John, List: I must confess that I find your response rather baffling, as if you were reading a completely different passage from the one that I quoted, even though you included the text itself.
JFS: The deleted parts show that Peirce was talking about a mental dialog between two "phases" of the same ego. They show no such thing. There are two parties involved, the Graphist and the interpreter, but they are decidedly *not *two "phases" of the same ego. Peirce explicitly identified the Graphist as either "the 'Plastic Nature' of Cudworth," which he elsewhere summarized succinctly as "a blind agent intermediate between God and the world" (R 870:42[36]; 1901); or "the Artifex of Nature," namely God Himself as creator of the world. Moreover, there is no *dialog* between the Graphist and interpreter in this account. Instead, the Graphist "scribes what he sees fit," such that the interpreter's "experience is forced upon him"; while the latter can "move the graph-instances about as he pleases," including bringing them "into his field of view, the sheet of assertion," such that "he attends to what he pleases, if he puts forth sufficient effort." JFS: If you search CP for 'dialog', you'll find 36 occurrences of 'dialogue' or 'dialogical' As I said before, if you would like to quote and comment on any or all of those passages, by all means please do so; but right now I am specifically quoting and commenting on an early draft of "The Basis of Pragmaticism" (R 280:82-83[29-30]; c. 1904-1905), which says *nothing whatsoever* about "dialog." Now, I certainly affirm with Peirce that all thought is dialogical; but as the subject heading indicates, my focus here is on the nature of *Experience* and the semeiosic process by means of which we *learn* from it. JFS: But CP has eight occurrences where the two parties are named Graphist and Grapheus. No, there are exactly eight instances of the *word* "grapheus" in CP--five in 4.431 and one each in 4.432, 4.439, and 4.472--all of which come from a single *earlier *manuscript, "Logical Tracts No. 2" (R 492; 1903). Moreover, it turns out that in this account there are *three* parties involved--the grapheus, who creates the universe of discourse; the graphist, who modifies the graph; and the interpreter, who is affected by the graph--and once again, there is *no mention at all* of "dialog" between any of them. Here is Peirce's summary. CSP: A certain sheet, called the *sheet of assertion*, is appropriated to the drawing upon it of such graphs that whatever may be at any time drawn upon it, called *the entire graph*, shall be regarded as expressing an assertion by an imaginary person, called the *graphist*, concerning a universe, perfectly definite and entirely determinate, but the arbitrary creation of an imaginary mind, called *the grapheus*. (CP 4.432) I wonder if perhaps you were recalling instead this contemporaneous passage from one of the Lowell Lectures. CSP: To begin, every act of expression or of representation supposes two persons, one who makes the signs, and another who interprets them, that is in whose mind an interpreting sign is determined. In this case, we may call the sign-maker the *graphist *and the other the *interpreter*. The interpreter may be the graphist’s future self ... In addition to the graphist and the interpreter, if we assume that the universe of discourse is the creation of some mind ... then we shall have to take account of this author of the universe of discourse who may be called the *grapheus*. (R 450:6-8; 1903) Here Peirce affirmed that the *graphist *and *interpreter *may indeed be two "phases" of the same ego, but once more the *grapheus* is a distinct third party--the "author of the universe of discourse." In other words, it seems to me that in the later account that I originally quoted, the Graphist encompasses *both *the grapheus *and *the graphist of the earlier accounts; and the latter correspond respectively to "the Artifex of Nature" and "Plastic Nature," who create and modify the *entire *Universe of Nature, not just the universe of discourse--which entails that the Graphist *cannot *correspond to the interpreter's past self. Again, the later account illustrates the interpreter having Experience *forced *upon him by the Graphist, rather than a single Quasi-mind *deliberately *engaging in dialogical thought over time. JFS: In fact, this paragraph does not mention any restriction on the immense surface where the Graphist or the interpreter may scribe or move graphs. I neither stated nor implied any such restriction. I simply pointed out that according to the quoted passage, the Sheet of Assertion is a relatively small *portion* of the immense surface, corresponding to the interpreter's *field of attention*. JFS: This is not a clarification of that paragraph. It's just a collection of random words, many of which Peirce used in various writings. But the arrangement of those words does not clarify or explain anything about the paragraph. There is nothing random about my words, and they were not intended to "clarify or explain anything about [Peirce's] paragraph" taken *by itself*. Instead, they constitute my attempt to combine specific ideas from Peirce's various writings into a coherent synthesis. Apparently you find *any *such exercise objectionable, but obviously I disagree, and Gary R. also seems to think that it has some merit. I even received generous off-List encouragement from a long-time "lurker" over the weekend, stating that "the work you are doing relative to understanding Peirce's thought is vital ... I am deeply grateful for the efforts you have put into sharing the development of Peirce's thought on the Peirce Listserv. Of all the members participating, you have been the deepest, most consistent, most honest, and most gracious. It has been a joy to follow your discussions. I believe what you are doing in your thorough analysis of clarifying Peirce's thought is fabulous." JFS: If Jon wants to say that this is his own opinion, I have no objection. But I strongly object to any claim that it is something that Peirce said, meant, implied, or intended. Peirce's words are his own, and my words are my own, although I always try to employ his technical terminology in a way that is faithful to his usage. I have every intention of continuing to offer my observations and argumentation, allowing readers to evaluate my claims and reasoning for themselves. When you believe that I am getting something wrong, you are welcome to make your case. JFS: These two sources show that Peirce's thoughts had no overlap with anything Jon was writing about. Nonsense, they are fully consistent with what I said above and previously. Besides, I consider Peirce's own voluminous writings to be a much more reliable source for understanding his thoughts than Wikipedia entries composed by others more than a century later. