John S., List:

Just to clarify, the quote attributed to Francesco below is actually
something that I wrote in response to him.  He seems to be basing his
understanding of the Immediate Object on Peirce's writings of 1904-1906 and
downplaying what came later, especially when defending his innovative
hypothesis that Rhemes do not have Immediate Objects at all.  By contrast,
my approach is more *systematic*, seeking to take into account anything and
everything that Peirce wrote, but ultimately condensing the subject matter
into my own framework that remains legitimately *Peircean*.

I am intrigued by the notion of "specifying that framework" in accordance
with Peirce's logic, whether the 1885 algebra or the later EGs.  However, I
remain unsure as to how one would proceed with such a project.  For
example, how could we use EGs to identify the Immediate Object of a Rheme
(if I am right), or somehow demonstrate that it cannot have one (if
Francesco is right)?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 2:51 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:

> On 9/12/2018 2:28 PM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
>
>> In any case, I am not ultimately seeking to explicate Peirce's
>> 1904-1906 efforts at classifying Signs; I am trying to develop a
>> viable framework for understanding Signs and their relations based
>> on Peirce's /entire /corpus, especially his late writings.
>>
>
> I strongly agree with the goal of developing such a framework.
>
> Peirce's algebraic logic of 1885 has had the strongest influence
> on subsequent developments.  For a brief survey, see the article
> "Peirce the logician" by Putnam:  http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>
> Peirce himself said that his EGs were directly related to all his
> other work.  Since his 1885 logic can be mapped directly to his EGs
> and both versions are precisely defined, that would make his logic
> a solid foundation for specifying that framework.
>
> John
>
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