Ethics and action 2 -- Situating all this in the transcendent via some form of contact 3 -- The nuts and bolts of doing are considered and analyzed -- determined 2 The aesthetic embraces all we say and do and points it toward the agapaic 3
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Wed, Aug 15, 2018 at 10:39 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] > wrote: > Mike B., List: > > Thank you for the considerable effort that you obviously invested in > compiling this comprehensive post. It merits careful consideration, so for > now I will simply offer one clarification of my own position. As Gary F. > helpfully pointed out regarding my current advocacy of using "Sign" only > for the general Type and "Sign-Replica" or "Sign-Instance" for each of its > individual Tokens, I am mainly seeking to tighten up *our *usage of terms > while remaining faithful to Peirce's concepts, rather than merely trying to > sort out *his *usage. I do not dwell on terminology for its own sake, > but as a means to a much more important end--namely, *making our (and > Peirce's) ideas clear*. My concern remains that associating > action/reaction/interaction with 3ns, rather than 2ns, fosters a > fundamental misunderstanding of Peirce's Categories, and thus his entire > philosophical system. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Aug 15, 2018 at 12:54 AM, Mike Bergman <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon, Gary R, Edwina, List, >> >> A few recent threads have discussed technical terminology, dyadic v >> triadic action, and natural language. I was challenged to back up my >> assertions about the importance of triadic action and natural language use >> and interpretation. I have attempted a broad survey, which I document next, >> and I conclude with some summary observations. I apologize for the length >> of this post, but I wanted to be both broad and deep in some areas. Skip to >> the end if you do not want the details. >> >> My approach combines some selected Peirce quotes and numerical counts of >> instances of various term matches drawn from searching my own internal CSP >> reference collection. Since I don't have InteLex, I had previously >> assembled my own reference collection, which I store separately from my >> scholarly Peirce papers. This enables me to do approximate searches across >> Peirce's writings. My reference collection includes the Collected Papers >> (CP), Essential Peirce (EP 1 and 2), Lady Welby, New Elements of >> Mathematics (all NEM), and a smattering of CSP papers not included in the >> others. There is some duplication between the sources, most often between >> CP and EP 2, so my search counts should not be taken as absolute (nor could >> any such collection be taken as such). Also, please note I have not placed >> any bold or italics emphases on Peirce's or my own statements. >> >> Within this collection there are slightly more than 2500 hits for the >> term 'action'. It is clear when reviewing all of these references that most >> refer to the dyadic 'action-reaction' action model. Some of the qualifying >> terms (and their counts) that CSP uses in referring to the dyadic model >> include: >> >> reaction - 540 >> interaction - 17 >> mechanical action - 16 >> dyadic action - 7 >> brute action - 6 >> mutual action - 5 >> particular action - 2 >> regular action - 2 >> forceful action - 2 >> dynamic action - 2 >> >> These qualified references to dyadic action are often provided in >> contrast to triadic action (see below). Also, generally any Peirce >> reference to capitalized 'Action' (see EP 2:272, 1903, and its equating >> Action to Secondness) relates to dyadic action, generally when not >> discussing contrasts to triadic action. In other contexts, such as "What >> Pragmatism Is" (EP 2:331, 1905), lowercase 'action' throughout appears to >> reference the dyadic kind. >> >> These kinds of dyadic action references appear to account for perhaps 70% >> of all references to 'action' across my reference collection. However, for >> the remaining 20-30%, Peirce is quite clear about asserting triadic >> actions, sometimes which he indicates can be analyzed by dyadic relations >> (degenerate forms), but some can not (non-degenerate forms). Actions that >> cannot be explained by dyadic means are of particular interest to Peirce. >> In chronological order, let me skip a stone across Peirce's evolution in >> what I interpret as his thoughts about triadic actions. >> >> As early as 1868 Peirce was talking about 'mental action', devoting an >> entire section to it in his 'Four Incapacities' (CP 5.266, 1868). I think >> one can see his fleshing out of the universal categories and some of his >> sign aspects as he discusses the mental actions of thought: >> >> "These two sorts of objects, what we are immediately conscious of and >> what we are mediately conscious of, are found in all consciousness. Some >> elements (the sensations) are completely present at every instant so long >> as they last, while others (like thought) are actions