Auke, Gary R., List:
Like Gary, I am having a hard time understanding exactly what Auke is
proposing. In EGs, the Sheet of Assertion itself is a Sign, and everything
scribed on it is a Sign, including the Spots, Lines of Identity, and Cuts
involved in the Propositions that are primarily being represented. As
such, the Sheet of Assertion is also a semeiotic sheet.
It further puzzles me that so many researchers still focus on the
three-trichotomy, ten-Sign taxonomy of 1903, since Peirce himself abandoned
it almost immediately--once he recognized the distinctions between the
different Objects and Interpretants of the same Sign. Although he
eventually viewed all ten trichotomies as corresponding to the three
Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants), rather than the three
Categories (1ns/2ns/3ns), there is still a phaneroscopic aspect to at least
three of them--the Sign itself, its Immediate Object, and its Immediate
Interpretant are all divided according to their Mode of *Presentation*.
Arguably those for the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant, divided
according to their Mode of *Being*, are also phaneroscopic--since "we can
directly observe [the three modes of being] in elements of whatever is at
any time before the mind in any way" (CP 1.23; 1903). Of the six
correlates, then, only the Final Interpretant, divided according to its
Purpose, is clearly normative.
As for the relation trichotomies, more recently I have highlighted the six
possible combinations of those for the Final Interpretant (Nature of
Influence) and Dynamic Interpretant (Manner of Appeal). Subjects,
Propositions, and Arguments can all be *presented* (Suggestive), such that
the Dynamic Interpretant is a Feeling; and it seems to me that it is *only *as
they are presented that they could be properly studied within
Phaneroscopy. Perhaps a Subject is first presented to the mind as quality,
a Proposition as relation/reaction, and an Argument as
representation/mediation. Normally, though, a Proposition is *urged
*(Imperative),
attempting to *compel *some kind of Exertion, whether physical or
psychical; and an Argument is *submitted *(Indicative), inviting *deliberate
*acceptance of its conclusion, although it can also be urged. Peirce's
account of perception seems relevant here.
CSP: The Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last
analysis, the Percept ... That we are conscious of our Percepts is a theory
that seems to me to be beyond dispute ... a Percept is a Seme, while ...
the Perceptual Judgment ... is a Pheme that is the direct Dynamical
Interpretant of the Percept, and of which the Percept is the Dynamical
Object ...
How is it that the Percept, which is a Seme, has for its direct Dynamical
Interpretant the Perceptual Judgment, which is a Pheme? For that is not the
usual way with Semes, certainly ...
Suffice it to say that the perceiver is aware of being compelled to
perceive what he perceives. Now existence means precisely the exercise of
compulsion. Consequently, whatever feature of the percept is brought into
relief by some association and thus attains a logical position like that of
the observational premiss of an explaining Abduction, the attribution of
Existence to it in the Perceptual Judgment is virtually and in an extended
sense, a logical Abductive Inference nearly approximating to necessary
inference. (CP 4.539-541; 1906)
A Percept is a Subject, and a Perceptual Judgment is a Proposition. How
can that which is merely presented have a Dynamic Interpretant that is an
Instance of a Sign, rather than a mere Feeling? Although Peirce initially
called the Perceptual Judgment "the direct Dynamical Interpretant of the
Percept," he went on to explain that the Perceptual Judgment is *really *the
conclusion of an almost instantaneous Abductive (or Retroductive) *Argument*.
In other words, all three kinds of Signs--Subject, Proposition, and
Argument--are involved in perception. For example, consider the thought
experiment that Gary R. posted more than a year ago, calling it "The First
Thing I See."
GR: I walk into a room I'm not familiar with, sit down, close my eyes,
then turn my head to the right, open my eyes, and the first thing I see is
an object of a peculiar shape (of course I haven't thought of it in these
terms, but it isn't at all immediately clear to me what it is), then in a
moment I recognize it as a 'vase' (a rheme, not a dicisign), albeit a
peculiarly shaped one. In my later analysis I see that I have had at least
two immediate objects set before my mind, a complex mix of qualisigns
(shape, colors, etc.), so, at first not recognizable as "something," and a
rhematic one, as I quickly identify this "something' to be a vase. And it
seems clear enough to me that at that moment of recognition I did not think
a proposition ("That is a vase"), but merely the rheme, 'vase'.
The initial Percept is a composite of qualities, whose Dynamic Interpretant
can only be a Feeling--perhaps of confusion at first, followed immediately
by a search for an explanation, just as genuine doubt prompts inquiry.
