John S., List: JAS: Peirce repeatedly made it very clear that he considered Logic as Semeiotic to be a Normative Science, not a branch of phenomenology. JFS: No. He explicitly said that logic is a branch of mathematics.
Please provide a citation for this claim. The first branch of mathematics is "the Mathematics of Logic" (CP 1.185; 1903), not "formal logic" as you have it in your chart, and certainly not "logic" in the broad sense. It is what Peirce sometimes called "the simplest mathematics" or "dichotomic mathematics." He wrote elsewhere that "mathematics has such a close intimacy with one of the classes of philosophy, that is, with logic, that no small acumen is required to find the joint between them" (CP 1.245; 1902). However, note that here logic is still not a branch of *mathematics*, but of *philosophy*. He confirmed this in some detail two paragraphs later. CSP: It might, indeed, very easily be supposed that even pure mathematics itself would have need of one department of philosophy; that is to say, of logic. Yet a little reflection would show, what the history of science confirms, that that is not true. Logic will, indeed, like every other science, have its mathematical parts. There will be a mathematical logic just as there is a mathematical physics and a mathematical economics. If there is any part of logic of which mathematics stands in need--logic being a science of fact and mathematics only a science of the consequences of hypotheses--it can only be that very part of logic which consists merely in an application of mathematics, so that the appeal will be, not of mathematics to a prior science of logic, but of mathematics to mathematics. Let us look at the rationale of this a little more closely. Mathematics is engaged solely in tracing out the consequences of hypotheses. As such, she never at all considers whether or not anything be existentially true, or not. But now suppose that mathematics strikes upon a snag; and that one mathematician says that it is evident that a consequence follows from a hypothesis, while another mathematician says it evidently does not ... because this dispute relates merely to the consequence of a hypothesis, the mere careful study of the hypothesis, which is pure mathematics, resolves it; and after all, it turns out that there was no occasion for the intervention of a science of reasoning. (CP 1.247; 1902) Mathematical logic is an application of mathematics to logic, not the other way around, because "logic [is] a science of fact and mathematics [is] only a science of the consequences of hypotheses." JFS: Mathematics and logic are the foundation every science without exception. Again, please provide a citation for this claim. On the contrary ... CSP: There is no science whatever to which is not attached an application of mathematics. This is not true of any other science, since pure mathematics has not, as a part of it, any application of any other science, inasmuch as every other science is limited to finding out what is positively true, either as an individual fact, as a class, or as a law; while pure mathematics has no interest in whether a proposition is existentially true or not. (CP 1.245; 1902) Mathematics *alone *is "the foundation [of] every science without exception." Logic, as a science of "finding out what is positively true," is *distinct *from mathematics, so this comment applies to it. Phenomenology, Esthetics, and Ethics are three *other *sciences that are *not *attached to an application of Logic as Semeiotic. Speaking of which, your chart is also incorrect in locating "Semiotic" as a separate branch under phenomenology, rather than recognizing it as a generalization of the Normative Science of logic, as Peirce did. I can understand the impulse at work here--at least with respect to Speculative Grammar--since phenomenology is the study of phenomena *in themselves*, while Normative Science is the study of phenomena *in their relations to ends* (cf. EP 2:197; 1903). However, Peirce placed Logic as Semeiotic under the latter, rather than the former, precisely because he viewed its subject matter as "those things whose end is to represent something" (EP 2:200)--not Signs as merely *apparent*, but Signs as *purposive*. Perhaps this is the basis for distinguishing mediation as 3ns in phenomenology from Signs as 3ns in Normative Science. If so, then my previous suggestion that there might be counterparts in Esthetics and Ethics to Speculative Grammar in Logic as Semeiotic should have likewise distinguished quality/reaction as 1ns/2ns in phenomenology from feeling/exertion as 1ns/2ns in Normative Science. Of course, these are not rigid separations, but they reflect different shades of meaning with respect to each Category. Phenomenology deals with what we *perceive*, while Normative Science deals with the resulting *effects *on us and how we *ought *to respond accordingly. I think that a key question, then, is whether a Percept is *itself *a Sign. It came up a couple of days ago that Peirce called a Percept a Seme at CP 4.538 (1906), but elsewhere he said otherwise. CSP: Let us say that, as I sit here writing, I see on the other side of my table, a yellow chair with a green cushion. That will be what psychologists term a "percept" (*res percepta*). They also frequently call it an "image." With this term I shall pick no quarrel. Only one must be on one’s guard against a false impression that it might insinuate. Namely, an "image" usually means something intended to represent,--virtually professing to represent,--something else, real or ideal. So