different > purpose from what she ended up observing and recording. I really like the > fact that you went there as a missionary and allowed your observations to > temper your beliefs. Something similar happened with this other person who > went there, Jean Liedloff. > After repeated trips over years she came to understand the different > parenting styles of the people in the Venezuelan Amazon she observed. She > termed what she observed “The Continuum Concept,” and produced a really > interesting book on this idea with that title. She allows the idea of > instinctive impulses as powerful positive influences on parenting and on the > expectations of infants and developmentally young children, which seems to me > of a piece with Peirce's view of critical Common Sense-ism. > > Gene Halton > > >> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 6:37 PM, Daniel L Everett <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> Changzi and I share many ideas in common and have corresponded about them. >> Indexes are used by all living creatures. The first valued icon in the >> fossil record is 3 million years ago, the Makapansgat Manuport, collected by >> Australopithecus africanus. The first symbols emerege with Homo erectus and >> are linked with the sailing revolution where erectus becomes the first ocean >> voyager. >> >> Sent from my iPhone >> >>> On Aug 13, 2018, at 19:34, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Gene, Mary, Daniel, List, >>> >>> I also agree that spoken language precedes written language. >>> >>> There are even some philosophers and scientists who have suggested that >>> perhaps music preceded spoken language. >>> >>> You recently mentioned, Gene, and I recall studies I read long ago which >>> suggested that response to music and vocal imitative play with the mother >>> occurs long before a baby begins to develop any of the other of the human >>> 'intelligences' (cf. Gardner's multi-intelligence model) such as speech or >>> being able to walk! >>> >>> The American aesthetician and philosopher of Mind, Susanne Langer, argued >>> that while music isn't actually a language (in her ground breaking 1942 >>> work, Feeling and Form: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art, >>> she refers to it an "unconsummated symbol"), yet music bears some >>> interesting structural similarities to music. >>> >>> "Music, like language, is an articulate form. Its parts not only fuse >>> together to yield a greater entity, but in so doing they maintain some >>> degree of separate existence, and the sensuous character of each element is >>> affected by its function in the complex whole. . [it] is articulated, i.e. >>> its internal structure is given to our perception. >>> >>> "Music has import, and this import is the pattern of sentience — the >>> pattern of life itself, as it is felt and directly known." >>> >>> The "sensuous characters" affected by the whole 'composition' is present in >>> the simplest ditty, child's song, or lullaby. >>> >>> In the mid-50's, in Mind: An Essay in Human Feeling, she hypothesized that >>> music might have worked in tandem with ritual dance and ecstatic vocalizing >>> to have created the first vocal symbols. Perhaps in some ecstatic communal >>> dance associated with some significant recurring event affecting human >>> physiology and feeling, one known as doing so by a tribal community--the >>> hypothetical example which Langer gives, as I recall, is how the moon >>> affects a woman's menstrual cycle, the tides, etc.--certain ecstatically >>> uttered sounds, perhaps first vocalized loudly by a tribal leader or shaman >>> in a tribal dance, became associated with that shaman's utterance, was >>> repeated by the community, and became their word for 'moon'. >>> >>> On the "significance of music" Langer wrote: >>> >>> Let us therefore call the significance of music its “vital import” instead >>> of “meaning,” using “vital” . . . as a qualifying adjective restricting the >>> relevance of “import” to the dynamism of subjective experience. >>> >>> Some have gone even deeper into the science involved in such a theory. One >>> example is the cognitive scientist, Mark Changizi, in his book, Harnessed. >>> From the publisher's blurb >>> >>> In Harnessed, cognitive scientist Mark Changizi demonstrates that human >>> speech has been very specifically “designed” to harness the sounds of >>> nature, sounds we’ve evolved over millions of years to readily understand. >>> Long before humans evolved, mammals have learned to interpret the sounds of >>> nature to understand both threats and opportunities. Our speech—regardless >>> of language—is very clearly based on the sounds of nature. >>> >>> Langer's work in this area has been largely neglected, while Changizi's >>> remains controversial. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary >>> >>> >>> Even more fascinating, Changizi shows that music itself is based on natural >>> sounds. Music—seemingly one of the most human of inventions—is literally >>> built on sounds and patterns of sound that have existed since the beginning >>> of time. >>> ccc >>> >>> Gary Richmond >>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>> Communication Studies >>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>> 718 482-5690 >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 3:47 PM Eugene Halton <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> I also agree. To twist Ernst Haeckel's saying: ontology does not >>>> recapitulate philology, contra Derrida. >>>> Gene H >>>> >>>>> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018, 3:20 PM Mary Libertin <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> I agree. With you, and with my interpretation of Sternfeldt. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 3:18 PM Daniel L Everett >>>>>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> Derrida is completely wrong. Both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. >>>>>> Besides doing field research on Amazonian languages that lack any form >>>>>> of writing, I have written extensively on language evolution. I have >>>>>> heard Derrida’s unfortunate claim before. >>>>>> https://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/0307386120/ref=dbs_a_w_dp_0307386120 >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.amazon.com/How-Language-Began-Humanitys-Invention/dp/0871407957 >>>>>> >>>>>> Dan Everett >>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Aug 13, 2018, at 16:40, Mary Libertin <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jon A S and list, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I find this discussion interesting. I have no thesis, instead just some >>>>>>> observations for possible discussion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Peirce in EP 2:488, as previously quoted, writes that the >>>>>>> tinge/tone/mark precedes the token/type. Are three senses possibly >>>>>>> being alluded to: sight, sound, and touch? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In regard to the sound and touch, I recall Peirce’s use of the utterer >>>>>>> and the graphist. