Gary R,
As the moderator, you have a responsibility to be fair to all
parties in any debate. But you frequently take Jon's side,
while ignoring or even belittling the points raised by other
parties to the discussion.
GR
I would appreciate it if you would read Joseph Ransdell's
"How the Forum Works."
I subscribed to Peirce-L in the 1990s, when Joe was running the
show, but I switched my email provider a few years later and lost
the connection. Joe would often correct people who made mistakes.
When I made a mistake, I appreciated the correction. I strongly
agree with the policy stated on the web site:
It is expected that criticism will be vigorous and diligently
pursued: philosophy is understood here to be essentially a
critically directed and self-controlled conversation.
GR
I thoroughly disagree with your critique of Jon's approach to
inquiry, so thoroughly that I have nothing more to add except
that I disagree with you in your continuous critique of his
approach
I have only one fundamental disagreement with Jon: his attempt to
"harmonize and synthesize" Peirce. Nobody is qualified to harmonize
and synthesize the views of anybody else, especially not someone
whose views are as rich and complex as Peirce's. His views were
evolving up to the end, and he could not harmonize them himself.
Jon has every right to state any opinion he likes. He can say that
his opinions were inspired by Peirce. But he can't claim that Peirce
would approve of any statement other than an exact quotation.
Re Jon's note of June 7: I read it, saw some mistakes, but ignored
them. But on June 14, you wrote that it was "a clear, complete
yet extraordinarily succinct articulation..." I could not let that
stand. I won't repeat the whole exchange, but see below for four
excerpts: (1) Jon's note of June 7, (2) my reply to you on June 16,
(3) Jon's reply on the same day, and (4) my reply later that day.
GR
such absurdities as John Sowa's commenting that "These two sources
show that Peirce's thoughts had no overlap with anything Jon was
writing about."
That sentence is taken out of context. See the final sentence by
Peirce in the paragraph from R 280: "The Graphist must be regarded
as corresponding to the “Plastic Nature” of Cudworth, or else to the
Artifex of Nature."
When Peirce cites sources, it's important to check the sources to
see what he was talking about. I googled those two terms to see
how Peirce regarded the Graphist. I found two Wikipedia articles
that explained those terms, and I included the URLs at the end of
the final excerpt below.
Before claiming that my statement is absurd, you have an obligation
to click on those two URLs. If you do, you'll find that Peirce was
not thinking about the issues in the way that Jon implied.
In conclusion, I promise that I'll be kinder and gentler in stating
my corrections to Jon's mistakes. But I hope that you would also
be more considerate in your role as moderator.
John
_____________________________________________________________________
1. Excerpt from note of June 7 by JAS:
We mark positions within a motion or points within a line for a
particular purpose, and we isolate Percepts within perception or events
within Experience by attending to the corresponding Perceptual
Judgments. Peirce hinted at this in one of his explanations of
Existential Graphs.
CSP: Namely, although the sheet that is actually employed may be quite
small, we make believe that the so-called sheet of assertion is only a
particular region, or area, of an immense surface ... Upon the great
surface the Graphist alone has the power to scribe any graph; while he
scribes what he sees fit. ... We further conceive that this feigned
sensible state of things is the icon or emblem of a mental state of
things. Namely, the immense surface with the graphs scribed upon it is
the image of the interpreter’s experience, while the sheet of assertion,
his field of view is the image of his field of attention. His experience
is forced upon him, while he attends to what he pleases, if he puts
forth sufficient effort. (R 280:82-83[29-30]; c. 1904-1905)
My Experience is forced upon me as a continuous stream of Perceptual
Judgments, often subconsciously, like EGs that the Graphist perpetually
scribes anywhere on the immense surface. A discontinuity in the flow of
perception tends to draw my attention to it involuntarily, such that the
EG for that Perceptual Judgment appears on the Sheet of Assertion. If I
choose to attend to it further--perhaps because it conflicts with my
current beliefs as derived from previous Perceptual Judgments, causing
the irritation of doubt that motivates all inquiry--then it serves as a
premiss for my subsequent deliberate reasoning; i.e., transforming that
EG along with previously scribed or transformed EGs. If truth is the
end in view, then this ought to be done in accordance with the logical
leading principles for Retroductive, Deductive, and Inductive Arguments;
in the case of necessary reasoning with EGs, the rules for erasure and
insertion.
_____________________________________________________________________
2. Excerpt from note by JFS to GR on June 16:
For example, the following note by Peirce is very clear:
CSP: Namely, although the sheet that is actually employed may be
quite small, we make believe that the so-called sheet of assertion
is only a particular region, or area, of an immense surface ...
Upon the great surface the Graphist alone has the power to scribe
any graph; while he scribes what he sees fit. ...
In short, Peirce says that the SA is potentially infinite. There
is no limit to the number of graphs that may be inscribed on it.
But the mention of Graphist implies that Peirce is talking about
a dialog with Grapheus in the process of endoporeutic.
But the two occurrences of "..." indicate some deletions. I don't
know why Jon deleted them, but the dialog with Grapheus is important.
Peirce used that dialog to illustrate the way people solve problems
by a mental dialog with themselves.
CSP continues: We further conceive that this feigned sensible state
of things is the icon or emblem of a mental state of things. Namely,
the immense surface with the graphs scribed upon it is the image of
the interpreter’s experience, while the sheet of assertion, his field
of view is the image of his field of attention. His experience is
forced upon him, while he attends to what he pleases, if he puts
forth sufficient effort. (R 280:82-83[29-30]; c. 1904-1905)
This says that the surface with its graphs is an icon of the person's
mental experience. It corresponds to what psychologists today call
a "mental model". That is where Peirce made important contributions
that psychologists are beginning to notice. That's where the action is.
