Matt, List: I disagree. The Proposition being expressed in ordinary language has three *really distinct* Subjects--paint, wetness, and freshness--which respectively fill the blanks of its Continuous Predicate, "if _____ possesses the character of _____, then it possesses the character of _____." Each of these Subjects is something *other than* the other two, although the different Possibles are obviously instantiated in the same Existent. Wetness is (often, but not always) an *Index *of freshness; paint is wet because it is fresh, not fresh because it is wet.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Feb 6, 2019 at 3:21 PM Matt Faunce <[email protected]> wrote: > On Feb 6, 2019, at 4:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Again, the obvious strategy for defeating my major premise is simply to > provide a single counterexample--something that we can agree Peirce would > have acknowledged to be a Sign, but that is *not *determined by an Object > other than itself. > > Here's an example of a sign and object being "other" by a formal > distinction and not a real distinction: > > > A sign of fresh paint is its wetness. > > > Matt >
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