Edwina, List, Again, and as you remarked, Edwina, I would prefer a moratorium on this topic. You've offered this up in support of *your* position regarding the 'action' of Mind, and as such it is provocative. While I have a response in mind--as several here may--I'm not going to make it. Responding to this post is likely to bring about another round of bickering, the kind of thing which results in some listers requesting to leave the list. So, once again, I would urge a moratorium on the topic. List members are, of course, free to do what they please.
Best, Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator) *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Aug 18, 2018 at 12:36 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > I receive regular posts from AAAS, Science Journal. I originally sent the > abstract below to only Mike Bergman and Gary Richmond. > > This abstract seemed, to me, to be empirically relevant to our > recent discussions on Peircean semiosis - on the nature of and differences > between physical action and mental action. I am aware that Gary R suggested > a moratorium on such discussion and I don't want to intrude on that > silence, but I feel that research on these issues in other areas might be > of interest to some members of the list. > > Note - the abstract is here:..and my comments to Mike and Gary R are below > Mike's comments. > > Early processing in the brain tends to simply represent external > > information from the sensory organs. However, to behave appropriately, > > organisms need to structure this input into meaningful categories and > > concepts. Brincat et al. recorded from multiple regions along the > > processing hierarchy in monkey brains while the animals performed > > sophisticated categorization tasks. Lower-level areas conveyed strong > > information about sensory stimuli within their preferred domains but > > indicated hardly any abstraction beyond the raw sensory inputs. In > > contrast, the prefrontal cortex, despite containing relatively weak > > information overall, showed strongly abstracted, task-relevant coding. > > Intermediate areas exhibited mixed representations, with partial > > categorical coding occurring in some domains but not others. > > Representational transformation thus happens gradually, across multiple > > cortical processing steps, rather than in a discrete, all-or-nothing > > fashion." > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Mike Bergman [email protected] > To: [email protected] > Sent: Sat 18/08/18 11:59 AM > Subject: Fwd: Re: the actions of mind > > Hi Edwina, > > This is tremendously interesting and on point. I think the authors' > observations would not surprise Peirce in the slightest. I think this > note is worth posting to the entire list, but I will let you decide that. > > BTW, the citation you provided is for the news summary in Science. Here > is the actual PNAS reference: > > Scott L. Brincat, Markus Siegel, Constantin von Nicolai, and Earl K. > Miller, 2018. "Gradual Progression from Sensory to Task-Related > Processing in Cerebral Cortex," Proceedings of the National Academy of > Sciences, Vol 115, No. 30, pp. E7202-E7211, 2018-07-24, DOI > 10.1073/pnas.1717075115. > > For a short period, one can get the full paper in PDF without charge > from here: > > http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/115/30/E7202.full.pdf > > Best, Mike > > On 8/18/2018 6:35 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Below is the abstract from a current article in the AAAS journal > > Science. 'From the Concrete to the Abstract', Peter Stern. > > > > My point is that to confine the meaning of 'action' in Peircean analysis > > to only the physical, i.e., to kinetic dyadic actions between two > > discrete entities, ignores the vital role of Mind within Peircean > > semiosis. It ignores the fact that the biological organism MUST enable > > constructive relations among and with other discrete organisms. How does > > it achieve this? Can a biological organism function within only one type > > of action - kinetic? > > > > Mind operates only within a triadic format; that is, it functions > > outside of the dyadic directly sensed external differentiations of > > discrete entities and as Mind, searches for and focuses on the > > commonalities of multiple entities. As such, it actually develops and > > creates representations of these commonalities, enabling a different > > type of interaction among organisms than basic kinetic dyadic > > interactions. Mind-actions, with their resultant symbolic or indexical > > mental images, enable and produce cohesion, collaboration, synthesis, > > while physical-actions acknowledge differentiation and produce > diversity. > > > > These two types of action; the physical and the mental - are very > > different in their natures - but both types are required in the > > biological world. > > > > Edwina > > > > > -- > __________________________________________ > > > __________________________________________ > > > >
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