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}JAS: You wrote:
"Peirce apparently considered accepting the Being of the entire
Universe as inexplicable to constitute a rejection of 3ns by denying
the Reality of God as Ens necessarium."
I don't see that Peirce equated 3ns with 'the reality of God'.
I also reject your claims about Peirce. My post was that I didn't
read/interpret the Peirce selections the same way that you did, as I
outlined that Peirce's narrow definition of atheism was very
different from my definition [which includes 3ns]. And my definition
of nominalism does not include atheism....and I suspect that most
definitions of nominalism don't necessarily bond the two. Therefore,
for me to claim that I am an atheist - is a very different atheism
from the selection of Peirce that you provided.
[Note: I've been called a Marxist because I'm an atheist - yet
another invalid correlation].
Also- I rejected, completely, Peirce's rather patronizing claim that
we all believe in God even if we say/think we don't.
Edwina
On Sun 02/06/19 6:47 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
sent:
Edwina, List:
ET: As for JAS's view that atheism is akin to nominalism - I don't
think this is what Peirce meant ... I am a committed atheist - and
equally committed to 3ns, so, therefore, I reject the opinion of JAS.
To clarify, this is not my view or opinion, it was Peirce's. He
said so explicitly.
CSP: The most powerful of the proofs of His Being is that the
sincere inquirer ... if he meditates well upon God's Reality
considered as a mere hypothesis ... will, as a fact, find himself
utterly incapable of doubting it, which is more than a Proof of it to
him;--it is a Rational Compulsion. Meantime, for all those who have
not yet themselves received that illumination, testimony to that
effect lies open;--testimony stupendous in volume, and moreover quite
unopposed if, as I believe to be the case, all Atheists are
Nominalists ... (R 641:19-20; 1909 Nov 7)
Again, anyone is free to disagree with him about this, but to claim
that he believed otherwise is untenable.
ET: Nor can nominalism be defined as asserting that something is
inexplicable. The definition of nominalism is simple: a belief only
in 2ns and 1ns [individual particular things and random interactions]
- and a rejection of 3ns or laws of mind
It is not relevant how you or I would define nominalism; what
matters is how Peirce defined it in 1909, such that he viewed atheism
as somehow entailing it. I offered one hypothesis, based on the text
that I quoted from 1901 and the first Additament to "A Neglected
Argument" from 1908. Accepting anything as inexplicable--a "brute
fact"--constitutes a rejection of 3ns in that case by denying that
there is a rational explanation for it. Peirce apparently considered
accepting the Being of the entire Universe as inexplicable to
constitute a rejection of 3ns by denying the Reality of God as Ens
necessarium.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Sun, Jun 2, 2019 at 3:53 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
JAS, Gene, list
Obviously I disagree with both theological outlines of JAS and Gene.
I didn't comment on Gene's outline because I thought it would take
too much non-Peircean analysis to explain my view that theological
structures - whether expressed within animism, polytheism or
monotheism - are related to societal functionality and not to
psychological needs. That is - there may be a psychological
requirement for a belief in continuity of Type, i.e., in habits, in
laws that are more authoritative than singular events and people --
but I don't think there is a psychological requirement for a specific
religious mode. That is, there is no psychological requirement as Gene
points out for 'bonding with nature' - but the mode of religious
organization [animism, polytheism, monotheism] - is related to the
economic mode, population size - which are both related to ecological
factors. I don't think this is an issue for Peircean discussion.
As for JAS's view that atheism is akin to nominalism - I don't think
this is what Peirce meant - for nominalism rejects the view that
universals or generals are real - and that only particular,
existential objects have any reality. In other words, nominalism is
focused around 2ndness and rejects 3ns. Most certainly, nominalism
was a strong philosophical and scientific view in the 15th-19th and
on centuries, but I think that correlating it with atheism
misunderstands both theories. The old nominalism was a rejection of
the equally basic theistic view that God-caused-everything, eg, the
argument vs Darwinism's natural mutations and natural selection. I
think that Peirce's definition of atheism refers to the rejection of
'supernatural causes' [God] and support for mechanical causality;
i.e., a view that the only causes of anything in the world are 2ns,
or mechanical causality.
But Peirce has THREE modal categories in his semiosis; 1ns or
freedom/chance; 2ns or mechanical particularity; and 3ns or, the rule
of laws or generals...Nominalism rejects Thirdness. Therefore Peirce's
definition of atheism essentially was that it rejected 3ns. But is
this a valid definition??????
I am a committed atheist - and equally committed to 3ns, so,
therefore, I reject the opinion of JAS. I know he is a committed
theist - and a monotheist - but, I don't think that it's helpful to
assert that 'even if you deny that you believe in God, you still
believe in God. So there'.
I think one has to analyze what the term of 'atheism' means. A
belief in 'God' surely can't be defined as a belief in genetic
knowledge - as with insects/birds/animals. What about a belief that
the Universe is 'rational'? As Peirce wrote: " the assumption that
the Universe, that each Universe, is governed by a Reason to which
our own is akin. It only remains, therefore, to inquire whether that
Universal Reason is or represents anything that can be properly
likened to a Mind." And there it is. My view is that the Universe
operates as a Mind, within the 3 categorical modes - and this is
hardly nominalism but is, indeed, firmly Peircean.
Nor can nominalism be defined as asserting that something is
inexplicable. The definition of nominalism is simple: a belief only
in 2ns and 1ns [individual particular things and random interactions]
- and a rejection of 3ns or laws of mind
As for the assertion by Peirce that 'It may, therefore, truly be
said that each of us believes in God, and that the only quest is how
to believe less crudely,-- I strongly disagree with such an
assertion. It is without any intellectual foundation and is an
intrusion into my beliefs. Again - to equate a belief in 3ns or laws
with a belief in God - simply doesn't , to me, make any sense.
I, quite firmly, do not believe in God - and as I've pointed out, I
believe that the need to believe in a metaphysical agency is a
psychological need, but the nature of this agency - is societal.
Therefore, monotheism arose in large populations which required a
centralizing and cohesive moral and social authority to prevent
diversity and dissension. Polytheism, on the other hand, flourished
in less centralized smaller populations with local economies and
diverse local loyalties. Animism is found primarily in populations
which are hunting and gathering and thus, have no control over the
production of their food and well-being. My analysis of religions and
religious beliefs, therefore, is based on the societal function of
these beliefs.
As for my own psychological need for a force beyond the simple
mechanics of 2ns - I, as an atheist, am a firm believer in the
function of Universal Mind or 3ns - and thus, am neither a nominalist
but remain a committed Peircean.
Edwina
Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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