There is then another vague Feeling, this time of recognition,
corresponding (loosely) to the Proposition, "if that is a vase, then seeing
this composite of qualities would be a matter of course." What follows is
the hypothesis, "that is a vase" or "I am seeing a vase," as the
(plausible, not certain) conclusion of a valid Retroductive Argument.
However, the Feeling of recognition is only possible for someone who has
had previous Collateral Experience with vases, as well as acquaintance with
the English word "vase"; otherwise, a more deliberate inquiry would be
necessary in order to determine the nature of the object being perceived
and/or the correct word to apply to it.
I have always disputed Gary's contention that what he thought at the moment
of recognition was the rheme, "vase," rather than the proposition, "that is
a vase." I would now say that there is a sense in which we are *both
*right--familiarity
with the *definition *of "vase" and experience with *actual *vases as *Subjects
*are necessary precursors to reaching the Perceptual Judgment, "that is a
vase" or "I see a vase," as a *Proposition *that follows from a
Retroductive *Argument*. Put in these terms, it is evident that we
*could *conceivably
use EGs to represent perception, and thereby study at least *some *aspects
of the Phaneron. However, I suspect that the *compulsive *aspect of
Experience as Peirce defined that term ultimately differentiates it from
what is merely *presented *to the mind--that which is true or false vs.
that which merely *seems*--and might account for the corresponding
distinction between the three Universes of Experience in Semeiotic and the
three phenomenological Categories in Phaneroscopy.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Sat, Feb 16, 2019 at 9:05 AM Auke van Breemen <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Gary, list,
>
>
>
> To prevent confusion, two remarks at the outset:
>
>
>
> 1. in a sense all sheets (of assertion {EG} of
> phaneroscopy/phenomenology and semiotis) are semiotic sheets in the sense
> that they model the process of semiosis. But each from a different
> perspective. ‘semiotic sheet’ is for me shorthand for the sheet on which
> the process is modeled in technical semiotic terms, including the sign –
> and the interpretant aspects. The same goes for the
> phaneroscopic/phenomenologic sheet.
> 2. I did not in the mail try to promote the semiotic program to which
> I contribute. By means of comparison: I provided a suggestive list of
> ingredients that might contribute to a good meal of a certain type, I did
> not try to present a recipe for a certain meal. Above that it is an
> incomplete list. Vinicius Romanini for instance would add from his Solenoid
> perspective the different types of objects and interpretants.
>
> What I would ague for is that the most fruitful way to proceed is to try
> to conceptually co-ordinate the different perspectives on each other. The
> key to that is the process of semiosis expressed as a sign process.
>
>
>
> Gary, you remarked about my assumed position: (perhaps, as you're
> suggesting, modifying EG notation)
>
>
>
> Re: most definitely I am not suggesting that. I only suggest to mimic the
> EG’s approach to sheets, but with a broader focus, not just propositions
> and not abstracting from the apprehension of the sign. The concept of a
> sheet is very helpful for that.
>
>
>
> GR did ask:
>
> Yet perhaps I'm missing something here (again, I'm no expert in EGs). To
> aid our comprehension, could you possibly draw even a crude draft modeling
> what might appear on a "phaneroscopic sheet"? That would certainly be most
> helpful.
>
>
>
> Re: First of all I do not profess to mimic the EG in Phenomenology, my
> interest is primary modeling the semiotic process. For me phaneroscopy is
> helpful for thinking about the sign aspects and the relations between them,
> like with the correspondence between feeling and qualisign. I mentioned De
> Tiene’s suggestion for completeness sake. And also since it delivers
> according to the architectonic the principles for semiotics, which is
> precisely the way I look at it.
>
>
>
> Lets start with your remark:
>
> In addition, the application of the phenomenological categories to
> semeiotics (according to the 'principle of principle' recently discussed)
> frequently occurs with no sense of their origins in phenomenology (also,
> their anticipation in the valencies of the simplest math).
>
>
>
> Indeed thus they deliver in terms of a valency connections categorically
> organized the basic dependency structure for the process of semiosis. The
> 1.1 qualisign – 3.3 argument structure of the sign aspects.
>
>
>
> Hope to have clarified my mail a little.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Auke van Breemen
>
>
>
> *Van:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
> *Verzonden:* vrijdag 15 februari 2019 20:20
> *Aan:* Peirce-L <[email protected]>
> *Onderwerp:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy
>
>
>
> Auke, list,
>
>
>
> Auke wrote: "You provided an excellent quote to point to the difference
> between sheets of assertion and phaneroscopic or semiotic sheets."