having beginning, >> middle, and end, and consist in a congruence in the succession of >> sensations which flow through the mind. They cannot be immediately present >> to us, but must cover some portion of the past or future. Thought is a >> thread of melody running through the succession of our sensations." (Make >> Our Ideas Clear, 1878) >> >> His investigations of the Logic of Relatives seemed to bring home the >> distinction that not all action may be of the dyadic kind: >> >> "The need is of one or other of two kinds. In the one class of cases we >> experience on several occasions to which our own deliberate action gave a >> common character, an excitation of one and the same novel idea or >> sensation, and the need is that a large number of propositions having the >> same novel consequent but different antecedents, should be replaced by one >> proposition which brings in the novel element, so that the others shall >> appear as mere consequences of every day facts with a single novel one. We >> may express this intellectual need in a brief phrase as the need of >> synthetising a multitude of subjects. It is the need of generalisation. In >> another class of cases, we find in some new thing, or new situation, a >> great number of characters, the same as would naturally present themselves >> as consequences of a hypothetical state of things, and the need is that the >> large number of novel propositions with one subject or antecedent should be >> replaced by a single novel proposition, namely that the new thing or new >> occasion belongs to the hypothetical class, from which all those other >> novelties shall follow as mere consequences of matters of course. This >> intellectual need, briefly stated, is the need of synthetising a multitude >> of predicates. It is >> the need of theory. Every problem, then, is either a problem of >> consequences, a problem of generalisation, or a problem of theory. This >> statement illustrates how special solutions are the only ones which >> directly mean anything or embody any knowledge; and general solutions are >> only useful when they happen to suggest what the special solutions will >> be." (Logic of Relatives, 196-197, 1883) >> >> These ideas of intellectual need or what Peirce called the "action of >> thought" (Make Our Ideas Clear, 1878) seem to coincide with Peirce's >> attempt over the rest of his career to find the 'true' triadic fact or >> action. I suspect the sophistication he gained in his investigations of the >> logic of relatives helped point him in this direction, as well as furthered >> his understanding of the sign relations: >> >> "So in a triadic fact, say, for example >> >> A gives B to C >> >> we make no distinction in the ordinary logic of relations between the >> subject nominative, the direct object, and the indirect object. We say that >> the proposition these six sentences express one and the same indivisible >> phenomenon. Nevertheless, just as [in] conceiving of two reacting objects >> we may introduce the metaphysical distinction of agent and patient so we >> may metaphysically distinguish the functions of the three objects denoted >> by the subject nominative, the direct object, and the indirect object. The >> subject nominative denotes that >> one of the three objects which in the triadic fact merely assumes a >> non-relative character of activity. The direct object is that object which >> in the triadic fact receives a character relative to that agent, being the >> patient of its action, while the indirect object receives a character which >> can neither exist nor be conceived to exist without the cooperation of the >> other two. When I call Category the Third the Category of Representation in >> which there is a Represented Object, a Representamen, and an Interpretant, >> I recognize that distinction. This mode of distinction is, indeed, germane >> to Thirdness, while it is alien to Secondness. That is to say, agent and >> patient as they are by themselves in their duality are not distinguished as >> agent and patient. The distinction lies in the mode of representing them in >> my mind, which is a Third. Thus there is an inherent Thirdness in this mode >> of distinction. But a triadic fact is in all cases an intellectual fact. >> Take giving for example. The mere transfer of an object which A sets down >> and C takes up does not constitute giving. There must be a transfer of >> ownership and ownership is a matter of Law, an intellectual fact. You now >> begin to see how the conception of representation is so peculiarly fit to >> typify the category of Thirdness. The object represented is supposed not to >> be affected by the representation. That is essential to the idea of >> representation. The Representamen is affected by the Object but is not >> otherwise modified in the operation of representation. It is either >> qualitatively the double of the object in the Icon, or it is a patient on >> which the object really acts, in the Index; or it is intellectually linked >> to the object in such a way as