understood, the word "image" would be a misnomer for a percept. The chair I appear to see makes no professions of any kind, essentially embodies no intentions of any kind, does not stand for anything. It obtrudes itself upon my gaze; but not as a deputy for anything else, not "as" anything. It simply knocks at the portal of my soul and stands there in the doorway. (CP 7.619; 1903) A Percept does not *represent *anything--it simply is what it is, or rather appears as it does; and as such, it only includes the elements of 1ns and 2ns (cf. CP 7.625). The subsequent Perceptual Judgment then *represents *the Percept, and thus introduces 3ns (cf. CP 7.630). I wonder if that is why Peirce felt constrained "to invent the term *percipuum *to include both percept and perceptual judgment" (CP 7.629), and affirmed later in the same manuscript, "We can know nothing about the percept,--but only experience it in its totality,--except through the perceptual judgment, and this likewise compels acceptance without any assignable reason" (CP 7.659; 1903). *Experiencing *the Phaneron is a matter of Percepts (1ns and 2ns), which *are not* Signs; but *studying *the Phaneron requires Perceptual Judgments (3ns), which *are *Signs. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 3:32 PM, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, Jerry R, Jon AS, and Jerry LRC, > > Peirce answered your questions. I like his 1903 *outline* because > it's a clean and simple summary of everything he wrote about the > sciences and their interrelationships. But as an outline, it omits > nearly all the details. > > ET > >> I wonder if this list will ever move beyond debates [and again, I >> consider them debates and not discussions] about classification >> and terminology >> > > I definitely do not want to debate. I consider this thread as a > *collaborative inquiry* in trying to understand what Peirce said > and fill in the gaps. My only goal is to get a clear understanding > of that outline and its relationship to all of Peirce's writings. > > That classification has some very important implications for biology, > but I'll have to address that separately because it requires more space. > > JR > >> From what I’ve read, biosemiotic suffers from not being a formal theory >> at all. Rather, it is a science (?) that is still seeking to understand >> itself. >> > > I agree. But I'll repeat the diagram in CSPsemiotic.jpg. Note that > mathematics includes all possible theories about anything. Every > theory, formal or informal, in every branch of philosophy and empirical > science is an application of some theory of mathematics. > > JR > >> my question was about biosemiotic, which has a perspective that is >> different from semiotic because of its special focus on living >> systems (biology, hence biosemiotic). >> > > Semiotic also has a focus on living systems: human beings. Peirce > himself talked about extensions to parrots, dogs, bees, and crystals. > > JR > >> I don’t treat bacteria as a quasi-mind. >> > > The biologist Lynn Margulis, who spent her career studying bacteria, > considered bacteria on a continuum with all higher life forms: > >> The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance- >> forming bacteria become isomorphic with our thought, with our happiness, >> our sensitivities and stimulations. >> > > Given what Peirce wrote, I believe that he would agree. My only > correction would replace the word 'isomorphic' (equal form) with > 'homomorphic' (similar form). This quotation comes from > https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html > > At the end of that article are various comments by prominent > researchers in biology and related fields. They're helpful > for understanding Lynn M's contributions. > > JAS > >> The other two--quality and brute reaction--are not Signs themselves, >> and cannot be reduced to Signs >> > > I agree. I thanked Gary F. for finding a quotation by Peirce > that clarified that issue. > > JAS > >> Peirce repeatedly made it very clear that he considered Logic as >> Semeiotic to be a Normative Science, not a branch of phenomenology. >> > > No. He explicitly said that logic is a branch of mathematics. > As mathematics, it is applicable to every science without exception. > But most sciences, including phenomenology, do not make value judgments. > Under normative science, he explictly said that it is a "partial and > narrow" point of view. See CP 1.573. > > Fundamental principle, which Peirce said many times in many ways: > Mathematics and logic are the foundation every science without > exception. In *every* science, logic is used in the broad sense. > But normative science is an exception: it's used in a narrow sense. > > JLRC > >> Semantics alone is merely philosophy abused. >> Mathematics alone is not even logic. >> > > I don't know how you define those terms. What I've been trying to do > is to summarize Peirce's classification of the sciences as accurately > as possible. If you can find any quotations by Peirce that support > those two points, please let us know. > > JLRC > >> CSP focused on language as a path of syntaxies to arguments that >> illuminated the natural groundings of human communication in an >> extraordinary wide sense. >> > > I agree. He said that linguistics was the best developed of all > the psychic sciences. That would probably imply that all the > other psychic sciences depend on linguistics. But that does not > negate his point that all sciences, including linguistics, depend > on math and logic. > > John >
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