BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List
In my view, terminological 'definitions' do not 'make our ideas
clear'. And pragmatism has nothing to do with definitions.
JAS wrote: "According to Peirce, it [note: pragmatism] is "merely
a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract
concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907).
1] If we are going to cherry-pick quotes, something I feel is a
misuse of Peirce, then, I can come up with "Now quite the most
striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an
inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational
purpose; and that consideration it was which determined the
preference for the name 'pragmatism' 5.412
And in 5.196, 'pragmatism' "is nothing else than the question of the
logic of abduction. that is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim
which, if sound, must render needless any further rule as to the
admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, that is to say, as
explanations of phenomena"
ET: I understand the above to mean that pragmatism is focused on
developing hypotheses about the laws/rules governing observed
phenomena
2] "There are two functions which we may properly require that
Pragmatism should perform...Namely it ought, in the first place, to
give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear. In
the second place, it ought to lend support, and help to render
distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of
apprehensions; and in in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory
attitude toward the element of thirdness" 5.206
ET: Essentially, then, pragmatism/icism is the abductive examination
of Thirdness, or, hypotheses about the laws governing observable
instantiations. And it is rooted in percepts, in the actual
observable world, grounded in the acknowledgment of the reality of
laws [3ns] - such that Peirce could even refer to it as 'a species of
prope-positivism' [5.423.
And "Pragmatism does not intend to define the phenomenal equivalents
of words and general ideas, but, on the contrary, eliminates their
sential element, and endeavors to define the rational purpose, and
this it finds in the purposive bearing of the word or proposition in
question" 5.428.
By this - I understand that the definition of the WORD is not the
point; the FUNCTION [purposive bearing] of the semiosic action and
examining the reality of 3ns in this function - that's pragmatism.
3] As he wrote, "Nothing new can ever be learned by analyzing
definitions" [5.393]. Now, Peirce continues on, with "Nevertheless,
our existing beliefs can be set in order by this process".
My view of the above is the limited scope of definitions, for they
fail to provide us with the real focus of thought -which is the
examination of the nature of Thirdness in the reality around us.
4] As Peirce writes, "the whole function of thought is to produce
habits of action" [5.400] and thought is therefore focused on
discerning and analyzing these 'habits of action' [Thirdness].
Edwina
On Mon 18/02/19 9:43 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
sent:
Gary R., Edwina, List:
GR: For example, it seems to me that the tendency recently of some,
perhaps most involved in the discussion here, to bypass phenomenology
as first cenoscopic science and to leap to its relation to logic as
semeiotic (notably, critical logic, esp. as expressed in EGs) is
unfortunate and, I'd say, counter-productive. Will we ever discuss
phenomenology as such?
How can we fruitfully discuss phenomenology as such, or anything
else for that matter, without employing normative Logic as Semeiotic?
It seems to me, as it did to Peirce, that all we can do is examine
what is present to our individual minds; "My appeal is to
observation,--observation that each of you must make for himself" (CP
5.52, EP 2:154; 1903). E ven then, we are immediately compelled to
adopt Perceptual Judgments about those Percepts--i.e., we formulate,
as Retroductive conclusions, Propositions that are either true or
false . And no matter how carefully we attend only to the
appearances themselves, we cannot subsequently describe them to
someone else without using such Propositions, as illustrated by
thought experiments like "The First Thing I See."
GR: Will we ever get back to discussing pragmaticism as such? ET:
As you note - Peirce was a pragmatist - and therefore, his analytic
framework obviously was developed to provide a pragmatic analysis -
and terminology can't enable us to achieve that goal.
What exactly is "pragmaticism as such"? What is the nature of "a
pragmatic analysis"? According to Peirce, it is "merely a method of
ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP
5.464, EP 2:400; 1907). As I have said repeatedly in defense of our
terminological discussions here, the goal is always to make our (and
Peirce's) ideas clear; but that is not an end in itself--it is
simply an indispensable step toward developing applications of those
ideas in the sciences that are below normative Logic as Semeiotic in
Peirce's classification, beginning with Metaphysics and then
encompassing all of the Special Sciences. After all, if our theory
of Logic as Semeiotic is incorrect or incomplete, then our use of it
in other fields will suffer from those defects.
Here is a hypothesis for consideration that touches on Phaneroscopy,
Logic as Semeiotic, and Metaphysics. We perceive relations with
different valencies, which correspond to the three Categories; we
experience Objects with different Modalities of Being, which
correspond to the three Universes . What do you think?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Mon, Feb 18, 2019 at 7:58 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Gary R - thanks for your post, but I think that my concern about the
tendency on this list:
ET: I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop
an isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework
based around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the
basic point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze
and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and
processes of the real world
IS NOT a definition of anthroposemiosis!
I don't see that a purely intellectual outline of interactions and
strict terminological definitions is 'about anthroposemiosis'. To me,
the term of 'anthroposemiosis' means an analytic infrastructure
capable and active in explaining human cognition and human societal
organization. Terminology can't do that. What is required is an
analytic frame that examines the dynamic, yes, dynamic, nature of
human cognition and human societal organization. And these endless
discussions of 'who is right' about 'what X term means' can't
provide us with such an analysis.
