Jon, Gary R, Edwina, List,
A few recent threads have discussed technical terminology, dyadic v
triadic action, and natural language. I was challenged to back up my
assertions about the importance of triadic action and natural language
use and interpretation. I have attempted a broad survey, which I
document next, and I conclude with some summary observations. I
apologize for the length of this post, but I wanted to be both broad and
deep in some areas. Skip to the end if you do not want the details.
My approach combines some selected Peirce quotes and numerical counts of
instances of various term matches drawn from searching my own internal
CSP reference collection. Since I don't have InteLex, I had previously
assembled my own reference collection, which I store separately from my
scholarly Peirce papers. This enables me to do approximate searches
across Peirce's writings. My reference collection includes the Collected
Papers (CP), Essential Peirce (EP 1 and 2), Lady Welby, New Elements of
Mathematics (all NEM), and a smattering of CSP papers not included in
the others. There is some duplication between the sources, most often
between CP and EP 2, so my search counts should not be taken as absolute
(nor could any such collection be taken as such). Also, please note I
have not placed any bold or italics emphases on Peirce's or my own
statements.
Within this collection there are slightly more than 2500 hits for the
term 'action'. It is clear when reviewing all of these references that
most refer to the dyadic 'action-reaction' action model. Some of the
qualifying terms (and their counts) that CSP uses in referring to the
dyadic model include:
reaction - 540
interaction - 17
mechanical action - 16
dyadic action - 7
brute action - 6
mutual action - 5
particular action - 2
regular action - 2
forceful action - 2
dynamic action - 2
These qualified references to dyadic action are often provided in
contrast to triadic action (see below). Also, generally any Peirce
reference to capitalized 'Action' (see EP 2:272, 1903, and its equating
Action to Secondness) relates to dyadic action, generally when not
discussing contrasts to triadic action. In other contexts, such as "What
Pragmatism Is" (EP 2:331, 1905), lowercase 'action' throughout appears
to reference the dyadic kind.
These kinds of dyadic action references appear to account for perhaps
70% of all references to 'action' across my reference collection.
However, for the remaining 20-30%, Peirce is quite clear about asserting
triadic actions, sometimes which he indicates can be analyzed by dyadic
relations (degenerate forms), but some can not (non-degenerate forms).
Actions that cannot be explained by dyadic means are of particular
interest to Peirce. In chronological order, let me skip a stone across
Peirce's evolution in what I interpret as his thoughts about triadic
actions.
As early as 1868 Peirce was talking about 'mental action', devoting an
entire section to it in his 'Four Incapacities' (CP 5.266, 1868). I
think one can see his fleshing out of the universal categories and some
of his sign aspects as he discusses the mental actions of thought:
"These two sorts of objects, what we are immediately conscious of and
what we are mediately conscious of, are found in all consciousness. Some
elements (the sensations) are completely present at every instant so
long as they last, while others (like thought) are actions having
beginning, middle, and end, and consist in a congruence in the
succession of sensations which flow through the mind. They cannot be
immediately present to us, but must cover some portion of the past or
future. Thought is a thread of melody running through the succession of
our sensations." (Make Our Ideas Clear, 1878)
His investigations of the Logic of Relatives seemed to bring home the
distinction that not all action may be of the dyadic kind:
"The need is of one or other of two kinds. In the one class of cases we
experience on several occasions to which our own deliberate action gave
a common character, an excitation of one and the same novel idea or
sensation, and the need is that a large number of propositions having
the same novel consequent but different antecedents, should be replaced
by one proposition which brings in the novel element, so that the others
shall appear as mere consequences of every day facts with a single novel
one. We may express this intellectual need in a brief phrase as the need
of synthetising a multitude of subjects. It is the need of
generalisation. In another class of cases, we find in some new thing, or
new situation, a great number of characters, the same as would naturally
present themselves as consequences of a hypothetical state of things,
and the need is that the large number of novel propositions with one
subject or antecedent should be replaced by a single novel proposition,
namely that the new thing or new occasion belongs to the hypothetical
class, from which all those other novelties shall follow as mere
consequences of matters of course. This intellectual need, briefly
stated, is the need of synthetising a multitude of predicates. It is
the need of theory. Every problem, then, is either a problem of
consequences, a problem of generalisation, or a problem of theory. This
statement illustrates how special solutions are the only ones which
directly mean anything or embody any knowledge; and general solutions
are only useful when they happen to suggest what the special solutions
will be." (Logic of Relatives, 196-197, 1883)
These ideas of intellectual need or what Peirce called the "action of
thought" (Make Our Ideas Clear, 1878) seem to coincide with Peirce's
attempt over the rest of his career to find the 'true' triadic fact or
action. I suspect the sophistication he gained in his investigations of
the logic of relatives helped point him in this direction, as well as
furthered his understanding of the sign relations:
"So in a triadic fact, say, for example
A gives B to C
we make no distinction in the ordinary logic of relations between the
subject nominative, the direct object, and the indirect object. We say
that the proposition these six sentences express one and the same
indivisible phenomenon. Nevertheless, just as [in] conceiving of two
reacting objects we may introduce the metaphysical distinction of agent
and patient so we may metaphysically distinguish the functions of the
three objects denoted by the subject nominative, the direct object, and
the indirect object. The subject nominative denotes that
one of the three objects which in the triadic fact merely assumes a
non-relative character of activity. The direct object is that object
which in the triadic fact receives a character relative to that agent,
being the patient of its action, while the indirect object receives a
character which can neither exist nor be conceived to exist without the
cooperation of the other two. When I call Category the Third the
Category of Representation in which there is a Represented Object, a
Representamen, and an Interpretant, I recognize that distinction. This
mode of distinction is, indeed, germane to Thirdness, while it is alien
to Secondness. That is to say, agent and patient as they are by
themselves in their duality are not distinguished as agent and patient.
