Dear list,
Jon said:
Why should we privilege a terminology and approach that he utilized only
once ("quasi-predicate" and "quasi-subject") over what he wrote more than
once ("Seme" and especially "continuous predicate"), later in his life, in
an analysis that he explicitly called "proper" and "ultimate"?
To which, Houser said:
Why *contrite* fallibilism?
As far as I know *Peirce used that expression, “contrite fallibilism”, only
once*, in the quotation I gave earlier where he said that it was “out of a
contrite fallibilism, combined with a high faith in the reality
of knowledge, and an intense desire to find things out”, that all of his
philosophy had grown (CP 1.13-14).
This adds a new dimension to fallibilism, humility, which Rescher
*also noticed*.
Remember Rescher’s admonition that “A kind of intellectual humility is in
order, a diffidence that abstains from the hubris of pretensions to
cognitive finality or centrality”. But the humility Peirce calls for is
more contrite for it is a humility that nature demands of us, a hard lesson
learned, when, for example, we must bow our heads and admit that heavy
bodies do not fall faster than light ones notwithstanding the common sense
of generations.
~ Houser, Peirce’s Contrite Fallibilism
But we can, of course, simply choose not to acknowledge Houser or Rescher.
With best wishes,
Jerry R
On Wed, Feb 6, 2019 at 3:15 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
wrote:
> John S., List:
>
> Just a couple of quick comments on an otherwise interesting post.
>
> JFS: A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate.
>
>
> This is *only *true in an analysis of Propositions that throws everything
> it can into the *predicate*, as modern logic advocates.
>
> JFS: There is no overlap between a seme and a subject or quasi-subject.
>
>
> This is clearly *false *in an analysis of Propositions that throws
> everything it can into the *subject*, as Peirce eventually advocated.
>
> Why should we privilege a terminology and approach that he utilized only
> once ("quasi-predicate" and "quasi-subject") over what he wrote more than
> once ("Seme" and especially "continuous predicate"), later in his life, in
> an analysis that he explicitly called "proper" and "ultimate"?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Feb 6, 2019 at 2:45 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> I started to reply to some of the issues in recent notes. And I
>> realized that some examples would help clarify the many issues about
>> continuity and semiosis.
>>
>> For the first example, see the attached diagram frere2.gif. At
>> the top is traditional notation for one bar of music. That diagram
>> states a proposition that is true of any music that any musician
>> would play by reading that diagram.
>>
>> To emphasize the fact that music notation can express propositions,
>> frere2.gif also contains a conceptual graph (CG) that expresses the
>> same proposition as that bar of music. That CG could be mapped to
>> logic as expressed by an existential graph or the algebraic notation.
>> For further explanation, see http://jfsowa.com/pubs/eg2cg.pdf
>>
>> All four notations -- traditional music notation and its translation
>> to CGs, EGs, or predicate calculus -- consist of a finite number of
>> symbols and icons. Some of the symbols are names, which have an
>> indexical effect of relating the notation to a physical instrument
>> and the music it generates.
>>
>> The vertical dimension of the lines of music is an icon that represents
>> tones ranging from lower to higher. The horizontal dimension is an
>> icon of the temporal sequence of the tones. The duration of each tone
>> is shown by symbols for quarter notes, half notes...
>>
>> In the CGs, EGs, or predicate calculus, the iconic conventions are
>> mapped to dyadic predicates named Dur (duration) or Next. For both
>> the EGs and CGs, the nodes can be freely moved around. But in
>> frere2.gif, the boxes and circles are placed in an iconic pattern
>> that mimics the icons in music notation. But the iconic placement
>> of CG or EG nodes, which is an aid to the reader, is irrelevant to
>> the logic -- any nodes of the CG or EG could be moved in any direction
>> without affecting the semantics.
>>
>> We can relate this to what Peirce wrote in 1902 (CP 2.320). He
>> started with two visual examples, a portrait and a photograph:
>>
>> > A man's portrait with a man's name written under it is strictly a
>> > proposition, although its syntax is not that of speech, and although
>> > the portrait itself not only represents, but is, a Hypoicon. But the
>> > proper name so nearly approximates to the nature of an Index, that
>> > this might suffice to give an idea of an informational Index.
>>
>> A portrait plus an index asserts a proposition (dicisign). In effect,
>> the image is used as a kind of predicate. In that same paragraph,
>> he introduced the word 'quasi-predicate' for images used in this way:
>>
>> > A better example is a photograph. The mere print does not, in itself,
>> > convey any information. But the fact, that it is virtually a section
>> > of rays projected from an object otherwise known, renders it a Dicisign.
>> > Every Dicisign, as the system of Existential Graphs fully recognizes,
>> > is a further determination of an already known sign of the same object.
>> > It is not, perhaps, sufficiently brought out in the present analysis.
>> > It will be remarked that this connection of the print, which is the
>> > quasi-predicate of the photograph, with the section of the rays,
>> > which is the quasi-subject, is the Syntax of the Dicisign;
>>
>> This paragraph explains the nature of continuity in semiosis:
>>
>> 1. Every predicate defined in logic or language is specified by
>> an expression with a finite number of symbols. There is only
>> a discrete (countable or denumerable) infinity of definitions
>> for logical predicates or logical subjects.
>>
>> 2. But visual images (such as photographs or visual percepts) and
>> sound images and percepts (such as the musical passages that
>> correspond to frere2.gif) vary along a continuum -- an uncountable
>> infinity of possibilities for which the logical predicate is true.
>>
>> 3. When an image is "connected" with an index, it serves as a
>> quasi-predicate to state a proposition or dicisign. Any instance
>> of that continuum of pseudo-predicates may be connected with an
>> index to state a proposition.
>>
>> 4. But note Peirce's term 'quasi-subject' for the intersection of
>> a continuum of light rays with the plane of the photograph. There
>> is an uncountable infinity of potential intersections. A slight
>> movement of the camera might have caused any of them to become
>> the image recorded by photograph.
>>
>> In summary, Peirce based his semeiotic on a solid foundation of
>> mathematics and logic. A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate.
>> There is no overlap between a seme and a subject or quasi-subject.
>> Peirce would reject any attempt to blur those distinctions as
>> "loose talk" -- as he did with loose definitions of pragmatism.
>>
>> John
>>
>
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