Stephen,
dont be disgrudged. The discourses follow a certain path, usually guided by close reading of Peirces writings.
If one puts in too many own ideas, then there is too much deviation, and the post is not answered. This is something, I too still have to learn. It is about practical, and matter-of-fact, but not personal. Do not take it so (personally).
Best, Helmut
I am used to being ignored in general discussions so I will simply react with no need for response. We are apparently in a time of incremental expansion of knowledge. This makes it impossible any more to go with much but the now. It makes this sort of linguistic exercise a sort of game of statues. I am not sure if that is the right description. But I have longed for some sense that there could be conversation that recognizes the efforts of persons like me who have labored considerably to create a more general and universal understanding that will resonate with ordinary readers. I do not think Peirce needs any of us. He may be amused. I would like to be able to talk freely about without feeling I must somehow have it pass muster with whatever one might term the standard to be. The group seems to me to have shrunk but it might grow with a trifle more toleration of a wider way.
On Tue, Jan 29, 2019 at 11:16 AM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote:
Jon AS,
> I suppose that I could invent my own word, but that would
> violate Peirce's ethics of terminology in the other direction,
> since he already created a suitable one--which happens to have
> the advantage of being the root of "semiosis" and "sem(e)iotic."
In his article on the ethics of terminology, Peirce was proposing
guidelines for establishing stable terminology in any branch of
science.
But he also said "symbols grow". He was well aware that the
terminology in any field evolves as new discoveries or inventions
extend or modify the meanings of the old terms. He also admitted
that his own meanings evolved over the years. For examples of
the evolution, look at the definitions in Commens.
Re seme: Peirce used that word in only one article, and he did
not develop it further. Nobody else has adopted it for any
purpose other than to note that Peirce used it in CP 4.538.
That means that the word 'seme' is obsolete. There is no ethical
obligation for anyone to use it. But the word 'predicate' is alive
and well in the same sense that Peirce used.
If you want a term that is similar to 'predicate', but slightly
different, there is a standard *ethical* solution: Just put
an adjective X in front of the word 'predicate'.
That would immediately tell the reader that an X predicate
is similar to a predicate, but qualified by X. In a footnote,
you could add "An X predicate is comparable to what Peirce
called a seme in CP 4.538."
That solution is precise and intelligible to modern readers.
The footnote would give credit to Peirce for the inspiration.
And the word 'comparable' would answer critics who might quibble
with any claim that your definition is identical to whatever
Peirce had intended.
That is more ethical than implying that you have a deeper
understanding of what Peirce intended than he had.
John
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
