List: Consistent with my previous summary as illustrated using Helmut's example, it turns out that there is a late passage--cited by Bellucci in his book (p. 332)--that spells out in considerable detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical analysis of a proposition. In his letter of December 5, 1908 to P. E. B. Jourdain--in the very same paragraph where he famously referred to the Existential Graphs, or perhaps his theory of logical analysis that was based on them, as his "*chef d'oeuvre*"--he stated the following.
CSP: A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more ways than one. But the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite. Thus, if you say 'This rose is red,' a colorblind person will not apprehend your meaning, which shows that the subject has modality, being a *possible *when it is a quality, *de inesse* when it is an existent or actual fact, and *necessary *when it follows from a law or tendency. The result is that everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown into the subjects, leaving the *pure *predicate a mere form of connection, such as 'is,' 'possesses (as a character),' 'stands in the dyadic relation _____ to _____ ,' 'and' = 'is at once _____ and _____ ,' etc. A *Pure Predicate *should be '*continuous*' or 'self-containing' as '*A* is coexistent with *B*' = '*A* coexists with something that coexists with *B*,' and '*A* possesses the character *ρ*' = '*A* possesses the character of possessing the character *ρ,*' and '*A* stands in the relation *λ* to *B*' = '*A* stands in the relation of being in the relation of standing in it to the relation *λ* to the relation of a relation to its correlate to *B*,' etc. The function of reason is to trace out in the real world analogues of logical relations. Thus, corresponding to subject and predicate, or that to which a predication refers, and the *predicate *the substance of the predication, reason supposes there is an element of *matter *which gives being, i.e. is that which is, and an element of *form *which is *how *it is. (NEM 3:885-886) Although Peirce did not mention the word itself, it is clear that the role of what he had called a Seme in 1906--such as "rose" or "red"--is to serve as a substitute for any logical *subject *that the Proposition *denotes*. He even hinted at this in one of the discarded drafts for "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism." CSP: The first member of the triplet, the 'Seme,' embraces the logical Term, the Subject or Object of a sentence, everything of any kind, be it a man or a scribed character, such as h or Pb, which will serve, or is supposed to serve, for some purpose, as a substitute for its Object. It is a Sign which pretends, at least, to intend to be virtually its Object. (R 295:[28-29]; 1906) In other words, a Seme stands in the place of *anything* that requires Collateral Experience in order to be known by an interpreting Quasi-mind; i.e., any member of any of the three *Universes *of Experience--Possible, Existent, or Necessitant (EP 2:478-479; 1908)--that together constitute the *entire *Universe. Meanwhile, the only logical *predicate *is the "pure" or "continuous" one--the "mere form of connection" that the Proposition *signifies*--as reflected in the continuity of the Line of Identity that *iconically *represents it in an Existential Graph. Perhaps that is precisely why Peirce came to favor this approach over the (now standard) one that instead throws everything into the predicate. With all of that in mind, I wonder if "Subject" might be another terminological alternative for "Seme," at least within the context of formal logic. A "proper" Peircean analysis of a sentence in modern predicate logic would then classify *both *the "identifiers" (Designatives) *and *the "predicates" (Descriptives) as *Subjects *connected by a *Continuous Predicate*. Regards, Jon S. On Wed, Jan 30, 2019 at 12:54 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Helmut, List: > > You are welcome! This is a simple and clear example of the contrast > between the two most extreme alternatives for analyzing a Proposition. > Peirce's eventual preference was to throw everything into the *subject*, > leaving only the Continuous Predicate; while his earlier approach (adopted > by modern logic) was to throw everything into the *predicate*, leaving > only a quantified variable as the subject--"anything you please," > "something I could designate," or "this specific thing." > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Wed, Jan 30, 2019 at 12:30 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Thank you, Jon! >> >> *Gesendet:* Mittwoch, 30. Januar 2019 um 18:33 Uhr >> *Von:* "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> >> *An:* "Helmut Raulien" <[email protected]> >> *Betreff:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Speculative Grammar: Logic as >> Semiotic >> Helmut, List: >> >> "Resistance," "is," and "futile" are all Semes (or Names) in the obvious >> sense that each serves as a substitute for its Object. "_____ is >> resistance" and "_____ is futile" are both Rhemes, which are Semes (or >> Names) with blank Continuous Predicates or unattached Lines of Identity; >> i.e., incomplete Propositions. Peirce's ultimate logical analysis of the >> Proposition would classify both "resistance" and "futility" as Descriptive >> Semes (or Names), and "_____ possesses the character of _____" as the >> Continuous Predicate. Modern logic would instead classify both >> "resistance" and "futile" as predicates and restate the Proposition as "For >> any x, if x is resistance then x is futile." Peirce's typical way of >> expressing the latter would classify the subject as "anything you please" >> and the predicate as "is either futile or not resistance." >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Wed, Jan 30, 2019 at 10:55 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> John, list, >>> Is a seme that what might be replaced by a name? Because a rheme, as I >>> remember, is the part of a proposition, that is not the part that might be >>> replaced with a name. So, does a proposition consist of a seme and a rheme? >>> Example: In "resistance is futile": Is "resistance" the seme, and "is >>> futile" the rheme, the rheme consisting of the predicate "futile" and the >>> peg "is"? >>> Ok, "resistance" might be called a name itself. Other example: >>> "Attending the Southpark elementary school probably is not a good choice": >>> "Attending the Southpark elementary school" is not a name, but might be >>> replaced by one: "Helmut probably is not a good choice". So "Attending the >>> Southpark elementary school" is the seme, "is not a good choice" is the >>> rheme, "not a good choice" is the predicate, and "probably is" is the peg? >>> Best wishes from the good choice >>> Helmut >>> >>
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