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The latter two suggest more agency. Saussure discussed the >>>>>>> signifier/signified relation in terms of the phoneme and speech, and >>>>>>> rarely the grapheme and writing. Speech can not be removed or erased, >>>>>>> and it assumes permanence with quote marks. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Derrida argued the grapheme preceded the phoneme, the written vs the >>>>>>> spoken. How relevant that is remains to be seen. Frederick Sternfelt in >>>>>>> the title of his insightful book _Diagrammatology_ makes implicit >>>>>>> reference to Derrida’s _Grammatology_, whose work is given short >>>>>>> shrift. It may be that preceed-ence is not an issue with the decisign, >>>>>>> or not relevant. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I do recall Peirce using tinge with regard to existential graphs, and >>>>>>> tinges perhaps served a purpose, perhaps with reference to layering and >>>>>>> juxtaposition in logic, that could not achieved with the spoken or >>>>>>> written. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It may be possible that Peirce ultimately chose mark rather than tinge >>>>>>> or tone because it is more permanent. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I apologize for lacking a thesis and any mistakes, and I look forward >>>>>>> to your responses. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mary Libertin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 1:45 PM Jon Alan Schmidt >>>>>>>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>> John S., List: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> JFS: I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It is a direct quote from Peirce (EP 2:303; 1904), and the point of >>>>>>>> the thread is to explicate it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> JFS: Since mark is his final choice, I'll use mark instead of tinge >>>>>>>> or tone. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In the referenced passage, Peirce stated, "I dare say some of my >>>>>>>> former names are better than those I now use" (EP 2:488; 1908). In >>>>>>>> fact, less than two weeks earlier, he had asked Lady Welby >>>>>>>> specifically about Tone vs. Mark (SS 83; 1908); and if I remember >>>>>>>> right--I do not have a copy of her reply--she found Tone preferable >>>>>>>> because a tone of voice is a paradigmatic example. Peirce also used >>>>>>>> Tone in what I think is one of his clearest passages about this >>>>>>>> division of Signs (CP 4.537; 1906). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> JFS: General principle: In any occurrence of semiosis, there is >>>>>>>> always a perceptible mark that is interpreted by some mind or >>>>>>>> quasi-mind as a token of some type. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This may be a case of hair-splitting on my part, but I would suggest >>>>>>>> instead that in any Instance of a Sign, the Tone is the character (or >>>>>>>> set of characters) by which the interpreting Quasi-mind recognizes the >>>>>>>> Sign-Replica to be an individual Token of the Type. Acquaintance with >>>>>>>> the system of Signs (Essential Information) is necessary and >>>>>>>> sufficient for this. It is analogous to the role of the Immediate >>>>>>>> Object as that by which the interpreting Quasi-mind identifies the >>>>>>>> Dynamic Object of the Sign, for which Collateral Experience >>>>>>>> (Experiential Information) is necessary and sufficient (cf. CP 8.179, >>>>>>>> EP 2:494; 1909). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As a Possible, the Tone can only have an Immediate Interpretant--"its >>>>>>>> peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter." As an >>>>>>>> Existent, the Token is what produces the Dynamic Interpretant--"that >>>>>>>> which is experienced in each act of Interpretation." As a >>>>>>>> Necessitant, only the Type has a Final Interpretant--"the one >>>>>>>> Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come >>>>>>>> if the Sign is sufficiently considered," which corresponds to the >>>>>>>> correct Habit of Interpretation (Substantial Information). In other >>>>>>>> words, "The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a >>>>>>>> Possibility. The Dynamical Interpretant is a single actual event. The >>>>>>>> Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends" (SS 111; >>>>>>>> 1909). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> JFS: In summary, semiosis turns real possibilities into real >>>>>>>> actualities. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree, and would add that semiosis also governs Real actualities in >>>>>>>> accordance with Real regularities. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Regards, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 1:15 AM, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>> I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In various writings over the years, Peirce wrote about >>>>>>>>> real possibilities. He also wrote about laws as real. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In writing about modality, he distinguished three universes: >>>>>>>>> the possible, the actual, and the necessitated. Actual >>>>>>>>> existence is just one of the three ways of being real. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> He also distinguished logical possibility and necessity >>>>>>>>> from real possibility and necessity. A theory is logically >>>>>>>>> possible if it's consistent by itself. It's a real possibility >>>>>>>>> if it's also consistent with the laws of nature. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Given the above, apply the principles to signs. For that, >>>>>>>>> consider Peirce's Letters to Lady Welby in 1908, in which >>>>>>>>> he wrote about signs and the three universes (EP 2:478-480). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In EP 2:488, he wrote that the triad Potisign (possible sign) / >>>>>>>>> actisign (sign in act) / and famisign (familiar or general sign) >>>>>>>>> might be called (tinge or tone or mark) / token / type. Since >>>>>>>>> mark is his final choice, I'll use mark instead of tinge or tone. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> General principle: In any occurrence of semiosis, there is >>>>>>>>> always a perceptible mark that is interpreted by some mind or >>>>>>>>> quasi-mind as a token of some type. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Prior to semiosis, the perceptible thing exists in actuality. >>>>>>>>> But it's only a possible mark. It doesn't become an actual mark >>>>>>>>> until it is sensed by some mind or quasi-mind. Then as soon as >>>>>>>>> it's recognized, the actual mark becomes an actual token of some type. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In summary, semiosis turns real possibilities into real actualities. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> John >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> null >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>>>>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>>>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> null >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY >>> of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but >> to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of >> the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