The distinction lies in the mode of representing them in my mind, which
is a Third. Thus there is an inherent Thirdness in this mode of
distinction. But a triadic fact is in all cases an intellectual fact.
Take giving for example. The mere transfer of an object which A sets
down and C takes up does not constitute giving. There must be a transfer
of ownership and ownership is a matter of Law, an intellectual fact. You
now begin to see how the conception of representation is so peculiarly
fit to typify the category of Thirdness. The object represented is
supposed not to be affected by the representation. That is essential to
the idea of representation. The Representamen is affected by the Object
but is not otherwise modified in the operation of representation. It is
either qualitatively the double of the object in the Icon, or it is a
patient on which the object really acts, in the Index; or it is
intellectually linked to the object in such a way as to be mentally
excited by that object, in the Symbol." (EP 2:70, 1901)
Note this language is couched in the context of understanding the parts
of speech of natural language. Clearly the ideas of thoughts and the
understanding of symbols fit into a different type of action:
"The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of
perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and
whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be
arrested as unauthorized by reason." (EP 2:241, 1903)
It seems clear to me that thought and mentality were becoming understood
by Peirce as a different kind of action:
"If you take any ordinary triadic relation, you will always find a
mental element in it. Brute action is secondness, any mentality involves
thirdness. Analyze for instance the relation involved in 'A gives B to
C.' Now what is giving? It does not consist [in] A's putting B away from
him and C's subsequently taking B up. It is not necessary that any
material transfer should take place. It consists in A's making C the
possessor according to Law. There must be some kind of law before there
can be any kind of giving, -- be it but the law of the strongest. But
now suppose that giving did consist merely in A's laying down the B
which C subsequently picks up. That would be a degenerate form of
Thirdness in which the thirdness is externally appended. In A's putting
away B, there is no thirdness. In C's taking B, there is no thirdness.
But if you say that these two acts constitute a single operation by
virtue of the identity of the B, you transcend the mere brute fact, you
introduce a mental element . . . . The criticism which I make on [my]
algebra of dyadic relations, with which I am by no means in love, though
I think it is a pretty thing, is that the very triadic relations which
it does not recognize, it does itself employ. For every combination of
relatives to make a new relative is a triadic relation irreducible to
dyadic relations. Its inadequacy is shown in other ways, but in this way
it is in a conflict with itself if it be regarded, as I never did regard
it, as sufficient for the expression of all relations. My universal
algebra of relations, with the subjacent indices and Σ and π, is
susceptible of being enlarged so as to comprise everything; and so,
still better, though not to ideal perfection, is the system of
existential graphs.[See CP 4, Book II]" (CP 8.331, 1904)
Though we can reason and more explicitly and logically communicate using
EGs, a benefit John Sowa emphasizes frequently, and quite applicable to
machine use and reasoning, we humans communicate via our symbolic signs.