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Jun 16, 2019 at 10:49 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina and Jon, > > Not surprisingly, I completely agree with Edwina, and I believe that > Jon missed the point that Peirce was trying to express. > > ET > > I fully agree and specifically refer to your points > > > > 3. "Show how Peirce's writings can clarify, enhance, or correct > > writings by more recent authors from the 20th and 21st c. > > > > 4. Add new examples that show how Peirce's writings can be > > applied to topics that he had not written about in his day. " > > > > I think these two points are vital, for they move out of the isolate, > > almost inward-looking focus on 'the text' and show how Peirce can be > > used to examine and explore the real world. > > Yes. Peirce was addressing the latest issues of his day, and he hoped > that future generations would build on his work to address the vital > issues of their times. > > > JFS: In short, Peirce says that the SA is potentially infinite. > > There is no limit to the number of graphs that may be inscribed on it. > > > > JAS: No, Peirce said that the Sheet of Assertion is merely a specific > > portion of an immense surface; the latter represents the interpreter's > > Experience, while the former represents the interpreter's field of > > attention. > > Thanks for the more complete quotation. The deleted parts show that > Peirce was talking about a mental dialog between two "phases" of the > same ego. If you search CP for 'dialog', you'll find 36 occurrences > of 'dialogue' or 'dialogical'. Following is a typical example: > > > thinking always proceeds in the form of a dialogue -- a dialogue > > between different phases of the ego -- so that, being dialogical, > > it is essentially composed of signs, as its matter, in the sense in > > which a game of chess has the chessmen for its matter. (CP 4.6) > > Given this quotation, note that the full paragraph talks about two > parties in a "make-believe". In this case, the interpreter does not > have a name. But CP has eight occurrences where the two parties > are named Graphist and Grapheus. Since both of them are "phases" of > the same "ego", there is no real partitioning of the SA. In fact, > this paragraph does not mention any restriction on the immense surface > where the Graphist or the interpreter may scribe or move graphs. > > > CSP: Two parties are, in our make-believe, feigned to be concerned > > in the scribing of graphs; the one called the Graphist, the other > > the interpreter. Namely, although the sheet that is actually employed > > may be quite small, we make believe that the so-called sheet of > > assertion is only a particular region, or area, of an immense surface; > > namely, the former is that part of the latter that falls within the > > field of view of the interpreter. Upon the great surface the Graphist > > alone has the power to scribe any graph; while he scribes what he sees > > fit. The interpreter, for his part, has the power, with more or less > > effort, to move the graph-instances about as he pleases, so long as > > he keeps them separate from one another, so that no two shall touch. > > In particular, he can move such ones as he likes and as many as he > > likes into his field of view, the sheet of assertion; or he can move > > them away. We further conceive that this feigned sensible state of > > things is the icon or emblem of a mental state of things. Namely, the > > immense surface with the graphs scribed upon it is the image of the > > interpreter’s experience, while the sheet of assertion, his field of > > view is the image of his field of attention. His experience is forced > > upon him, while he attends to what he pleases, if he puts forth > > sufficient effort. The Graphist must be regarded as corresponding to > > the “Plastic Nature” of Cudworth, or else to the Artifex of Nature. > > (R 280:82-83[29-30]) > > Now compare this paragraph to the commentary that Jon made about it. > Note that there is no recognition of the dialog between the two > "parties" of the same "ego", and the pattern of words is unrelated > to the subject matter of the paragraph. > > > JAS, note of June 7: My Experience is forced upon me as a continuous > > stream of Perceptual Judgments, often subconsciously, like EGs that > > the Graphist perpetually scribes anywhere on the immense surface. > > A discontinuity in the flow of perception tends to draw my attention > > to it involuntarily, such that the EG for that Perceptual Judgment > > appears on the Sheet of Assertion. If I choose to attend to it > > further--perhaps because it conflicts with my current beliefs as > > derived from previous Perceptual Judgments, causing the irritation > > of doubt that motivates all inquiry--then it serves as a premiss for > > my subsequent deliberate reasoning; i.e., transforming that EG along > > with previously scribed or transformed EGs. If truth is the end in > > view, then this ought to be done in accordance with the logical > > leading principles for Retroductive, Deductive, and Inductive > > Arguments; in the case of necessary reasoning with EGs, the rules > > for erasure and insertion. > > This is not a clarification of that paragraph. It's just a collection > of random words, many of which Peirce used in various writings. But > the arrangement of those words does not clarify or explain anything > about the paragraph. > > If Jon wants to say that this is his own opinion, I have no objection. > But I strongly object to any claim that it is something that Peirce > said, meant, implied, or intended. > > And by the way, Peirce's sources can be helpful, especially when he > explicitly mentions them. For "the Plastic Nature of Cudworth", > Google found https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plastic_Principle > > For "artifex of nature", Google found > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theologia_Poetica > > These two sources show that Peirce's thoughts had no overlap with > anything Jon was writing about. > > John >
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