Gary R., Auke, List: I apologize, "abandoned" was indeed too strong a word; and if researchers today continue to find Peirce's 1903 taxonomy of Signs to be useful for their purposes, then far be it from me to block the way of inquiry.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Feb 16, 2019 at 11:11 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Auke, Jon, List, > > > Your post, Auke, did indeed help clarify your earlier one for me. It > having done that, it makes me further doubt your hypothetical project of > diagramming phenomenon based on an Existential Graph model. > > > I most certainly think that "optimally iconic" (Stjernfelt) diagrams and > graphs (EGs being a prime example) are far preferable to those which are > merely "operational" (characteristically, discursive). See, for example: > https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11787181_6 There are good > reasons for this, notably that it is valuable to be able to observe, > modify, and otherwise experiment on graphs, and the more iconic a graph is, > the easier it is to do this. For logic, EGs would appear to be "optimally > iconic." > > > However, it seems to me that one remains squarely in the realm of logic as > semeiotic when one is working with EGs because, as now repeatedly noted: "All > that existential graphs can represent is *propositions*, on a single > sheet, and arguments on a succession of sheets, presented in temporal > succession." CSP > > > Consequently, I strongly doubt that EGs can be useful in phenomenology > *qua* phenomenology. > > > GR: EGs seem to me capable only of (a) helping to clarify those logical > moves by Peirce which served to reveal the connection between types of > propositions and the three categories [I would add now that this is > principally, if not exclusively, a logical matter], or (c) explicate the > findings of phenomenological research in graphic form [again, a project in > logic GR]. > > > Phenomenology/phaneroscopy is *not concerned at all* with propositions or > arguments. It asserts nothing, but merely observes what appears in the > phaneron. > > > Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of > elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the > Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or > cognition of any kind. Everything that you can possibly think involves > three kinds of elements (1903, Lowell Lectures, in *Commens*). > > > Nevertheless, both via our every day logic (*logica utens) *as well as by > the 'principle of data' (earlier discussed), phenomenology can use *logic > docens *(i.e., logic as semeiotic, further down in the Classification of > Sciences than phenomenology) to further describe/explicate its findings. > > > So, I remain confused as to why you argue: > > > AvB: What I would argue for is that the most fruitful way to proceed is to > try to conceptually co-ordinate the different perspectives on each other. > The key to that is the process of semiosis expressed as a sign process. > > > But, again (in what also, btw, sounds to me tautological) when you write > that "The key. . . is the process of semiosis expressed as a sign > process," then you're still considering semiotic and *not* phenomenology. > > > > Even while I remain open to the notion that some sort of 'sheet' may be > helpful, no doubt even necessary, in creating "optimally iconic" diagrams > appropriate to phenomenology, it seems to me that it cannot be a "sheet of > assertion" as described here: > > > A certain sheet, called the *sheet of assertion*, is appropriated to the > drawing upon it of such graphs that whatever may be at any time drawn upon > it, called the *entire graph*, shall be regarded as *expressing an > assertion*. . . CP 4.432 (c. 1903, in *Commens, *emphasis added). > > > Phenomenology doesn't assert anything whatsoever. From what you've written > so far, I do not see you meaning to diagram anything but "semiotic" > process. > > > I fervently believe that there are ways to diagram especially trichotomic > relations (and complexes of these) more iconically (my trikonic diagrams > are a first stab at that), but I'm now fairly certain that EGs will not > prove to be a useful model for those diagrams. Nonetheless, creating more > iconic diagrams *of all sorts of *phenomena and relations ought, in my > opinion, be much further explored including, of course, those suitable to > phenomenology. > > > Turning to another topic which I'll have to respond to in the thread in > which it appears, you quote Jon: > > > JAS: It further puzzles me that so many researchers still focus on the > three-trichotomy, ten-Sign taxonomy of 1903, since Peirce himself abandoned > it almost immediately--once he recognized the distinctions between the > different Objects and Interpretants of the same Sign. > > > And reply: > > > > AvB: I provided a locus in the Welby correspondence in which the small > classification is part of the Welby classification. Bernard Morand did a > great job in showing how the later trichotomies append on the former. > > > At first blush, I would tend to agree with you, Auke, that there is no > good reason to believe that Peirce "abandoned" "the three-category, > ten-Sign taxonomy of 1903." See, for example: > > > https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249933979_On_diagrams_for_Peirces_10_28_and_66_classes_of_signs > > > Indeed, it is possible that such complexifications could prove to be an > obstacle in optimally disseminating Peirce's work more broadly. Having said > that, within the realm of Peirce scholarship, especially in > anthroposemiotics, such work that Jon has been engaged in may prove of some > considerable value. I am finding that I am grasping his project better than > I was at first, especially as Peirce's novel terminology (the kindest way > of putting it) becomes more and more familiar to me. Indeed, Jon's work is > helping me in that regard as he seems to have mastered it. > > > But, again, I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and *contra* Tom > Short for example, I don't see Peirce "abandoning" much at all. And when he > finds himself as having clearly been in error, he tends to explicitly state > that along with his corrected view (in years past I've offered several > examples of this). Peirce is constantly experimenting; but, in my opinion, > one needn't take an experiment late in his life as necessarily "abandoning" > those undertaken earlier and the principles derived from them. > > > Best, > > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690* >
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