John, List: I sincerely appreciate the more characteristic tone of your latest post, and hope that we can both maintain it going forward.
JFS: Before going further, note that my explanation is consistent with the three footnotes by Hartshorne and Weiss to CP 4.538. Yes, but as I have indicated before, I believe those footnotes to be *incorrect*. The CP editors were not infallible, and their interpretive comments are not authoritative. Peirce stated explicitly that "Delome" is synonymous with "Argument," but made no such remarks about "Seme" or "Pheme" with respect to "Rheme" or "Dicisign," respectively. As you said yourself, "Peirce was very precise in what he wrote"--if he had considered those sets of terms to be equivalent, he surely would have simply continued using the latter pair; in fact, his ethics of terminology would have *required *this. CSP: Having thus given some idea of the nature of the reasons which weigh with me, I proceed to state the rules which I find to be binding upon me in this field ... Sixth, for philosophical conceptions which vary by a hair's breadth from those for which suitable terms exist, to invent terms with a due regard for the usages of philosophical terminology and those of the English language, but yet with a distinctly technical appearance ... Having once introduced a symbol, to consider myself almost as much bound by it as if it had been introduced by somebody else; and after others have accepted it, to consider myself more bound to it than anybody else. Seventh, to regard it as needful to introduce new systems of expression when new connections of importance between conceptions come to be made out, or when such systems can, in any way, positively subserve the purposes of philosophical study. (CP 2.225-226, EP 2:266; 1903) Peirce considered himself "bound to" his own neologisms as long as the corresponding conceptions remained the same, but he also considered new terminology *necessary *once those conceptions varied, even if only "by a hair's breadth"; all the more so when it would bring out "new connections of importance between conceptions" or otherwise "subserve the purposes of philosophical study." Hence we can infer that he must have had *very specific reasons* for introducing "Seme" and "Pheme," rather than sticking with "Rheme" and "Dicisign." I am by no means breaking new ground here; for example, Francesco Bellucci takes the same position in *Peirce's Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotics*. FB: New concepts require new names, and Peirce was the last of men to be indifferent to this. Indeed, it is during the spring of 1906 that he must have come to the conclusion that his new findings in speech act theory necessitated a new grammatical terminology ... A "pheme" is not simply a dicisign. A dicisign is something that has the structure of a proposition, and that can be used to make an assertion. A pheme is, *more generally*, something that has the structure of a proposition and that can be used to perform several speech acts ... the grammatical notion of dicisign is further enlarged to that of pheme by including non-assertoric dicisigns. Given the taxonomic investigations I have documented above, this should come as no surprise. To signalize the further extension, Peirce re-names the locutionary trichotomy <rheme, dicisign, argument> into <seme, pheme, delome>. (pp. 315-316) As I have explained previously, I think that using "Proposition," rather than "Dicisign" or "Pheme," is warranted by Peirce's statement elsewhere that "One and the same proposition may be affirmed, denied, judged, doubted, inwardly inquired into, put as a question, wished, asked for, effectively commanded, taught, or merely expressed, and does not thereby become a different proposition" (EP 2:312; 1904). Bellucci does not comment directly on "Seme" vs. "Rheme," but while reviewing our recent List exchanges (as you requested), I came across this observation in your post <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-02/msg00004.html> from a few weeks ago with the subject line, "A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate." JFS: In 1903, Peirce defined the word 'seme' in a way that is inconsistent with what he wrote in 1906: CSP: An *Index*, or *Seme* (*σημα*), is a Representamen whose Representative character consists in its being an individual Second. (EP 2:274) Compare this with the 1906 definition. CSP: By a *Seme*, I shall mean anything which serves for any purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign. (CP 4.538) While the later notion of "Seme" is certainly not *synonymous* with "Index," it is not *incompatible* with it, either--a Seme *can* be Index, and it can also be an Icon or a Symbol. As I have pointed out before, that is the primary sense in which "Seme" is "much widened" relative to the more familiar "Term," which only applies to Symbols. After all, for Peirce the Logical *Breadth* of a Sign corresponds to the *Objects* that it denotes, and "Seme" refers to *more *Objects than "Term." I will elaborate on this below. JFS: This point distinguishes logical subject and logical predicate: A subject (which has an attached line of identity) is a sign of some definite object, but a predicate (with its unattached peg) is a sign of some unspecified possible object. Are there any passages in Peirce's writings that spell out this purported basis for distinguishing the *subject *of a proposition from its *predicate*? For one thing, I understand a Line of Identity to represent an *indefinite *individual; i.e., "something," corresponding to a variable in modern predicate logic. More relevantly, I understand Peirce as having drawn the distinction instead