to be mentally excited by that object, in >> the Symbol." (EP 2:70, 1901) >> >> Note this language is couched in the context of understanding the parts >> of speech of natural language. Clearly the ideas of thoughts and the >> understanding of symbols fit into a different type of action: >> >> "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of >> perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and >> whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be >> arrested as unauthorized by reason." (EP 2:241, 1903) >> >> It seems clear to me that thought and mentality were becoming understood >> by Peirce as a different kind of action: >> >> "If you take any ordinary triadic relation, you will always find a mental >> element in it. Brute action is secondness, any mentality involves >> thirdness. Analyze for instance the relation involved in 'A gives B to C.' >> Now what is giving? It does not consist [in] A's putting B away from him >> and C's subsequently taking B up. It is not necessary that any material >> transfer should take place. It consists in A's making C the possessor >> according to Law. There must be some kind of law before there can be any >> kind of giving, -- be it but the law of the strongest. But now suppose that >> giving did consist merely in A's laying down the B which C subsequently >> picks up. That would be a degenerate form of Thirdness in which the >> thirdness is externally appended. In A's putting away B, there is no >> thirdness. In C's taking B, there is no thirdness. But if you say that >> these two acts constitute a single operation by virtue of the identity of >> the B, you transcend the mere brute fact, you introduce a mental element . >> . . . The criticism which I make on [my] algebra of dyadic relations, with >> which I am by no means in love, though I think it is a pretty thing, is >> that the very triadic relations which it does not recognize, it does itself >> employ. For every combination of relatives to make a new relative is a >> triadic relation irreducible to dyadic relations. Its inadequacy is shown >> in other ways, but in this way it is in a conflict with itself if it be >> regarded, as I never did regard it, as sufficient for the expression of all >> relations. My universal algebra of relations, with the subjacent indices >> and Σ and π, is susceptible of being enlarged so as to comprise everything; >> and so, still better, though not to ideal perfection, is the system of >> existential graphs.[See CP 4, Book II]" (CP 8.331, 1904) >> >> Though we can reason and more explicitly and logically communicate using >> EGs, a benefit John Sowa emphasizes frequently, and quite applicable to >> machine use and reasoning, we humans communicate via our symbolic signs. >> Again, I think that is in part why Peirce continues to probe the questions >> of triadic action: >> >> "The action of a sign calls for a little closer attention. Let me remind >> you of the distinction referred to above between dynamical, or dyadic, >> action; and intelligent, or triadic action. An event, A, may, by brute >> force, produce an event, B; and then the event, B, may in its turn produce >> a third event, C. The fact that the event, C, is about to be produced by B >> has no influence at all upon the production of B by A. It is impossible >> that it should, since the action of B in producing C is a contingent future >> event at the time B is produced. Such is dyadic action, which is so called >> because each step of it concerns a pair of objects." (CP 5.472, 1907) >> >> There are numerous places where Peirce ascribes triadic action to the >> actions of signs or semiosis: >> >> "But by "semiosis" I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, >> which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its >> object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any >> way resolvable into actions between pairs." (EP 2:411; CP 5.484, 1908) >> >> So, while Peirce was becoming increasingly specific and understanding of >> the distinction of triadic action, it also fit nicely into his universal >> categories and prior views of brute Secondness: >> >> "That whatever action is brute, unintelligent, and unconcerned with the >> result of it is purely dyadic is either demonstrable or is too evident to >> be demonstrable. But in case that dyadic action is merely a member of a >> triadic action, then so far from its furnishing the least shade of >> presumption that all the action in the physical universe is dyadic, on the >> contrary, the entire and triadic action justifies a guess that there may be >> other and more marked examples in the universe of the triadic pattern. No >> sooner is the guess made than instances swarm upon us amply verifying it, >> and refuting the agnostic position; while others present new problems for >> our study. With the refutation of agnosticism, the agnostic is shown to be >> a superficial neophyte in philosophy, entitled at most to an occasional >> audience on special points, yet infinitely more respectable than those