BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }I
agree with Stephen's concerns. I think that the repeated focus on
terminology, with the agenda of insisting that it's 'this term' and
not 'that term' obscures and makes almost irrelevant the real point
of Peircean semiosis which is, in my view, as Stephen points out,
'that the universe is information'.
It is this 'fact' which is the basis of Peircean semiosis and I
consider that this is the key area of analysis. Unfortunately, this
list at this time, doesn't have that same focus.
Edwina
On Sun 03/02/19 8:44 AM , Stephen Curtiss Rose [email protected]
sent:
Peirce is relevant for having suggested all thought is in signs.
Pierce fuels folk who are looking past he could see but where he knew
of. This was known when this list began. It is lost now in the back
and forth which continues despite its impossibility which you point
out. The result of his root premise is the inevitable suggestion that
the universe is information and that this is the stuff of the
universe.
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=the+universe+is+information
[1]
amazon.com/author/stephenrose [2]
On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 8:05 AM Auke van Breemen wrote:
List,
Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the
world at large
2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use
common language in order to have it achieve the influence it
deserves.
I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem.
Maybe Short is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as
much groping with little conclusions. If he is right it is not the
esoteric terminology, that prevents semiotics the get the influence
it ought to have. That terminology may prove to be technical language
needed for a grammar of the speculative faculty, which is not confined
to the mind according to Peirce, hence argument becomes delome.
If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research
program (Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the
semiotic trade.
I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and
John Sowa points in this direction:
JAS:
> I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have
to
> accept our disagreement and move on.
John:
That is certainly true. The evidence shows that Peirce defined a
seme as a predicate or quasi-predicate. Continuity cannot have any
effect on that definition. There is nothing more to say.
(To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)
Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth
considering his considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the
have any influence at all it is because it is transformed into a
promising research program and not because of what Peirce did
contribute to that enterprise. What we need is a semiotic definition
of the (argument) delome. How can we explicate with the semiotic
terminology the process of semiosis that is captured in logic by the
term argument?
In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we
may find many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at
the changes as improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that
the different terms introduced may co-exist as different angles on the
same object. Both possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's
writings. I think the experimentation with the first trichotomy of
sign aspects delivers an example of differences in perspective:
On the terminological level Peirce experimented
He suggested:
A (1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign, as an
alternative trichotomy for
B (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign, but he also
introduced
C (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type.
In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a
different angle
With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an
interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative
perspective,
With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our
world, it opens up the sign structure perspective
With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation
of a sign, how it affects the interpreting system, it associates
signs with the phaneroscopic endeavour.
A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The
exchange Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking
recourse to the type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is
right in his interpretation of type, which is informed by
phaneroscopic considerations, a similarity in tokens, and reserve
legisign for my opinion which allows different tokens to be taken as
the same. For instance when we deal with the spoken and written
forms. Familiarity may overcome differences in form by an established
law; because two different forms raise the same symbol habitually. It
acts as a same sign.
Best,
Auke van Breemen
Links:
------
[1]
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=the+universe+is+information
[2] http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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