between the subject as the part of a proposition that *denotes its Object(s)* vs. the predicate as the part that *signifies its Interpretant*. I have provided multiple (often lengthy) quotations to this effect in various recent posts, so I will not repeat them here. With this in mind, even if we *do not* throw everything possible into the subject as I have been advocating, each of a proposition's constituent Signs that *denotes *one of its Objects is by definition a *subject*. Denotation is precisely the function of an Index, so when Peirce needed an alternative to "Term" that was even broader than "Rheme," it made sense to repurpose "Seme" to name *whatever *serves as a substitute for an Object--such as the *Indexical* part of a proposition, its subject. We can test this hypothesis with the example that you cited in that same post <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-02/msg00004.html> from a few weeks ago. CSP: A man's portrait with a man's name written under it is strictly a proposition, although its syntax is not that of speech, and although the portrait itself not only represents, but is, a Hypoicon. But the proper name so nearly approximates to the nature of an Index, that this might suffice to give an idea of an informational Index. (CP 2.320; 1903) JFS: A portrait plus an index asserts a proposition (dicisign). In effect, the image is used as a kind of predicate. Accepting this analysis for the moment, what then serves as the *subject *of that proposition, the *Index *that denotes its Object? The man's name written under it, obviously. Surely we cannot properly call *this* a "predicate" (or even a "quasi-predicate"), since we already assigned that role to the image, and *every* proposition must include *both* a subject *and* a predicate. Consequently, neither "Subject" nor "Predicate" (nor "Quasi-predicate") will work as the "much widened" replacement for "Term" or "Rheme," since it has to encompass *both* of them. That is presumably why Peirce reintroduced "Seme" in 1906--again, a word that he had once previously *equated* with "Index," a function that even Symbolic Semes routinely perform. The portrait is an *Iconic *Seme of the man, while the name written under it is an *Indexical *Seme of the same man, and the conventional syntax of such juxtaposition "marries" them in a Proposition. CSP: Syllogism consists in stating in one proposition the truth involved in two non-relative propositions after the elimination of a common term as -- All a is b; All c is a; ∴ All c is b. JFS: Note that the common term c occurs in both subject position and object position. As an object, it is just a rheme or monad -- a predicate with one peg that is not attached to a line of identity. But in subject position, it is part of the noun phrase "All c". In an EG, the word 'All' includes a line of identity, which is attached to the unattached peg in the term c. Actually, "c" occurs in the subject position in both the minor premiss and the conclusion; "a" is the common term that occurs in both subject and object positions, in the major and minor premisses respectively. Also, a Line of Identity corresponds to the word "Some," not "All"; Cuts must be added in order to represent "All." Regardless, Peirce was quite adamant in various places--again, I have quoted them extensively before--that both *grammatical **subjects *and *grammatical **objects *are *logical* *subjects *of a proposition. This is the case even when we turn one of them into a Rheme by attaching the copula to it. CSP: I have said that the subjects and predicate are the two parts of an assertion. (Abelard reckoned the copula as a third part; and in a certain sense, it is a part of an assertion, but not in the sense in which the subject and predicate are parts. It is nothing but a mark that the predicate is to be understood predicatively, that is, as conveying information, and not as limiting the denotation of the grammatical subject.) (R 339:492; 1908) Again, it is the *syntax *of a proposition that conveys predication, not any of its constituent Semes, each of which can serve as *either *a grammatical subject or a grammatical predicate. That is precisely why many languages other than English, including Greek, can express propositions *without *including a separate word for the copula. CSP: Finally, our conclusions require that the proposition should have an actual *Syntax*, which is represented to be the Index of those elements of the fact represented that correspond to the Subject and Predicate. This is apparent in all propositions. Since Abelard it has been usual to make this Syntax a third part of the proposition, under the name of the Copula. The historical cause of the emergence of this conception in the twelfth century was, of course, that the Latin of that day did not permit the omission of the verb *est*, which was familiarly, though not invariably, omitted in Greek, and not very uncommonly in classical Latin. In most languages there is no such verb. But it is plain that one does not escape the need of a Syntax by regarding the Copula as a third part of the proposition; and it is simpler to say that it is merely the accidental form that Syntax may take. (CP 2.319, EP 2:292; 1903) Likewise, it is the *syntax *of an EG that conveys predication, not any of its constituent elements. In accordance with the standard interpretation, a Spot with an unattached peg represents a predicate in the traditional sense, while a Line of Identity represents an individual. In other words, a Spot is a *Sign* of a predicate, while a Line of Identity is a *Sign *of an individual; but which *class* of Sign is each of these, according to its relation with its Final