> On Feb 8, 2019, at 1:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > > How can subjects be disjoint from predicates if they can denote properties? > How can predicates by themselves be "true of things" when only a complete > proposition is capable of being true or false? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Jon: These two questions in relation to a general notion of logic as “If antecedents, then consequences”. 1. The proposition is false. (Not every subject is related to every predicate.) 2. As I understand this linguistic game, the “things” are mathematical objects and the logic is called first order logic. One general (and perhaps predominant?) view of mathematics is that mathematical symbols can not carry any meaning outside the mathematical symbol system. That is, one must add some adjectives to give meaning to the syntactical symbols and relations of pure mathematics. In this worldview, the physical meaning of mathematical symbols and logic are conveyed by the asSIGNment of physical units (mass, distance, electricity, temperature, etc.). For example: X has the property Y. Or: X = The number 47.63 , Y = mass. Or: The mass of the mathematical object X is 47.63. BTW, one must always keep in mind the distinction between the mathematics of the discrete and the mathematics of the continuous, which often underlies John Sowa’s perspectives and occasionally his assertions. Conceptually, Quine’s dictum, “To be is to be variable” directly opposes CSP’s “Logic of Proper Names.” Cheers jerry
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