Edwina, List,
Edwina wrote:
ET: I agree with John Sowa's suggestion - the universe as a sign of itself.
There is NOTHING outside of the universe; Peirce was quite clear on that -
repeatedly. [6.490, 6.214.."The initial condition, before the universe
existed, was not a state of pure abstract being. On the contrary it was a
state of just nothing at all, not even a state of emptiness, for even
emptiness is something"
On a number of occasions in the past, you've repeated this notion of the
initial condition of "nothing at all" before the Universe existed without
referring to Peirce's explanation of what he means by that phrase as he
develops it in the paragraphs just following 6.214.
There we read that this "is not the nothing of negation," a notion which
follows from "the logic of deduction." Rather, Peirce makes cleat that the
'nothing' he is explicating is, rather, "the pure zero of not having been
born." "It is the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is involved
or foreshadowed. . . absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility --
boundless possibility." Rather than following the nothing of the logic of
deduction ("the nothing of death"), his "germinal nothing" follows an
abductive logic, the logic of "potentiality," "So of potential being there
was in that initial state no lack." The result is that "nothing in
particular necessarily resulted" but that everything in general was
possible (on this, see below my discussion of 6.490 which you also
referenced).
Here are the relevant passages starting with 6.214 with the ideas I've just
abstracted above put in boldface:
6.214. . . The initial condition, before the universe existed, was not a
state of pure abstract being. On the contrary it was a state of just
nothing at all, not even a state of emptiness, for even emptiness is
something. CP 6.215 . . . We start, then, with nothing, pure zero. *But
this is not the nothing of negation.* For not means other than, and other
is merely a synonym of the ordinal numeral second. As such it implies a
first; while the present pure zero is prior to every first. *The nothing of
negation is the nothing of death, which comes second to, or after,
everything. But this pure zero is the nothing of not having been born. *There
is no individual thing, no compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. *It is
the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is involved or
foreshadowed*. *As such, it is absolutely undefined and unlimited
possibility -- boundless possibility*. There is no compulsion and no law.
It is boundless freedom. CP 6.217 *So of potential being there was in that
initial state no lack.* CP 6.218 Now the question arises, what necessarily
resulted from that state of things? But the only sane answer is that *where
freedom was boundless nothing in particular necessarily resulted. The
logic may be that of. . . hypothetic inference.* CP 6.219 I say that *nothing
necessarily resulted from the Nothing of boundless freedom*. That is,
nothing according to deductive logic. But such is not the logic of freedom
or possibility. The logic of freedom, or potentiality, is that it shall
annul itself.
And so become the *somethings* of this particular Universe (of which others
are possible).
Edwina continued:
ET: Therefore, for JAS to posit that 'because a sign requires an external
object, and the Universe is a 'Sign', THEN, this external Object must 'be
God' - contradicts the Peircean axiom that there is nothing outside of the
Universe.
Let's consider this in consideration of "a perfect cosmology of the three
universe" discussed in 6.490. We again begin at a state of 'nility' which
Peirce says that *we* cannot conceive of; however, we can "conceive that
there should be *a mind* that could conceive it" (boldface added).
What/whose would *that* mind be? Peirce then takes up the notion of
"super-order" and "super-habit." Every *existential being* (*not* every
reality) requires a super-order for "to suppose a thing to have any
particular character is to suppose a conditional proposition to be true of
it, which proposition would express some kind of superorder." On the other
hand, a "state in which there should be absolutely no super-order
whatsoever would be . . a state of nility." "So in that state there must
then have been a tohu bohu of which nothing whatever affirmative or
negative was true universally. There must have been, therefore, a little of
everything conceivable." And so there must have been "a little
undifferentiated tendency to take super-habits. But such a state must tend
to increase itself." Again, I put these ideas in boldface in the relevant
passages beginning with 6.4590.
6.490 Now imagine, in such vague way as such a thing can be imagined, *a
perfect cosmology of the three universes*. . . . That perfect cosmology
must therefore show that the whole history of the three universes, as it
has been and is to be, would follow from a premiss which would not suppose
them to exist at all. Moreover, such premiss must in actual fact be true.
But that premiss must represent a state of things in which the three
universes were completely nil. Consequently, whether in time or not,* the
three universes must actually be absolutely necessary results of a state of
utter nothingness. We cannot ourselves conceive of such a state of nility;
but we can easily conceive that there should be a mind that could conceive
it*, since, after all, no contradiction can be involved in mere
non-existence. *A state in which there should be absolutely no super-order
whatsoever would be such a state of nility. For all Being involves some
kind of super-order. *For example, *to suppose a thing to have any
particular character is to suppose a conditional proposition to be true of
it, which proposition would express some kind of superorder, as any
formulation of a general fact does. *To suppose [for example for] it to
have elasticity of volume is to suppose that if it were subjected to
pressure its volume would diminish until at a certain point the full
pressure was attained within and without its periphery. *This is a
super-order, a law expressible by a differential equation. Any such
super-order would be a super-habit*. Any general state of things whatsoever
would be a super-order and a super-habit. In that state of absolute nility.
. . *of which nothing whatever affirmative or negative was true
universally. There must have been, therefore, a little of everything
conceivable.* T*here must have been here and there a little
undifferentiated tendency to take super-habits. But such a state must tend
to increase itself. *For a tendency to act in any way, combined with a
tendency to take habits, must increase the tendency to act in that way. Now
substitute in this general statement for "tendency to act in any way" a
tendency to take habits, and we see that that tendency would grow. It would
also become differentiated in various ways. . .
CP 6.491 Among the many pertinent considerations which have been crowded
out of this article, *I may just mention that it could have been shown that
the hypothesis of God's Reality is logically not so isolated a conclusion
as it may seem.*
Again, in regard to "the hypothesis of God's Reality," consider that
*some *Mind
(not ours) must have been able to conceive niility. This is quite different
from your claim that there was no Mind before the Universe came into being
and that the "three categorical modes. . .operate as Mind" and further that
"Peirce specifically says that the term Mind is an analogy with the term of
'God'." " Where does he say this?
You continued:
I disagree with JAS's view that there IS 'a reality outside the Universe,
aka God'. Instead, I see the Universe as a massive semiosic process, a
function of the operation of Mind-as-Matter, increasing in complexity
within the operations of the three categorical modes.
But both Jon and I have been arguing that the idea that there is "a reality
outside the Universe, aka God" is Peirce's. Jon has repeatedly outlined
that argument with which I am mainly in agreement. His excellent analysis
of Peirce's early cosmology, including the further developments in Peirce's
thinking on the matter (including much that follows from the Blackboard
analogy in the 1898 Cambridge House Lectures) is offered in "A Neglected
Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of God"
https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187
Best,
Gary R
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