I am laughing Edwina because we used to be able to disagree with abandon but all we do now is agree that something has happened. I think it is nothing that is here -- but something in the cosmosphere -- the point at which the academy reached its limit and C. P. Snow smiled in Heaven. Life goes on. As does continuity. And they are not exactly the same. amazon.com/author/stephenrose
On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 9:51 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > I agree with Stephen's concerns. I think that the repeated focus on > terminology, with the agenda of insisting that it's 'this term' and not > 'that term' obscures and makes almost irrelevant the real point of Peircean > semiosis which is, in my view, as Stephen points out, 'that the universe is > information'. > > It is this 'fact' which is the basis of Peircean semiosis and I consider > that this is the key area of analysis. Unfortunately, this list at this > time, doesn't have that same focus. > > Edwina > > > > On Sun 03/02/19 8:44 AM , Stephen Curtiss Rose [email protected] sent: > > Peirce is relevant for having suggested all thought is in signs. Pierce > fuels folk who are looking past he could see but where he knew of. This was > known when this list began. It is lost now in the back and forth which > continues despite its impossibility which you point out. The result of his > root premise is the inevitable suggestion that the universe is information > and that this is the stuff of the universe. > https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=the+universe+is+information > amazon.com/author/stephenrose > > > On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 8:05 AM Auke van Breemen <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> List, >> >> Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues. >> 1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at >> large >> 2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common >> language in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves. >> >> I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe >> Short is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping >> with little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology, >> that prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That >> terminology may prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the >> speculative faculty, which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce, >> hence argument becomes delome. >> >> If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program >> (Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade. >> >> I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John >> Sowa points in this direction: >> >> JAS: >> > I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to >> > accept our disagreement and move on. >> >> John: >> That is certainly true. The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as >> a predicate or quasi-predicate. Continuity cannot have any effect on that >> definition. There is nothing more to say. >> >> (To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue) >> >> Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering >> his considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence >> at all it is because it is transformed into a promising research program >> and not because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we >> need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we >> explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is >> captured in logic by the term argument? >> >> In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may >> find many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes >> as improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different >> terms introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both >> possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the >> experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an >> example of differences in perspective: >> >> On the terminological level Peirce experimented >> >> He suggested: >> A (1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign, as an alternative >> trichotomy for >> B (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign, but he also >> introduced >> C (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type. >> >> In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a >> different angle >> With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an >> interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective, >> With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our >> world, it opens up the sign structure perspective >> With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a >> sign, how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the >> phaneroscopic endeavour. >> >> A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The >> exchange Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking >> recourse to the type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is right >> in his interpretation of type, which is informed by phaneroscopic >> considerations, a similarity in tokens, and reserve legisign for my opinion >> which allows different tokens to be taken as the same. For instance when we >> deal with the spoken and written forms. Familiarity may overcome >> differences in form by an established law; because two different forms >> raise the same symbol habitually. It acts as a same sign. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Auke van Breemen >> >> >> >> >> >
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