Helmut, List: I share Peirce's preference for the terms Breadth and Depth, rather than extension and intension, and suspect that there are subtle differences in their meanings. What I have proposed is that the Immediate Object corresponds to Essential Breadth and the General Object corresponds to Substantial Breadth, more or less as Peirce defined those terms in 1867.
I am not sure what you mean by "the categorial-modal affair," since I do not conceive of semiosis in those terms. I follow Peirce in viewing all semiosis of any kind as dialogical, requiring three Quasi-minds--the Utterer, the Interpreter, and the Commens--but recognizing that they may correspond to three temporal phases of the *same *Quasi-mind. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > Jon, list, > > Thank you for clarification! Is it so, that the general object and the > final interpretant (of a rheme) are what in some other theory is the > extension and the intension of a term? > > Before, I had assumed, that these (in- and extension) might be the two > submodes (2.2.1) and (2.2.2) of the DO. > > How does the general object fit into the categorial-modal affair? > > And is it so, that we are talking about language-communication-signs, for > which the sign system is two or more individuals, and that it is also > possible to talk about a thought-sign of one person who hears, reads, or > just thinks the term, and that in this case the stuff applies I had > written, with primisense, altersense, medisense? > > Best, > Helmut >
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