As you note - Peirce was a pragmatist - and therefore, his analytic
framework obviously was developed to provide a pragmatic analysis -
and terminology can't enable us to achieve that goal.
My focus is not simply on biosemiotics but on human cognition and
human societal organization - and I consider Peircean semiosis to be
an excellent analytic agent for such an examination - but find that
this list is either silent on such topics or, the few who do post,
confine themselves to back-and-forth arguments over who is right
about terminology.
Edwina
On Mon 18/02/19 3:20 AM , Gary Richmond [email protected] [4]
sent:
Jon, Edwina, list,
Jon wrote: I apologize, "abandoned" was indeed too strong a word;
and if researchers today continue to find Peirce's 1903 taxonomy of
Signs to be useful for their purposes, then far be it from me to
block the way of inquiry.
No need to apologize. As I've repeatedly said, your inquiry into
Peirce's late taxonomy of signs has been helpful to me and, I
believe, of potentially considerable value to those doing research
especially into the grammatical branch of logic as semeiotic.
Granted, "abandoned" may perhaps have been "too strong a word" to
describe Peirce's position apropos the late classification of signs
in considering the 1903 classification. Yet when one is working, as
you have been, within that late taxonomy based on Peirce's developed
notion of their being two objects and three interpretants, it is
understandable that an emphasis on the later one would take
precedence over that earlier classification.
Continuing, Edwina quoted me:
GR: I see Peirce's work as evolving so that, and contra Tom Short
for example, I don't see Peirce "abandoning" much at all. And when he
finds himself as having clearly been in error, he tends to explicitly
state that along with his corrected view[. . .] Peirce is constantly
experimenting; but, in my opinion, one needn't take an experiment
late in his life as necessarily "abandoning" those undertaken earlier
and the principles derived from them.
Then commented:
ET: I agree and am puzzled by the strong effort of some to develop
an isolate framework of the work of Peirce - a particular framework
based around a purely intellectual outline of interactions and strict
terminological definitions which in my opinion both utterly miss the
basic point of Peircean semiosis - which is its capacity to analyze
and explain the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and
processes of the real world.
I would not characterize the great effort by Peirce and others
(including John S, Jon S, Gary F, and Jeff D and others on this
list, and myriad others involved in Peirce studies for the past 6 or
7 decades) made in logic as semeiotic as an attempt "to develop an
isolate framework" for semeiotic. Indeed, Peirce did the vast
majority of his work in what we sometimes refer to as
'anthroposemiotic', that is, that logica docens which strictly is
logic as semeiotic (his pragmaticism is included here).
While logicians and others may argue as to what semeiotic
definitions are important, ought to be emphasized, their proper
relations to other definitions, etc., it seems to me that logicians
tend to find what you call "strict terminological definitions" not
only important, but quite essential for certain types of inquiry.
It is understandable that as a biosemiotician that you would be
especially concerned with semeiotics in "its capacity to analyze and
explain the dynamic, adaptive, living infrastructure and processes of
the real world." And, in truth, it is my opinion that the discoveries
of the normative science of logic as semiotics ought more and more
(according to "the principle of principles") be applied to
pragmaticism, metaphysics, and most all the special sciences,
including biosemiotics. I would only suggest--really a kind of
truism--that there are many kinds of semiotic inquiry, and that, for
example, the logic of semeiotic (semiotic grammar, critic, and
methodeutic/rhetoric) as the principal discovery science (pure
research science) ought to be allowed free reign in its inquiries,
and even if these naturally and necessarily principally deal with
anthroposemiotics. In sum: there are in fact many possible inquiries
and applications of Peircean semeiotics, but the first of these is
properly in theoretical science.
Perhaps, Edwina, you are frustrated by the tendency on this list to
concentrate from time to time on anthroposemiotics which, truly, can
at times seem all too abstract even to me! But this has not always
been the case. Consider, for example, the slow read here (and
concurrently on the Biosemiotics list) of Frederik Stjernfelt's,
Natural Propositions. The Actuality of Peirce’s Doctrine of
Dicisigns, a year or so long ago. Earlier slow reads also concerned
topics other than logica docens.
I have repeatedly urged folk here to take up on the list threads on
other topics than the first two branches of the normative science of
logic as semeiotic (semeiotic grammar and critical logic). But this
hasn't much happened. For example, it seems to me that the tendency
recently of some, perhaps most involved in the discussion here, to
bypass phenomenology as first cenoscopic science and to leap to its
relation to logic as semeiotic (notably, critical logic, esp. as
expressed in EGs) is unfortunate and, I'd say, counter-productive.
Will we ever discuss phenomenology as such? Will we ever get back to
discussing pragmaticism as such?
Nonetheless, one does not want to block the way of inquiry of those
who are especially interested in anthroposemiosis through inquiries
into philosophical (semeiotic) grammar and critical logic (logic as
logic, which includes discussions of EGs). One is always free to
introduce a thread here on any topic, but of late this has rarely
happened. Perhaps we need a new 'slow read'? Any suggestions?
Best,
Gary (writing, in part, as list moderator)
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