Interpretant or the Nature of its Influence? Clearly not an Argument or a Proposition; and I think just as clearly not a predicate (or quasi-predicate), either. The *Object* of a Spot is a predicate, for which the Spot serves as a substitute for the purpose of diagramming a Proposition; so the Spot *itself* is not a predicate, but a Seme. A Line of Identity is a Sign that serves as a substitute for an individual; not a predicate of that individual, but a Seme thereof. In 1906, there really was no suitable existing name for these *kinds *of Signs. Given the context of "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism," it is no wonder that Peirce introduced a *new *term there that could apply to any and every part of an EG that, taken together, represents a Proposition (or Pheme). An unattached Peg is a Seme of valency; the *recto *of the Sheet of Assertion is a Seme of the Universe of Truth; and the shaded area within a Cut is a Seme of the *verso* of the Sheet of Assertion, which in turn is a Seme of the Universe of Falsity. As Symbols governed by conventions, each of these has both Iconic and Indexical aspects, although some tilt more one way or the other. JFS: Since every term is a predicate, a Seme or a Rheme would "embrace" all logical terms, including those which occur in subject position or object position in any sentence. I have never disputed this, since Peirce stated plainly, "The logical Term, which is a class-name, is a Seme" (CP 4.538; 1906). However, not every Seme is a logical term--again, a Seme can be an Icon or an Index, not just a Symbol--and not every Seme is a predicate (or a quasi-predicate), as the examples above from EGs demonstrate. JFS: If a Seme is a Rheme, and a Rheme is a sign of "qualitative possibility", this would imply a rather odd conclusion: A qualitative possibility pretends to be a virtual object. Since a Seme is *not *a Rheme, there is no need to draw that "rather odd conclusion." Again, Peirce quite deliberately *avoided* coining new terms for identical concepts, except for purely aesthetic reasons, as in the case of "Delome." CSP: I might, well enough, have used the word 'argument' instead of 'delome,' except that it did not go so well with the words I use for the other members of the triplet ... (R 295:13[30]; 1906) Besides, in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies, the distinction between "a Sign of qualitative possibility" and "a sign of actual existence" no longer corresponds to the Sign's relation with its Final Interpretant (Seme vs. Pheme), but instead corresponds to the Nature of the Sign's Dynamic Object (Abstractive vs. Concretive)--perhaps *another *reason for the terminological change from "Rheme" to "Seme." CSP: Accordingly, the Dynamoid Object may be a Possible,--when I term the Sign an *Abstractive*, such as the word Beauty; and it will be none the less an Abstractive if I speak of "the Beautiful," since it is the ultimate reference, and not the grammatical form, that makes the sign an Abstractive. When the Dynamoid Object is an Occurrence (Existent thing or Actual fact of past or future), I term the Sign a *Concretive*; any one barometer is an example, and so is a written narrative of any series of events. For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have at present no better designation than a *Collective *... (EP 2:480; 1908) CSP: In respect to the Nature of their Dynamical Objects, Signs I found to be either 1. Signs of Possibles. That is, *Abstractives *such as Color, Mass, Whiteness, etc. 2. Signs of Occurrences. That is, *Concretives *such as Man, Charlemagne. 3. Signs of Collections. That is, *Collectives *such as Mankind, the Human Race, etc. (CP 8.366, EP 2:489; 1908) All of the examples in the second passage are Semes, and the subjectal/hypostatic abstraction of "Whiteness" suggests that Peirce was thinking of them primarily as logical *subjects *rather than logical *predicates*. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 8:33 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > On 2/27/2019 12:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > I focused on representing Propositions, rather than the process > > of reasoning; and then I decided accordingly to call the resulting > > diagrams Propositional Graphs, rather than Modified Existential Graphs. > > The notation for every version of logic from Aristotle to the present > has been designed to facilitate the process of reasoning. > > > Even so, I still might ultimately adopt your recommendation to stick > > with EGs > > That's a good step in the right direction. Peirce devoted many years > to developing a precise notation with the most general and powerful > rules of inference ever invented. The best way to preserve that power > and precision is to define any proposed notation by a formal mapping > to and from his EGs. > > > You went on to assert that "Seme" cannot possibly apply to a subject, > > even though Peirce explicitly stated otherwise in an alternate draft > > of the very same paragraph. > > > > CSP: The first member of the triplet, the 'Seme,' embraces the logical > > Term, the Subject or Object of a sentence, everything of any kind, be it > > a man or a scribed character, such as h or Pb, which will serve, or is > > supposed to serve, for some purpose, as a substitute for its Object. > > It is a Sign which pretends, at least, to intend to be virtually its > > Object. (R 295:11-12[28-29]; 1906) > > No. Before going further, note that my explanation is consistent > with the three footnotes by Hartshorne and Weiss to CP 4.538. > The first cites CP 2.250f for the triad Rheme, Dicisign, Argument > as equivalent to the "triplet... Term, Proposition, Argument." > The