Matt, List: Thanks for the clarifications.
MF: Just as the character of points in the outer borderline of a black dot doesn't follow the same logic which determines the character of the points in the interior of the dot ... In my view, the mistake here is not recognizing that the borderline is a *discontinuity*; and that neither it, nor the black dot, nor (for that matter) the white plane outside the black dot is *composed *of discrete dimensionless (and therefore colorless) points. Any arbitrarily small but finite area that we designate *within *the dot is black; any such area that we designate *outside *the dot is white; and any such area that we designate *along *the borderline is partially black and partially white. MF: ... the character of the whole collective of all signs, i.e., the whole universe, doesn't follow the same the same logic which determines the character of the signs interior to the universe. Why not? Peirce did not say that the Universe is *like *a Sign, or that it is *merely *"the whole collective of all signs," but that it *is *a Sign (Representamen). He also held that *any *complex of connected Signs constitutes *one *Sign. What color is the dot? If we isolate a smaller dot within that dot, what color is it? What color will *any *dot be, if it is composed *entirely *of smaller black dots? We can thus revise your premise accordingly to something that is not problematic--"Every dot making up a larger black dot is black." MF: Yes, in my counter argument I rejected the part of Peirce's generalization that included the whole universe as a sign. I thought that you were rejecting the major premise, not the minor premise. In any case, I am not proposing that the *entire *Universe as a Sign is a collection of discrete Instances--if anything, that would be "the universe of existents" only--but that it is a *semiosic continuum*; its material parts are continuous Signs, whose material parts are continuous Types, whose material parts are their indefinite and inexhaustible *potential *Instances. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 4:43 PM Matt Faunce <[email protected]> wrote: > First off, please ignore my second from last paragraph in my previous > post, as I didn't flesh out my ideas very well. > > Further comments below. > > On Feb 3, 2019, at 5:13 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Matt, List: > > Which of the Five Ways of Aquinas includes only premises that "can > possibly have a shred of inductive support"? They are not intended to > persuade non-theists to become theists, but rather to demonstrate how > certain combinations of other beliefs *warrant *or even *require *theism. > As I stated previously, that is also my objective here. > > On the other hand, my first premise is *falsifiable*, at least in > principle. All we need is one counterexample--a single Sign that is > *not *determined by an Object other than itself. Can you suggest one? > Your proposed revision--"every Sign save the universe-as-a-whole is > determined by an Object other than itself"--not only begs the question, but > also amounts to special pleading. > > The special pleading was specifically this analogy: Just as the character > of points in the outer borderline of a black dot doesn't follow the same > logic which determines the character of the points in the interior of the > dot, the character of the whole collective of all signs, i.e., the whole > universe, doesn't follow the same the same logic which determines the > character of the signs interior to the universe. > > The support that I offered for my two premises consisted entirely of > quotes from Peirce's writings. Someone who rejects his definitions of Sign > and Object--which require the latter to be *external *to, *independent *of, > and *unaffected *by the former--will obviously reject my argumentation > out of hand. Likewise, someone who denies that the entire Universe is a > Sign will just as readily dismiss it. > > Yes, in my counter argument I rejected the part of Peirce's generalization > that included the whole universe as a sign. I'm not that wedded to this > rejection; I just think it should be considered. > > However, in either case, it should be acknowledged that one is deviating > from Peirce's own explicitly stated views; i.e., that he was *incorrect *to > affirm one or both of those propositions. Then the question becomes what > ramifications this has for his (and our) understanding of Signs and the > Universe. > > Yes. I agree. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 3:34 PM Matt Faunce <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On Feb 3, 2019, at 3:55 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> My argument is deductively valid, so in order to disagree with its >> conclusion, one must also disagree with at least one of its premises. With >> which of those premises do you specifically disagree, and why? >> >> Jon, here's my 2 cents. >> >> >> I don't think your inclusion of "every" in your major premise, "every >> Sign is determined by an Object other than itself," can possibly have a >> shred of inductive support. That is, I think your major premise is a mere >> hypothesis. >> >> >> I wonder if your major premise is analogous to this: "Every point making >> a black dot is black." Here I'm referring to a black area on an otherwise >> white plane. According to bivalent logic it is either true or false that a >> given point making up the black dot is black—and we'd have to say "true." >> But, Peirce discovered tri-valent logic by wondering about the color of the >> outer borderline of the dot separating the black dot from the white >> surroundings, and determined that, since no point in the line can be half >> black and half white, and since you can't butt two points up together (one >> point in the white line surrounding the dot and the other point at the >> outer black line of the dot abutting the white line) with no room in >> between, the borderline's color must be indeterminate. So, the logic by >> which everyone thought the major premise, "every point making a black dot >> is black", was secure, was in fact not applicable to that outer edge, and >> therefore the inclusion of "every" is specious. I think that it may be, by >> analogy, that the logic by which you think the major premise, "every Sign >> is determined by an Object other than itself", is secure, is likewise not >> applicable to your task. I can accept this revision: "every Sign save the >> universe-as-a-whole is determined by an Object other than itself," but >> that's not useful for your task. >> >> >> The mere possibility that your major premise, "Every Sign is determined >> by an Object other than itself", is analogous to this major premise, "Every >> point making a black dot is black", means that your major premise is a mere >> hypothesis. It's not inductively supported because you can't possibly >> assign a probability to the status of the analogy, for example, "the >> probably that the analogy holds is 25%." It would be like determining the >> color content of beans in a bag after randomly sampling a percentage of >> beans from all but the bottom layer of the bag. The probability that you >> assign to your induction doesn't apply to the contents of the whole bag but >> only to the area from which you were capable of sampling. If you pulled all >> white beans, the statement, "all the beans in the bag are white", must >> still be treated as a hypothesis. (I'm not considering that you have a clue >> as to how the beans got into the bag, as that would be useful information; >> all that you could include in your induction about how the universe got >> here are further hypotheses.) >> >> >> A valid syllogism that has a hypothetical major premise has a >> hypothetical conclusion. So your deduction begs the question: Can the >> reality of God be logically supported? >> >> >> Matt >> >
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