>
>
>
> I found it difficult to grasp exactly what you're suggesting in this
> message beginning with your distinguishing "between sheets of assertion
> and phaneroscopic or semiotic sheets"
>
>
>
> This is doubly confusing because sheets of assertion would seem to me *to
> be* "semiotic sheets" rather than whatever your proposed "phaneroscopic
> sheets" might be. Indeed, the seemingly contradictory language you use
> appears to me to work to conflate phenomenology (the 1st cenoscopic
> science) with logic as semeiotic (3rd branch of the 2nd second cenoscopic
> science, viz., normative science). In a word "phanerocopic" doe not =
> "semiotic".
>
>
>
> Expanding on this a little, in my view, the categories of phenomenology
> are all too often also confused/conflated with the metaphysical categories
> (which, as I see it, are the Universal Categories applied--offering
> *principles*--to metaphysics, perhaps recast at Three Universes of
> Experience). In addition, the application of the phenomenological
> categories to semeiotics (according to the 'principle of principle'
> recently discussed) frequently occurs with no sense of their origins in
> phenomenology (also, their anticipation in the valencies of the simplest
> math).
>
>
>
> Be that as it may, despite your intriguing comments, it is entirely
> unclear to me what a phaneroscopic (or "semiotic" as your wrote) sheet
> might look like, what its purpose might be, its rules, etc.
>
>
>
> I'm not an expert in EGs by a long shot, but my earlier stated reservation
> concerning the possible use of EGs *within* Peirce's science of
> Phenomenology is based exactly on the Peirce quotation I'd earlier given
> and which you reproduced in your message, namely, that "All that
> existential graphs can represent is *propositions*, on a single sheet,
> and arguments on a succession of sheets, presented in temporal succession."
>
>
>
> (Btw, following de Tienne, I tend to limit my use of the expression,
> "Phaneroscopy," to the *initial* *stage* of phenomenological research; de
> Tienne adds another stage, I a third.)
>
>
>
> So, as I see it now, unless an entirely original kind of graph can be
> created to aid in phenomenological *research *(perhaps, as you're
> suggesting, modifying EG notation), at present, EGs seem to me capable only
> of (a) helping to clarify those logical moves by Peirce which served to
> reveal the connection between types of propositions and the three
> categories, or (c) explicating the findings of phenomenological research in
> graphic form.
>
>
>
> Yet perhaps I'm missing something here (again, I'm no expert in EGs). To
> aid our comprehension, could you possibly draw even a crude draft modeling
> what might appear on a "phaneroscopic sheet"? That would certainly be most
> helpful.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
>
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>
> *Communication Studies*
>
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
> On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 10:07 AM Auke van Breemen <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
> Gary (List),
>
>
>
> You provided an excellent quote to point to the difference between sheets
> of assertion and phaneroscopic or semiotic sheets:
>
>
>
> CSP:
>
> All that existential graphs can represent is *propositions*, on a single
> sheet, and arguments on a succession of sheets, presented in temporal
> succession.
>
>
>
> A semiotic sheet could be modeled with the sign aspects. The interpretant
> aspects could bridge the gap with phaneroscopy: emotional interpretant (a
> feeling of a quality is an instance of it, but it can encompass much more).
> This differs from representing propositions on sheets. I think it should
> start with a sheet and a sign that gets inscribed and must find a way to
> model the interaction. On the most general level there are 9 sign aspects
> according to Peirce, but only six interpretant aspects, so it seems
> reasonable to suppose that the three missing interpretant aspects are
> concerned with the (object of) the sign. I found the three missing to be
> the index, the legisign and the symbol position.
>
>
>
> If we suppose a line of identity, it could appear on a semiotic sheet as a
> dot. It is the index signifying the interaction between sheet and
> inscribing sign. If the legisign position is not ‘satisfied’ the
> interpreting system (sheet) has no collateral knowledge of the sign. And it
> will not be able to ‘satisfy’ the symbol position, which provides the
> meaning of the sign.
>
>
>
> I use ‘satisfy’ to prevent a mechanical interpretation of the
> interpretation process. The goal operative in the sheet and the sign
> co-determine the responding sign. The model has, in my opinion, to provide
> a process of translation from qualisign to the response sign that is guided
> by the doleme. The categories have to deliver the dependency structure in
> between.
>
>
>
> Looked at from this angle the extended Welby classification refines the
> analysis on several aspects already made. P. 162 of the Welby
> correspondence offers a lot to ponder. Just in order to illustrate the
> importance of looking at the responding sign as the outcome of the
> interpretation process, I give the last trichotomy.
>
> 10. Assurance of interpretants by signs.
>
> a. assurance by instinct
>
> b. assurance by experience
>
> c. experience by habit.
>
>
>
> It is a measure for the adequacy of the response.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Auke van Breemen
>
>
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