Edwina, Helmut, List:
I could comment on what I consider to be several fundamental
misunderstandings throughout this exchange, but Gary R. already pointed out
a few of them; so instead, I will simply take the opportunity to illustrate
(and hopefully clarify further) why I am now advocating the notion of
a *General
*Object for every Sign (Type).
The word "dog" is a common noun, which makes it a *term *in traditional
logic, a *Rheme *in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy ("_____ is a dog"), and a *Seme *in
his later taxonomies. As such, the Immediate Interpretant is its
*meaning *within
the Sign System of written English, and the Immediate Object is the *range *of
what a Replica of "dog" *possibly could *denote accordingly to someone with
mere Sign System Acquaintance, consisting entirely of *all *such
definitions and nothing else (Essential Knowledge).
The Dynamic Object is the *individual *that a Replica of "dog" *actually
does* denote to someone with previous Collateral Experience of dogs in a
single concrete Instance of the Sign, which is an *occurrence *that
produces a feeling, exertion, or other Sign-Instance as the Dynamic
Interpretant in accordance with *fallible *Interpretative Habits (Informed
Knowledge). I agree with Edwina that this only (or at least primarily)
happens when the Replica of the term/Rheme/Seme is *involved* in a Replica
of a proposition/Dicisign/Pheme, such as "Buster is a dog," "Any dog is a
mammal," "This dog is a poodle," "Some dog is black," or even a child
simply pointing at a dog and saying "Dog!"
The General Object is the *collection *of all Real dogs, which is what the
Sign (Type) *necessarily would* denote in the final opinion at the end of
infinite inquiry by an infinite community, corresponding to the Final
Interpretant that *would be* produced in accordance with *infallible
*Interpretative
Habits (Substantial Knowledge). I disagree with Edwina that this implies
Platonism, because--entirely consistent with Aristotelianism, specifically
Peirce's extreme scholastic realism--the General Object is a Reality that
only *exists* in its members, which are all *particular* dogs. Likewise,
the Sign (Type) only *exists *in its Replicas; or more precisely, in its
Instances (Tokens).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 3:25 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> Helmut, you wrote:
>
> "I think, a specific dog is not the DO of the rheme, but of the dicent the
> rheme is part of, that would be Buster in "Buster is a dog"."
>
> Yes - you have to process the Rhematic Iconic Qualisign further to get the
> specifics, but - the FACT that a rhematic iconic qualisign emerged in your
> sensations - is due to the fact that a dog or something/animal is in the
> room. Your experience of that dog is as a rhematic iconic qualisign, i.e,
> that sensation/feeling of something there..You then process it further -
> and can interpret as 'a dog' and even 'that dog'...
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 13/09/18 4:19 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Edwina, list,
>
> I think I agree that the extension is not the DO. I also agree, that, if
> you look very closely at a rheme, it has no object, is just a feeling, like
> what Peirce called "primisense".
> If you look less closely, but say that rheme is the complete sign, then I
> would say, that Peirces "altersense" comes into the game, when this feeling
> picks the connection towards the dog-species and its traits out of the
> interpreter´s memory, being rather a dicent or proposition then, like:
> "This feeling indicates to the dog-species and what I know about it:...".
> When the interpreter starts thinking about the traits of dogs, Peirces
> "medisense" is used too, and it even becomes argumental, like: "A cat is
> not a dog, because it does not bark".
> So perhaps we are merely quibbling about the boundary of the sign, how
> closely you look at it, and whether you separate it into subsigns or not.
> I think, a specific dog is not the DO of the rheme, but of the dicent the
> rheme is part of, that would be Buster in "Buster is a dog".
>
> Best,
> Helmut
> 13. September 2018 um 21:55 Uhr
> "Edwina Taborsky" wrote:
>
> Helmut, list:
>
> My reference to Platonism was when you suggested that the extension "all
> existing dogs" would be the DO". I would think that a specific dog is the
> DO.
>
> The rhematic iconic qualisign is a pure feeling. In your example of, I
> suppose, a dog being in the room - you might 'feel/smell' something. That's
> an uninterpreted sensation. You'd have to process this sensation further,
> using your habits within the Representamen, to interpret those sensual data
> as 'there's a dog in the room'.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 13/09/18 3:43 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Edwina, list,
>
> I think, that to say the idea transported by the rheme "dog", resp. "is a
> dog" is not platonic, because in this context "idea" is a secondary thing,
> out of reflexion, intuition, in any case out of the memory. For Platon,
> "idea" however had the reverse meaning: Not a secondary, but a primordial
> thing. A ground, not an effect.
> Trying to understand your point: Is it so, that a rheme just causes a pure
> feeling (e.g. doggishness as an unconnected blur) in the sign, and the
> further connection to the dog-species and its qualities is another sign, a
> dicent, in which this by-itself-unconnected feeling picks the remembered
> meaning of doggishness out of the interpreter´s memory?
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>
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