g...@gnusystems.ca
Jeff, I wonder if CP 4.641-2 might be the kind of thing you have in mind in posing your question — though I don’t know whether you’d count it as clarification. It’s from the concluding piece in Peirce’s Monist series on “Some Amazing Mazes.” The core idea would seem to be that semiosis is continuous because it takes time.
[[ 641. The argument which seems to me to prove, not only that there is such a conception of continuity as I contend for, but that it is realized in the universe, is that if it were not so, nobody could have any memory. If time, as many have thought, consists of discrete instants, all but the feeling of the present instant would be utterly non-existent. But I have argued this elsewhere. The idea of some psychologists of meeting the difficulties by means of the indefinite phenomenon of the span of consciousness betrays a complete misapprehension of the nature of those difficulties.
642. Added, 1908, May 26. In going over the proofs of this paper, written nearly a year ago, I can announce that I have, in the interval, taken a considerable stride toward the solution of the question of continuity, having at length clearly and minutely analyzed my own conception of a perfect continuum as well as that of an imperfect continuum, that is, a continuum having topical singularities, or places of lower dimensionality where it is interrupted or divides. These labors are worth recording in a separate paper, if I ever get leisure to write it. Meantime, I will jot down, as well as I briefly can, one or two points. If in an otherwise unoccupied continuum a figure of lower dimensionality be constructed — such as an oval line on a spheroidal or anchor-ring surface — either that figure is a part of the continuum or it is not. If it is, it is a topical singularity, and according to my concept of continuity, is a breach of continuity. If it is not, it constitutes no objection to my view that all the parts of a perfect continuum have the same dimensionality as the whole. (Strictly, all the material, or actual parts, but I cannot now take the space that minute accuracy would require, which would be many pages.) That being the case, my notion of the essential character of a perfect continuum is the absolute generality with which two rules hold good, first, that every part has parts; and second, that every sufficiently small part has the same mode of immediate connection with others as every other has. This manifestly vague statement will more clearly convey my idea (though less distinctly) than the elaborate full explication of it could. In endeavoring to explicate “immediate connection,” I seem driven to introduce the idea of time. Now if my definition of continuity involves the notion of immediate connection, and my definition of immediate connection involves the notion of time; and the notion of time involves that of continuity, I am falling into a circulus in definiendo. But on analyzing carefully the idea of Time, I find that to say it is continuous is just like saying that the atomic weight of oxygen is 16, meaning that that shall be the standard for all other atomic weights. The one asserts no more of Time than the other asserts concerning the atomic weight of oxygen; that is, just nothing at all. If we are to suppose the idea of Time is wholly an affair of immediate consciousness, like the idea of royal purple, it cannot be analyzed and the whole inquiry comes to an end. If it can be analyzed, the way to go about the business is to trace out in imagination a course of observation and reflection that might cause the idea (or so much of it as is not mere feeling) to arise in a mind from which it was at first absent. It might arise in such a mind as a hypothesis to account for the seeming violations of the principle of contradiction in all alternating phenomena, the beats of the pulse, breathing, day and night. For though the idea would be absent from such a mind, that is not to suppose him blind to the facts. His hypothesis would be that we are, somehow, in a situation like that of sailing along a coast in the cabin of a steamboat in a dark night illumined by frequent flashes of lightning, and looking out of the windows. As long as we think the things we see are the same, they seem self-contradictory. But suppose them to be mere aspects, that is, relations to ourselves, and the phenomena are explained by supposing our standpoint to be different in the different flashes. Following out this idea, we soon see that it means nothing at all to say that time is unbroken. For if we all fall into a sleeping-beauty sleep, and time itself stops during the interruption, the instant of going to sleep is absolutely unseparated from the instant of waking; and the interruption is merely in our way of thinking, not in time itself. There are many other curious points in my new analysis. Thus, I show that my true continuum might have room only for a denumeral multitude of points, or it might have room for just any abnumeral multitude of which the units are in themselves capable of being put in a linear relationship, or there might be room for all multitudes, supposing no multitude is contrary to a linear arrangement. ]]
Gary f.
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
Sent: 14-Jan-19 11:11
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis
John S, List,
You say: "That would explain why Peirce never used the term 'continuous semiosis': Semiosis is a kind of cognition. Cognition is a continuous process. Therefore, semiosis is a continuous process. Eating is a continuous process. Therefore, nobody talks about continuous eating. If something X is continuous, it's redundant to say "continuous X"."
While I accept your point about terminology--i.e., that I don't see instances where Peirce puts these terms together as "continuous semiosis"--I think this analogy rests on an assertion (i.e., "Cognition is a continuous process) that is not universally accepted. Nominalists such as Hume and Mill, for instance, argue that cognition is entirely composed of discrete impressions of sense. Any process of cognition, they claim, consists of a finite number of steps involving discrete parts.
As such, the claim that the process of semiosis is essentially continuous is a claim that calls out for (1) greater clarification and (2) supporting arguments.
How might we use the mathematical ideas involved in Peirce's later conception of continuity for the sake of pursuing (1) and (2)?
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net>
Sent: Monday, January 14, 2019 1:15:59 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis
Jerry R and Jeff BD,
I would never stop anybody from discussing anything they wish.
But Peirce objected to people who took his words ('pragmatism', for
example) and used them in ways that were inconsistent with the way
he defined them.
JR
> Correct me if I’m wrong, but isn’t semiosis a greek term?
The base word in Greek is 'sema' (sign or mark). The ending is also
Greek. Peirce put the parts together in a way that is consistent
with classical usage.
JR
> To use your arguments to declare such limits as to how we ought
> to engage in this conversation...
I have no objection to the conversation. My only point is that we
should distinguish the terms that Peirce used from terms that he might
have used, but didn't.
JBD
> Consider the following well-known passage...
> "The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite series of
> inductions and hypotheses (which though infinite a parte ante logice,
> is yet as one continuous process not without a beginning in time) are
> of two kinds, the true and the untrue, or cognitions whose objects
> are real and those whose objects are unreal..."
That quotation explains what is going on. Note that Peirce does not
use the term 'continuous cognition". Instead, he says that cognition
is a continuous process.
That would explain why Peirce never used the term 'continuous semiosis':
Semiosis is a kind of cognition. Cognition is a continuous process.
Therefore, semiosis is a continuous process.
Eating is a continuous process. Therefore, nobody talks about
continuous eating. If something X is continuous, it's redundant to
say "continuous X".
Since semiosis is a kind of cognition, Peirce would not talk about
continuous semiosis for the same reason that he would not talk
about continuous cognition or continuous eating.
This is why careful observation of Peirce's terminology is important.
Noticing whether Peirce avoids a certain kind of term is just as
significant as noticing that he uses it.
By the way, inferences from the absence of something are often
very important, but they are easy to miss. Sherlock Holmes was
very good at such inferences. So are expert bridge players.
John
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