who >> seek to bolster up what is really true by sophistical arguments -- the >> traitors to truth that they are. . . ." (CP 6.332, 1909) >> >> Which, in terms of its Thirdness, also ties nicely back to Peirce's >> earlier observations that brute Action is a Secondness (see EP 2:272, 1903) >> while equating Conduct to Thirdness: >> >> "By 'conduct' I mean action under an intention of self-control. No event >> that occurs to any mind, no action of any mind can constitute the truth of >> that conditional proposition. The Immediate Interpretant consists in the >> Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any actual >> reaction. Thus the Immediate and Final Interpretants seem to me absolutely >> distinct from the Dynamical Interpretant and from each other. And if there >> be any fourth kind of Interpretant on the same footing as those three, >> there must be a dreadful rupture of my mental retina, for I can't see it at >> all." (CP 8.315, 1909) >> >> Across the reference collection, here are some of the various natural >> language ways that Peirce often referred to triadic action (not all >> accounts so apply): >> >> conduct - 547 (sometimes specifically related to 3ns; EP 2:272) >> gives - 488 >> represents - 366 >> reasons - 293 >> triadic relation - 150 >> thinks - 142 >> aggregation - 70 >> mental action - 49 >> expresses - 47 >> conceives - 32 >> semiosis - 19 (incl semeoisis) >> analyzes - 13 >> mediates - 9 (CP 8.332, 1904, others) >> triadic fact - 8 >> generalizes - 7 >> psychical action - 7 >> sign action - 5 (incl 'action of sign') >> purposive action - 4 >> triadic action - 2 >> intelligent action - 2 >> binds - 2 >> >> Of course, some of these terms, such as 'gives' or 'reasons' may be used >> by CSP in non-specific ways. It is also hard to aggregate all of the >> natural language variants by which a specific concept may be referenced >> (such as 'sign action' or 'action of sign'). The intent of these counts is >> not to be definitive, but indicative. However, we can clearly see the >> emphasis Peirce placed on the actions of signs, mentality and intelligence >> in his views of triadic action (see also the very related discussions to >> 'triadic relation'). >> >> Each of these qualified terms is worth searching and inspecting within >> your own reference collections. There is much context to be gained from >> these matches. I have tended to use 'triadic action' to refer to the >> aggregate of all of these references even though that was not Peirce's most >> common qualified term. Still, I think 'triadic action' provides a useful >> summary term. >> >> On another note, Peirce was also clear that he saw 'action' as within the >> proper purview of ethics. "Ethics is the study of what ends of action we >> are deliberately prepared to adopt." (EP 2:200, 1903) I think we can infer >> that 'action' in this ethical sense is one of dyadic action, though >> elsewhere it is also clear that Peirce places pragmatism and actions >> related to pragmatism in Thirdness. >> >> In summary, then, I offer these observations regarding the concept of >> 'action' in Peirce's writings: >> >> * Action most often refers to the dyadic, energetic kind >> * Unqualified action nearly always refers to the dyadic, action-reaction >> kind >> * But Peirce also insisted upon a triadic form of action, referenced in >> multiple ways >> * Triadic action is most often referenced with respect to mental or >> intellectual actions, such as thought >> * When contrasted to triadic actions or in that context, Peirce also uses >> a number of specific action terms to qualify dyadic action >> * The non-degenerate forms of triadic action can not be fully understood >> based on dyadic relations. >> >> Lastly, I do respect Peirce's passion for precise and technical >> terminology, but also recognize he sometimes changed preferred terms due to >> development of his thought or due to context. The universal categories of >> 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are the very embodiment of how Peirce applied contextual >> perspectives across scores of triadic terms [1]. Peirce also is clear in >> his understanding of the frailties of natural language, using examples and >> a rich, contextual language to improve his communication. A cursory >> inspection of references using the qualified terms above clearly shows this. >> >> My bottom line conclusion is that the meaning of 'action' for Peirce was >> very much contextual, most often dyadic in nature, but also often seen >> through the lens of natural language, with an important contribution being >> his unique views on triadic action. And, yes, while Peirce preferred >> precise terminology and had an ethics for such, many ideas and concepts >> such as 'action' require natural language to distinguish and provide >> clearer communications. >> >> Mike >> >> [1] c.f., the table in http://www.mkbergman.com/2077/ >> how-i-interpret-c-s-peirce/. > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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