Edwina, List: ET: As for JAS's view that atheism is akin to nominalism - I don't think this is what Peirce meant ... I am a committed atheist - and equally committed to 3ns, so, therefore, I reject the opinion of JAS.
To clarify, this is not *my *view or opinion, it was *Peirce's*. He said so *explicitly*. CSP: The most powerful of the proofs of His Being is that the sincere inquirer ... if he meditates well upon God's Reality considered as a mere hypothesis ... will, as a fact, find himself utterly incapable of doubting it, which is more than a Proof of it to him;--it is a Rational Compulsion. Meantime, for all those who have not yet themselves received that illumination, testimony to that effect lies open;--testimony stupendous in volume, and moreover quite unopposed if, as I believe to be the case, all Atheists are Nominalists ... (R 641:19-20; 1909 Nov 7) Again, anyone is free to *disagree *with him about this, but to claim that *he *believed otherwise is untenable. ET: Nor can nominalism be defined as asserting that something is inexplicable. The definition of nominalism is simple: a belief only in 2ns and 1ns [individual particular things and random interactions] - and a rejection of 3ns or laws of mind It is not relevant how *you or I* would define nominalism; what matters is how *Peirce *defined it in 1909, such that he viewed atheism as somehow *entailing *it. I offered one hypothesis, based on the text that I quoted from 1901 and the first Additament to "A Neglected Argument" from 1908. Accepting *anything *as inexplicable--a "brute fact"--constitutes a rejection of 3ns *in that case* by denying that there is a *rational *explanation for it. Peirce apparently considered accepting the Being of the entire Universe as inexplicable to constitute a rejection of 3ns by denying the Reality of God as *Ens necessarium*. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Jun 2, 2019 at 3:53 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > JAS, Gene, list > > Obviously I disagree with both theological outlines of JAS and Gene. > > I didn't comment on Gene's outline because I thought it would take too > much non-Peircean analysis to explain my view that theological structures - > whether expressed within animism, polytheism or monotheism - are related to > societal functionality and not to psychological needs. That is - there may > be a psychological requirement for a belief in continuity of Type, i.e., in > habits, in laws that are more authoritative than singular events and people > -- but I don't think there is a psychological requirement for a specific > religious mode. That is, there is no psychological requirement as Gene > points out for 'bonding with nature' - but the mode of religious > organization [animism, polytheism, monotheism] - is related to the economic > mode, population size - which are both related to ecological factors. I > don't think this is an issue for Peircean discussion. > > As for JAS's view that atheism is akin to nominalism - I don't think this > is what Peirce meant - for nominalism rejects the view that universals or > generals are real - and that only particular, existential objects have any > reality. In other words, nominalism is focused around 2ndness and rejects > 3ns. Most certainly, nominalism was a strong philosophical and scientific > view in the 15th-19th and on centuries, but I think that correlating it > with atheism misunderstands both theories. The old nominalism was a > rejection of the equally basic theistic view that God-caused-everything, > eg, the argument vs Darwinism's natural mutations and natural selection. I > think that Peirce's definition of atheism refers to the rejection of > 'supernatural causes' [God] and support for mechanical causality; i.e., > a view that the only causes of anything in the world are 2ns, or mechanical > causality. > > But Peirce has THREE modal categories in his semiosis; 1ns or > freedom/chance; 2ns or mechanical particularity; and 3ns or, the rule of > laws or generals...Nominalism rejects Thirdness. Therefore Peirce's > definition of atheism essentially was that it rejected 3ns. But is this a > valid definition?????? > > I am a committed atheist - and equally committed to 3ns, so, therefore, I > reject the opinion of JAS. I know he is a committed theist - and a > monotheist - but, I don't think that it's helpful to assert that 'even if > you deny that you believe in God, you still believe in God. So there'. > > I think one has to analyze what the term of 'atheism' means. A belief in > 'God' surely can't be defined as a belief in genetic knowledge - as with > insects/birds/animals. What about a belief that the Universe is > 'rational'? As Peirce wrote: " the assumption that the Universe, that each > Universe, is governed by a Reason to which our own is akin. It only > remains, therefore, to inquire whether that Universal Reason is or > represents anything that can be properly likened to a Mind." And there it > is. My view is that the Universe operates as a Mind, within the 3 > categorical modes - and this is hardly nominalism but is, indeed, firmly > Peircean. > > Nor can nominalism be defined as asserting that something is inexplicable. > The definition of nominalism is simple: a belief only in 2ns and 1ns > [individual particular things and random interactions] - and a rejection of > 3ns or laws of mind > > As for the assertion by Peirce that 'It may, therefore, truly be said that > each of us believes in God, and that the only quest is how to believe less > crudely,-- I strongly disagree with such an assertion. It is without any > intellectual foundation and is an intrusion into my beliefs. Again - to > equate a belief in 3ns or laws with a belief in God - simply doesn't , to > me, make any sense. > > I, quite firmly, do not believe in God - and as I've pointed out, I > believe that the need to believe in a metaphysical agency is a > psychological need, but the nature of this agency - is societal. Therefore, > monotheism arose in large populations which required a centralizing and > cohesive moral and social authority to prevent diversity and dissension. > Polytheism, on the other hand, flourished in less centralized > smaller populations with local economies and diverse local loyalties. > Animism is found primarily in populations which are hunting and gathering > and thus, have no control over the production of their food and well-being. > My analysis of religions and religious beliefs, therefore, is based on the > societal function of these beliefs. > > As for my own psychological need for a force beyond the simple mechanics > of 2ns - I, as an atheist, am a firm believer in the function of Universal > Mind or 3ns - and thus, am neither a nominalist but remain a committed > Peircean. > > Edwina >
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