I think Jeff’s post shows clearly the sense in which semiosic processes are continuous in character. But that doesn’t necessarily entail that semiosic processes are continuous with one another in that sense. Indeed, if all cognition were continuous, then I don’t think there could be any surprises, and hence no learning, if Peirce is right in saying that Nature teaches us all she deigns to teach us by means of surprises.
I am however stumped by Jeff’s final question, as I don’t see what remains to be explained about the continuity of semiosis. Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> Sent: 14-Jan-19 08:44 To: [email protected]; Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis I think that the two phrases in bold and underlined by Jeff support the conclusion that semiosis is a continuous process.. Edwina On Mon 14/01/19 5:34 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> sent: John S, List, Consider the following well-known passage: At any moment we are in possession of certain information, that is, of cognitions which have been logically derived by induction and hypothesis from previous cognitions which are less general, less distinct, and of which we have a less lively consciousness. These in their turn have been derived from others still less general, less distinct, and less vivid; and so on back to the ideal first, which is quite singular, and quite out of consciousness. This ideal first is the particular thing-in-itself. It does not exist as such. That is, there is no thing which is in-itself in the sense of not being relative to the mind, though things which are relative to the mind doubtless are, apart from that relation. The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite series of inductions and hypotheses (which though infinite a parte ante logice, is yet as one continuous process not without a beginning in time) are of two kinds, the true and the untrue, or cognitions whose objects are real and those whose objects are unreal. And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which alone this fact logically called, was between an ens relative to private inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ens such as would stand in the long run. The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge. And so those two series of cognition -- the real and the unreal -- consist of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the community will always continue to re-affirm; and of those which, under the same conditions, will ever after be denied. Now, a proposition whose falsity can never be discovered, and the error of which therefore is absolutely incognizable, contains, upon our principle, absolutely no error. Consequently, that which is thought in these cognitions is the real, as it really is. There is nothing, then, to prevent our knowing outward things as they really are, and it is most likely that we do thus know them in numberless cases, although we can never be absolutely certain of doing so in any special case. CP 5.311 It looks to me like the semiotic processes involved in cognition that Peirce describes in the first part of this passage have material parts, and those parts consist of an infinite series of inductive and abductive inferences. In turn, the inferences have material parts, and those parts consist of the propositions that function as premisses and conclusions. In turn, the propositions have material parts, and those parts consist of the terms that function as subjects and predicates. Let us ask: do the propositions that serve as premisses and conclusions of inferences have material parts (i.e., the terms) in the same sense in which the inferences have parts (i.e., the propositions)? The answer, I think, is "yes". In this way, we can see some of the significance of Peirce's reconceptualization of the nature of the proposition. He says: I mentioned on an early page of this paper that this System leads to a different conception of the Proposition and Argument from the traditional view that a Proposition is composed of Names, and that an Argument is composed of Propositions. It is a matter of insignificant detail whether the term Argument be taken in the sense of the Middle Term, in that of the Copulate of Premisses, in that of the setting forth of Premisses and Conclusion, or in that of the representation that the real facts which the premisses assert (together, it may be, with the mode in which those facts have come to light) logically signify the truth of the Conclusion. In any case, when an Argument is brought before us, there is brought to our notice (what appears so clearly in the Illative Transformations of Graphs) a process whereby the Premisses bring forth the Conclusion, not informing the Interpreter of its Truth, but appealing to him to assent thereto. This Process of Transformation, which is evidently the kernel of the matter, is no more built out of Propositions than a motion is built out of positions. The logical relation of the Conclusion to the Premisses might be asserted; but that would not be an Argument, which is essentially intended to be understood as representing what it represents only in virtue of the logical habit which would bring any logical Interpreter to assent to it. ... It thus appears that the difference between the Term, the Proposition, and the Argument, is by no means a difference of complexity, and does not so much consist in structure as in the services they are severally intended to perform. CP 4.572 While Peirce does not put the terms "continuous" and "semiosis" together here, he does appear to be describing the process of semiosis as involving, essentially, a continuous process of transformation. I have been working under the assumption that this much is widely accepted as a reasonable interpretation of how the processes of transformation involved in semiosis are continuous processes. Is there some disagreement about whether or not Peirce is asserting that the semiotic processes he is describing in these passages are continuous in character? If there is no disagreement about the assertion, then how might we explain the continuous character of these processes? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 _____ From: John F Sowa Sent: Sunday, January 13, 2019 9:14 PM To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis Folks, The discussion in this thread suggests the following points: 1. Peirce used the terms 'continuous' and 'semiosis', but there is no evidence that he used the terms 'continuous semiosis' or 'continuity of semiosis'. 2. Since Peirce said that anything continuous must have material parts, he may have had some reason for not using the term 'continuous semiosis' -- i.e., he didn't have a clear idea about the material parts of semiosis. 3. I am always suspicious of any claim that Peirce would have, might have, or should have used some term that does not occur anywhere in his publications or MSS -- unless there is some very precise definition of how the new term should be used. 4. If anybody wishes to invent a new term that does not occur in anything CSP wrote, they should (a) give a precise definition with examples. and (b) state that it is their own term, not Peirce's. By the way, it's possible that some unpublished MS might turn up in which Peirce does use that term. But unless and until any such MS is discovered, I would observe the caveats in point #4. John
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