second says that 'Rmeme' as a synonym for 'Seme'. And the > third says that 'Ddicisign' is a synonym for 'Pheme'. > > I copied CP 2.250-251 at the end of this note. Note that Peirce > wrote that a Dicisign is "a proposition or quasi-proposition". > He also wrote "A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, > is a Sign of qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood > as representing such and such a kind of possible Object." > > This point distinguishes logical subject and logical predicate: > A subject (which has an attached line of identity) is a sign of > some definite object, but a predicate (with its unattached peg) > is a sign of some unspecified possible object. > > In Latin, the word 'quasi', in hypothetical statements, means "as if"; > in comparisons, 'quasi' means "as", "like as", "as it were", "almost", > "a sort of". CP has 78 occurrences of 'quasi-'. Therefore, the word > 'quasi-predicate', which Peirce used at least once, would be suitable > for something that played a role similar to a predicate. An alternate > word could be 'quasi-rheme'. But if 'Rheme' is a synonym for 'Seme', > then Rheme would also include both predicates and quasi-predicates. > > These points are consistent with the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition > for the terms of syllogisms. Peirce was the author of the article on > Syllogism in Baldwin's Dictionary, vol 2, pp. 628-639. It begins > > Syllogism consists in stating in one proposition the truth involved > > in two non-relative propositions after the elimination of a common > > term as -- All a is b; All c is a; ∴ All c is b. > > Note that the common term c occurs in both subject position and object > position. As an object, it is just a rheme or monad -- a predicate > with one peg that is not attached to a line of identity. But in > subject position, it is part of the noun phrase "All c". In an EG, > the word 'All' includes a line of identity, which is attached to > the unattached peg in the term c. > > Peirce learned syllogisms in 1852 (age 13), wrote a definitive article > about them 50 years later, and continued that interest all his life. > For what he wrote in 1911, see http://jfsowa.com/peirce/eg1911.pdf : > > But this letter will be long enough without discussing Aristotle and > > his Greek commentators, a subject on which I should soon tire you, > > interesting as it is to me. (NEM 3:167-168) > > Then he continues on pp. 168-169 with a proof in EGs: > > Fig. 11 shows the two premisses "Any M is P" and "Any S is M" > > ... giving Fig. 17 [Any S is P] > > Note that every EG from Fig. 11 to Fig. 17 of eg1911.pdf has two > or more terms (S, M, or P). Each subject term is attached to a > line of identity that links it to a peg of an object term. > > This evidence shows that (1) Peirce, Hartshorne, and Weiss agree that > a Seme is a Rheme; (2) a term is a monad that may occur in a logical > subject or a logical predicate; and (3) as a logical subject, the > monad refers to something definite; but as a logical predicate, > it refers to some qualitative possibility. > > Finally, these points enable us to interpret R 295:11-12[28-29]: > Since every term is a predicate, a Seme or a Rheme would "embrace" > all logical terms, including those which occur in subject position > or object position in any sentence. > > But I admit that the word 'or' in the following list may be puzzling: > "the Subject or Object of a sentence, everything of any kind, be it > a man or a scribed character, such as h or Pb, which will serve, or is > supposed to serve, for some purpose, as a substitute for its Object." > > Therefore, start with the final sentence: A Seme "is a Sign which > pretends, at least, to intend to be virtually its Object." If a Seme > is a Rheme, and a Rheme is a sign of "qualitative possibility", this > would imply a rather odd conclusion: A qualitative possibility > pretends to be a virtual object. > > This conclusion is a metaphorical way of talking about possibilities > such as an indefinite or virtual man, hydrogen atom (H), lead atom (Pb), > or anything of any kind. It's consistent with the conclusions above, > but a more precise definition would be helpful. That is probably why > Peirce did not consider it suitable for the final draft. > > Conclusion: R 295:11-12[28-29] is consistent with the previous points: > (1) a Seme is a Rheme, (2) there is a sharp distinction between logical > subjects and logical predicates; and (3) the word 'term' refers to a > monad, which represents a definite individual in a logical subject > or an indefinite possibility in a logical predicate. > > John > ________________________________________________________________________ > > CP 2.250 > According to the third trichotomy, a Sign may be termed a Rheme, > a Dicisign or Dicent Sign (that is, a proposition or quasi-proposition), > or an Argument. A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a > Sign of qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing > such and such a kind of possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will > afford some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. > > CP 2.251 > A Dicent Sign is a Sign, which for its Interpretant, is a sign of > actual existence. It cannot, therefore, be an Icon, which affords > no ground for an interpretation of it as referring to actual > existence. A Dicisign necessarily involves, as a part of it, a > Rheme, to describe the fact which it is interpreted as indicting. > But this is a peculiar kind of Rheme; and while it is essential to > the Dicisign, it by no means constitutes it. >
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