Edwina, List:
ET: There is NOTHING outside of the universe; Peirce was quite clear on
that - repeatedly.
I obviously have a different interpretation of the cited passages (CP
6.490, CP 6.214). For one thing, Peirce *explicitly stated* that the
Universe is a Sign ("a vast representamen"); but if there is *nothing *outside
the Universe, then the Universe as a whole *cannot *be a Sign, because ...
ET: As Peirce notes, "Every sign stands for an object independent of
itself ...
Again, the only way to escape the conclusion of my Semeiotic Argumentation
is to *disagree with Peirce* by rejecting one or both of the premisses--in
this case, by *denying *that the Universe is a Sign. Moreover, Peirce
*explicitly
stated* his belief that God is "Really creator of all three Universes of
Experience" and "a Being *not *immanent in the Universes of Matter, Mind,
and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every content of them without
exception." These descriptions *directly contradict* the claim that there
is *nothing *outside the Universe, so the latter clearly *cannot *be a
"Peircean axiom."
ET: ... but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object
is itself of the nature of sign or thought. For the sign does not affect
the object but is affected by it; so that the object must be able to convey
thought, that is, must be of the nature of a thought or of a sign" 1.538.
Indeed--and that is how Peirce characterized God!
CSP: If a pragmaticist is asked what he means by the word "God," he can
only say that just as long acquaintance with a man of great character may
deeply influence one's whole manner of conduct, so that a glance at his
portrait may make a difference, just as almost living with Dr. Johnson
enabled poor Boswell to write an immortal book and a really sublime book,
just as long study of the works of Aristotle may make him an acquaintance,
so if contemplation and study of the physico-psychical universe can imbue a
man with principles of conduct analogous to the influence of a great man's
works or conversation, then that analogue of a mind--for it is impossible
to say that *any *human attribute is *literally *applicable--is what he
means by "God." Of course, various great theologians explain that one
cannot attribute *reason *to God, nor perception (which always involves an
element of surprise and of learning what one did not know), and, in short,
that his "mind" is necessarily so unlike ours, that some--though
wrongly--high in the church say that it is only negatively, as being
entirely different from everything else, that we can attach any meaning to
the Name. This is not so; because the discoveries of science, their
enabling us to *predict *what will be the course of nature, is proof
conclusive that, though we cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch
a fragment of His Thought, as it were. (CP 6.502; c. 1906)
CSP: But I had better add that I do *not *mean by God a being merely
"immanent in Nature," but I mean that Being who has created every content
of the world of ideal possibilities, of the world of physical facts, and
the world of all minds, without any exception whatever. For the argument
that I am to consider; and which, by the way, I will designate as 'The
Neglected Argument,' would not be true of any other being than God. But I
do not, by 'God,' mean, with some writers, a being so inscrutable that
nothing at all can be known of Him. I suppose most of our knowledge of Him
must be by similitudes. Thus, He is so much like a mind, and so little
like a singular Existent (meaning by an Existent, or object that Exists, a
thing subject to brute constraints, and reacting with all other Existents,)
and so opposed in His Nature to an ideal possibility, that we may loosely
say that He is a Spirit, or Mind. (R 843:26-27; 1908)
God is an "analogue of a mind" such that "we can catch a fragment of His
Thought," and "He is so much like a mind ... that we may loosely say that
He is a Spirit, or Mind." Moreover, in the first passage, notice the
parallels that Peirce drew between different Signs of *persons*--a portrait
as a Sign of "a man of great character," Boswell's "really sublime book" as
a Sign of Dr. Johnson, "the works of Aristotle" as a Sign of their author,
and finally "the physico-psychical universe" as a Sign of God. In each
case, the Sign *conveys knowledge* of the person. And in the second
passage, besides affirming the *transcendence *of God as previously quoted,
Peirce also succinctly explained why he argued for the *Reality *of God,
rather than the *existence *of God.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 3:31 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:
> List
>
> I agree with John Sowa's suggestion - the universe as a sign of itself.
> There is NOTHING outside of the universe; Peirce was quite clear on that -
> repeatedly. [6.490, 6.214.."The initial condition, before the universe
> existed, was not a state of pure abstract being. On the contrary it was a
> state of just nothing at all, not even a state of emptiness, for even
> emptiness is something"
>
> Therefore, for JAS to posit that 'because a sign requires an external
> object, and the Universe is a 'Sign', THEN, this external Object must 'be
> God' - contradicts the Peircean axiom that there is nothing outside of the
> Universe.
>
> Furthermore, the Sign, that triad, certainly does require an external
> Object, but, why can't that external Object be within the semiosic
> Universe, i.e., part of the semiosic process? That is, any particular
> triadic Sign A is interactive with another triadic Sign B -IN the universe.
> that 'other triadic Sign'B' is an Object to A. Again - according to
> Peirce, there is nothing outside of the Universe. Therefore, I disagree
> with JAS's view that there IS 'a reality outside the Universe, aka God'.
> Instead, I see the Universe as a massive semiosic process, a function of
> the operation of Mind-as-Matter, increasing in complexity within the
> operations of the three categorical modes.
>
> As Peirce notes, "Every sign stands for an object independent of itself;
> but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself
> of the nature of sign or thought. For the sign does not affect the object
> but is affected by it; so that the object must be able to convey thought,
> that is, must be of the nature of a thought or of a sign" 1.538. My
> interpretation of this is that the OBJECT of a SIGN is 'itself a sign or
> thought. This means - to me - that it is part of the whole semiosic
> process. It is not outside; it is not transcendent. Therefore - I disagree
> with the view of JAS who posits a transcendent God as the Object of the
> semiosic Universe.
>
> Edwina Taborsky
>
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