If I continue these musings, then, I will ask:
1] If we read from Peirce that 'the Universe is perfused with signs'
[5.448f] then, does this also mean that all these signs are connected
and can be understood as ONE sign?
That is - are these signs in this 'perfusion of signs' - all
connected? Or does 'perfusion' mean as it does to my understanding,
'drenched with', 'filled with' - signs [multiple signs].
I have a problem moving from 'signs' to 'sign' since I consider such
a reduction a denial of the differentiative power of habit formation -
which is an integral function of the mediative power of the
sign/representamen.
So- I can't move from 'perfusion of signs' to consider the whole
Universe as a sign.
2] And I don't know how one can rely on deductive arguments to
provide the truth of a situation. That is, if I use the Salem Witch
Trials as an example, the community [which was filled with
interpersonal and familial rivalries anyway] sincerely believed in
the realities of God and Satan and witches.
If you have set up the logical argument for a belief in the reality
of God [as JAS has done] - using selections from Peirce's writings,
and defined that such an argument is true - then, how do you defend
yourself against an accusation that you are a witch, denying the
reality of God, and filled instead, with Satan?
The trials, for example, which accepted the realities of both God
and Satan, considered that IF an accused touched someone who was
having an epileptic [or psychological] fit, and the symptoms stopped,
then, this proved that the accused was a witch, for the 'evil spirits'
had retreated back into [her] body. Or - the afflicted claimed to see
the image of the person who was afflicting them - i.e., if I was
having an hysteric attack and the image of my hostile next door
neighbour came into my mind, then, this proved that the neighbour was
a witch.
That is, the deductive argument, which is strictly intellectual, is
used as a basis for empirical testing. How can such a correlation be
valid?
Edwina
On Sat 25/05/19 9:25 AM , Edwina Taborsky [email protected] sent:
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My concern in these discussions about 'science' and 'truth' is how
are we to differentiate between what can be empirically justified as
truth and what is believed to be truth? Isn't such a distinction
necessary to prevent the fundamentalism that leads to such things as
religious wars or, eg, the Salem Witch Trials?
Because one can set up a syllogistic argument that is valid, does
this mean its conclusion is also a truth?
That is, if one begins with a belief - as one must - and in this
instance, it is that both the devil and god are real and can
influence human behaviour, if one so chooses - then, how do you
differentiate between the two types of behaviour and their causes?
Edwina
On Fri 24/05/19 2:21 PM , John F Sowa [email protected] sent:
Jon AS, Gary F, Edwina,
Peirce's classification of the sciences (1903 with refinements
before
and after) has never been surpassed or even approximated by anyone
in the past century. I believe it's fundamental to understanding
many issues about science, engineering, philosophy, *and* religion.
See the diagram http://jfsowa.com/ikl/cspscience.png
For example, see the comment by Victor Lowe, as quoted by Jaime
Nubiola
(p. 4 of
https://www.academia.edu/attachments/40941552/download_file?st=MTU1ODcwNTk1MCw3MC4yMy4zNi4xNzMsNDQ3MDEzOQ%3D%3D&s=swp-toolbar
)
VL
> How shall metaphysics be pursued? — As a science among the
sciences,
> says Peirce. Not so, says Whitehead; it seeks truth, but a more
> general truth than sciences seek" (Lowe 1964, 440).
But that is just a trivial distinction based on their definitions
of 'science': Peirce's definition is closer to the German word
'Wissenschaft', which includes includes philosophy. If asked, I'm
sure that Whitehead would have agreed with the top level of that
diagram. In fact, he might have agreed with most or all the
details.
> JAS: If "God" is indeed "the definable proper name," then might it
> not also be the exception to the rule that acquaintance with the
> Object of a Sign requires Collateral Experience/Observation?
>
> GF: Quite possibly; and that would explain why “knowledge of
God”
> is indeed exceptional, and not at all like our knowledge of Peirce
> or any person who has existed.
These questions also depend on the definitions of the terms and the
way they're used in normal discourse.
First, every term of mathematics is based on a definition, not on
collateral experience. But anyone who reads any book or article
on mathematics must use collateral experience to understand which
definition(s) the author is using.
Second, children learn about God in the same way they learn numbers:
by the contexts in which the words are used. Any definition of the
word 'God' is an invention of theologians. Religions are rarely,
if ever, founded on a priori definitions. Sacred texts begin with
stories or hymns, usually based on oral transmissions. Theologians
don't define the terms until the "faithful" begin to doubt them.
Third, the distinction between knowledge and belief is vague.
Gettier (1963) raised puzzling questions about the definition of
knowledge as justified true belief. But long before Gettier, Peirce
pointed out that any of our cherished beliefs might be falsified.
ET
> Peirce's use of 'fancy' is different from our modern day
understanding
> of the word.
Yes. It's important to read more of CP 1.321:
> We live in two worlds, a world of fact and a world of fancy...
> I doubt not that much the greater part of the reader's labor is
> expended on the world of fancy, yet it is near enough the truth
> for a first approximation. For this reason we call the world of
> fancy the internal world, the world of fact the external world.
This implies that the world of fancy includes everything we know or
believe about all the sciences of discovery and all the practical
sciences.
Religion includes aspects of every branch of philosophy
(phenomenology,
semeiotic, aesthetics, ethics, normative logic, metaphysics) *and*
of
the special sciences, both physical and psychical. In fact, it's
hard
to find any science of discovery that is not in some way related to
some aspect of religion. That point is not surprising, since
primitive
societies rarely make any distinction between them: the religious
leader is often the "medicine man".
The practical sciences include practical ethics (as distinguished
from theoretical ethics as a normative science). Religion has a
great deal to say about that. The chief political/military leader
is usually distinct from the chief science/religious leader. But
the two of them work together in both primitive and modern
societies.
ET
> I think the Chinese perspectives, and there are quite a few, are
not
> similar to monotheism, since, to me the very ancient Chinese
'forces
> of the world' which move in cycles are not similar to the singular
> hierarchy of monotheism. And Confucian 'ren' [also 'jen' in
pinyin]
> to me, is more of a system of societal norms --and this isn't
> monotheistic. The Taoist perspective is also societal [as are all
> religions] but - it acknowledges a metaphysical force in the
world.
I agree. But again, the lines aren't sharp. The translation of
the New Testament to Chinese maps 'Logos' to 'Tao'. Then John's
equation Theos = Logos would become Theos = Tao. That definition
would facilitate the goals of the missionaries, but it seems to
have some basis in the experiences called mystical or religious.
Re fact and fancy: As Peirce said, symbols grow. That is true
about the way that every child's vocabulary develops during a
lifetime *and* about the way that the vocabulary of any science
or religion develops. That means it's a psychological distinction.
It can't be used to distinguish science and religion.
John
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