JAS: My Experience is forced upon me as a continuous stream of
Perceptual Judgments, often subconsciously, like EGs that the
Graphist perpetually scribes anywhere on the immense surface...
This sentence and its continuation is a distraction. it seems to imply
that learning involves adding EGs to the SA. That is rote learning,
which computers do far more efficiently than people. The mental dialog
between Graphist and Grapheus is a deeper kind of learning that adapts
and assimilates the new information to the old information. That is
a major insight that should be emphasized.
I also found the other two quotations by Peirce to be clearer than
Jon's additions. The categories of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are certainly
important. But if Peirce felt that they would have clarified his
meaning in those passages, he would have said so.
_____________________________________________________________________
3. Excerpt from note by JAS to JFS on Jun 16:
JFS: In short, Peirce says that the SA is potentially infinite. There
is no limit to the number of graphs that may be inscribed on it.
No, Peirce said that the Sheet of Assertion is merely a specific portion
of an immense surface; the latter represents the interpreter's
Experience, while the former represents the interpreter's field of
attention.
CSP: Upon the great surface the Graphist alone has the power to scribe
any graph; while he scribes what he sees fit. (R 280:82[29])
JFS: But the mention of Graphist implies that Peirce is talking about a
dialog with Grapheus in the process of endoporeutic.
No, although Peirce mentioned "Grapheus" and dialog in some of his other
writings about EGs, he did not do so in this particular one.
there is no "dialog with Grapheus" in this case, as you can see for
yourself in the complete text of the paragraph that I quoted.
CSP: Two parties are, in our make-believe, feigned to be concerned in
the scribing of graphs; the one called the Graphist, the other the
interpreter. Namely, although the sheet that is actually employed may be
quite small, we make believe that the so-called sheet of assertion is
only a particular region, or area, of an immense surface; namely, the
former is that part of the latter that falls within the field of view of
the interpreter. Upon the great surface the Graphist alone has the power
to scribe any graph; while he scribes what he sees fit. The interpreter,
for his part, has the power, with more or less effort, to move the
graph-instances about as he pleases, so long as he keeps them separate
from one another, so that no two shall touch. In particular, he can move
such ones as he likes and as many as he likes into his field of view,
the sheet of assertion; or he can move them away. We further conceive
that this feigned sensible state of things is the icon or emblem of a
mental state of things. Namely, the immense surface with the graphs
scribed upon it is the image of the interpreter’s experience, while the
sheet of assertion, his field of view is the image of his field of
attention. His experience is forced upon him, while he attends to what
he pleases, if he puts forth sufficient effort. The Graphist must be
regarded as corresponding to the “Plastic Nature” of Cudworth, or else
to the Artifex of Nature. (R 280:82-83[29-30])
The Graphist scribes Graphs on the immense surface, forcing the
interpreter's Experience upon him. The interpreter moves those
Graph-instances around as he pleases, presumably transforming some of
the ones that he brings into his field of attention--the Sheet of
Assertion--in accordance with the usual permissions. The illustration
here is not of "the way people solve problems," but of the way people
make inferences about their Experience, and thereby derive knowledge
from it; i.e., establish their beliefs on the basis of the Perceptual
Judgments that serve as "the first premisses of all our reasonings" (CP
5.116, EP 2:191; 1903).
_____________________________________________________________________
4. Excerpt from note by JFS to JAS later on Jun 16:
Thanks for the more complete quotation. The deleted parts show that
Peirce was talking about a mental dialog between two "phases" of the
same ego. If you search CP for 'dialog', you'll find 36 occurrences
of 'dialogue' or 'dialogical'. Following is a typical example:
> thinking always proceeds in the form of a dialogue -- a dialogue
> between different phases of the ego -- so that, being dialogical,
> it is essentially composed of signs, as its matter, in the sense in
> which a game of chess has the chessmen for its matter. (CP 4.6)
Given this quotation, note that the full paragraph talks about two
parties in a "make-believe". In this case, the interpreter does not
have a name. But CP has eight occurrences where the two parties
are named Graphist and Grapheus. Since both of them are "phases" of
the same "ego", there is no real partitioning of the SA. In fact,
this paragraph does not mention any restriction on the immense surface
where the Graphist or the interpreter may scribe or move graphs.
> CSP: Two parties are, in our make-believe, feigned to be concerned
> in the scribing of graphs; the one called the Graphist, the other
> the interpreter. Namely, although the sheet that is actually...
>
> [See the complete paragraph from R 280 in Jon's note above.]
>
> The Graphist must be regarded as corresponding to the “Plastic
> Nature” of Cudworth, or else to the Artifex of Nature.
Now compare this paragraph to the commentary that Jon made about it.
Note that there is no recognition of the dialog between the two
"parties" of the same "ego", and the pattern of words is unrelated
to the subject matter of the paragraph.
> JAS, note of June 7: My Experience is forced upon me as a continuous
> stream of Perceptual Judgments, often subconsciously, like EGs...
>
> [See the full paragraph in the excerpt above.]
This is not a clarification of that paragraph [in R 280]. It's just
a collection of random words, many of which Peirce used in various
writings. But the arrangement of those words does not clarify or
explain anything about the paragraph.
If Jon wants to say that this is his own opinion, I have no objection.
But I strongly object to any claim that it is something that Peirce
said, meant, implied, or intended.
And by the way, Peirce's sources can be helpful, especially when he
explicitly mentions them. For "the Plastic Nature of Cudworth",
Google found https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plastic_Principle
For "artifex of nature", Google found
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theologia_Poetica
These two sources show that Peirce's thoughts had no overlap with
anything Jon was writing about.
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