Again, I think that is in part why Peirce continues to probe the
questions of triadic action:
"The action of a sign calls for a little closer attention. Let me remind
you of the distinction referred to above between dynamical, or dyadic,
action; and intelligent, or triadic action. An event, A, may, by brute
force, produce an event, B; and then the event, B, may in its turn
produce a third event, C. The fact that the event, C, is about to be
produced by B has no influence at all upon the production of B by A. It
is impossible that it should, since the action of B in producing C is a
contingent future event at the time B is produced. Such is dyadic
action, which is so called because each step of it concerns a pair of
objects." (CP 5.472, 1907)
There are numerous places where Peirce ascribes triadic action to the
actions of signs or semiosis:
"But by "semiosis" I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence,
which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign,
its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being
in any way resolvable into actions between pairs." (EP 2:411; CP 5.484,
1908)
So, while Peirce was becoming increasingly specific and understanding of
the distinction of triadic action, it also fit nicely into his universal
categories and prior views of brute Secondness:
"That whatever action is brute, unintelligent, and unconcerned with the
result of it is purely dyadic is either demonstrable or is too evident
to be demonstrable. But in case that dyadic action is merely a member of
a triadic action, then so far from its furnishing the least shade of
presumption that all the action in the physical universe is dyadic, on
the contrary, the entire and triadic action justifies a guess that there
may be other and more marked examples in the universe of the triadic
pattern. No sooner is the guess made than instances swarm upon us amply
verifying it, and refuting the agnostic position; while others present
new problems for our study. With the refutation of agnosticism, the
agnostic is shown to be a superficial neophyte in philosophy, entitled
at most to an occasional audience on special points, yet infinitely more
respectable than those who seek to bolster up what is really true by
sophistical arguments -- the traitors to truth that they are. . . ." (CP
6.332, 1909)
Which, in terms of its Thirdness, also ties nicely back to Peirce's
earlier observations that brute Action is a Secondness (see EP 2:272,
1903) while equating Conduct to Thirdness:
"By 'conduct' I mean action under an intention of self-control. No event
that occurs to any mind, no action of any mind can constitute the truth
of that conditional proposition. The Immediate Interpretant consists in
the Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any
actual reaction. Thus the Immediate and Final Interpretants seem to me
absolutely distinct from the Dynamical Interpretant and from each other.
And if there be any fourth kind of Interpretant on the same footing as
those three, there must be a dreadful rupture of my mental retina, for I
can't see it at all." (CP 8.315, 1909)
Across the reference collection, here are some of the various natural
language ways that Peirce often referred to triadic action (not all
accounts so apply):
conduct - 547 (sometimes specifically related to 3ns; EP 2:272)
gives - 488
represents - 366
reasons - 293
triadic relation - 150
thinks - 142
aggregation - 70
mental action - 49
expresses - 47
conceives - 32
semiosis - 19 (incl semeoisis)
analyzes - 13
mediates - 9 (CP 8.332, 1904, others)
triadic fact - 8
generalizes - 7
psychical action - 7
sign action - 5 (incl 'action of sign')
purposive action - 4
triadic action - 2
intelligent action - 2
binds - 2
Of course, some of these terms, such as 'gives' or 'reasons' may be used
by CSP in non-specific ways. It is also hard to aggregate all of the
natural language variants by which a specific concept may be referenced
(such as 'sign action' or 'action of sign'). The intent of these counts
is not to be definitive, but indicative. However, we can clearly see the
emphasis Peirce placed on the actions of signs, mentality and
intelligence in his views of triadic action (see also the very related
discussions to 'triadic relation').
Each of these qualified terms is worth searching and inspecting within
your own reference collections. There is much context to be gained from
these matches. I have tended to use 'triadic action' to refer to the
aggregate of all of these references even though that was not Peirce's
most common qualified term. Still, I think 'triadic action' provides a
useful summary term.
On another note, Peirce was also clear that he saw 'action' as within
the proper purview of ethics. "Ethics is the study of what ends of
action we are deliberately prepared to adopt." (EP 2:200, 1903) I think
we can infer that 'action' in this ethical sense is one of dyadic
action, though elsewhere it is also clear that Peirce places pragmatism
and actions related to pragmatism in Thirdness.
In summary, then, I offer these observations regarding the concept of
'action' in Peirce's writings:
* Action most often refers to the dyadic, energetic kind
* Unqualified action nearly always refers to the dyadic, action-reaction
kind
* But Peirce also insisted upon a triadic form of action, referenced in
multiple ways
* Triadic action is most often referenced with respect to mental or
intellectual actions, such as thought
* When contrasted to triadic actions or in that context, Peirce also
uses a number of specific action terms to qualify dyadic action
* The non-degenerate forms of triadic action can not be fully understood
based on dyadic relations.
Lastly, I do respect Peirce's passion for precise and technical
terminology, but also recognize he sometimes changed preferred terms due
to development of his thought or due to context. The universal
categories of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are the very embodiment of how Peirce
applied contextual perspectives across scores of triadic terms [1].
Peirce also is clear in his understanding of the frailties of natural
language, using examples and a rich, contextual language to improve his
communication. A cursory inspection of references using the qualified
terms above clearly shows this.
My bottom line conclusion is that the meaning of 'action' for Peirce was
very much contextual, most often dyadic in nature, but also often seen
through the lens of natural language, with an important contribution
being his unique views on triadic action. And, yes, while Peirce
preferred precise terminology and had an ethics for such, many ideas and
concepts such as 'action' require natural language to distinguish and
provide clearer communications.
Mike
[1] c.f., the table in
http://www.mkbergman.com/2077/how-i-interpret-c-s-peirce/.
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