Helmut, List Over the years, I have found CSP’s beliefs about atomism to be bizarre and unorthodox. Cutworth’s writings appear to cohere with CSP’s ambivalence toward atomism (not to be confused with the scientific facts of chemical experiments.)
Cheers Jerry Sent from my iPad > On Jun 21, 2019, at 1:43 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > From Seneca to Hartmann, what is this meant to be about? Who is Cudworth? > Mentioning names from the antique until today, what do you intend to tell us? > Fatalism and atheism have nothing to do with each other: Fatalism is a > weakness of will, camouflaged as supersticion, and atheism is a belief. > Helmut > > Gesendet: Freitag, 21. Juni 2019 um 20:18 Uhr > Von: "Jerry LR Chandler" <[email protected]> > An: "Peirce List" <[email protected]> > Cc: "John F Sowa" <[email protected]> > Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semeiosis and Experience Ralph Cudworth, > List: > > On Jun 17, 2019, at 11:16 AM, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > > See the final sentence by > Peirce in the paragraph from R 280: "The Graphist must be regarded > as corresponding to the “Plastic Nature” of Cudworth, or else to the > Artifex of Nature." > > When Peirce cites sources, it's important to check the sources to > see what he was talking about. I googled those two terms to see > how Peirce regarded the Graphist. I found two Wikipedia articles > that explained those terms, and I included the URLs at the end of > the final excerpt below. > Thank you John, for posting this reference to Ralph Cudworth’s work. > The online article was rather fascinating wrt. some of the roots of CSP’s > philosophy that lies outside of logic and chemical logic. > > It is an alternate historical view of “three-ness”…and an early view of > “system’s thinking”. > > See clip below. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > https://www.1902encyclopedia.com/C/CUD/ralph-cudworth.html > RALPH CUDWORTH (1617-1688), the most learned and philosophical of the > Cambridge Plutonists, > > > The True Intellectual System, to justify its general title and fulfil its > author's plan, should have contained two other parts, each on the same scale > as the part which we possess. There appeared to Cudworth to be three systems > which deny liberty and involve necessity,—three sorts of fatalism. The first > is materialistic fatalism, which suppresses with the idea of liberty every > idea of God and spirit, and explains all phenomena, even those of thought and > feeling, by mechanical laws, and the formation of all beings by the > combination and concourse of atoms; the second is a theological or religious > fatalism, advocated by various scholastic and later divines, which makes good > and evil, right and wrong, the creation of the will of God, and thus destroys > liberty by destroying its condition and its law ; and the third is Stoical > fatalism, which, although not denying the Divine existence or the rectitude > of the Divine nature, affirms that all that happens is determined by an > eternal and unchangeable necessity. These are the three chief false systems > of the universe, according to Cudworth, and he would oppose to them three > great principles, the fundamentals or essentials of religion —to the first > the existence of God and of a spiritual world ; to the second the eternal and > immutable distinction of right and wrong; and to the third the freedom and > responsibility of man. The proof of these three truths with the refutation of > the opposite errors seemed to him to be the establishment of a system of the > universe entitled to be called, in opposi-tion to those refuted, true, and, > in distinction from physical systems, like the Ptolemaic, Tychonic, and > Copernican, intellectual. The first of these forms of fatalism is the only > one with which his principal work deals. It includes four species of > materialistic atheism, namely,—the atomic, adopt-ed by Democritus, Epicurus, > and Hobbes, which recognizes no other substances than material atoms and no > other forces than their movements ; the hylopathic, maintained by > Anaximander, which makes infinite matter, devoid of understanding and life, > form all things by " a secretion or segregation " which takes place according > to inherent law; the hylozoic, asserted by Strato of Lampsacus, which > explains everything by the supposition of an inward, self-organizing, plastic > life in matter ; and the cosmoplastic, perhaps held by Seneca and the younger > Pliny, which represents the universe as an organized being, like a plant, > with a spontaneous and necessary but unconscious and un-reflective > development. They are, however, reducible to two—the atomic and hylozoic,—the > one best represented by Democritus, the other by Strato; the one explaining > everything by matter and movement, the other everything by matter endowed > with life; the one mechanical, the other dynamical. > > The history of the atomic philosophy is narrated by Cudworth at great length > and with vast erudition, but no one will now be found to accept the view > which he gives of its development as even in the main accurate. Like his > friend, Henry More, he derives the atomic theory, in so far as it is a purely > physical speculation, from Moses, and his conclusions as to its transmission > are in many respects not less untrustworthy. He would make it out to have > been taught by Pythagoras, Empedocles, and, in fact, nearly all the ancient > philosophers, and only to have been mutilated and perverted by Leucippus and > Democritus. He had the merit, however, of seeing very clearly that the atomic > theory in itself, or what he calls the atomic physiology, had no natural or > even necessary connection with the atomic atheism. He contends that " so far > from being either the mother or nurse of atheism, or any ways favourable > thereto (as is vulgarly supposed), it is indeed the most opposite to it of > any, and the greatest defence against the same." He states with great fulness > and fairness the arguments which have been urged in support both of the > atomic and hylozoic atheism. He refutes them, although in a cumbrous and > discursive manner, with great strength of reason. It is in connection with > the refutation of hylozoic atheism that he brings forward the celebrated > hypothesis, which he held in common with More, of a plastic nature,—a > substance intermediate between matter and spirit,—a power which prosecutes > certain ends but not freely or intelligently,—an instrument by which laws are > able to act without the immediate agency of God. He argues that to reftr the > life and motion of the universe immediately to God renders Divine Providence > " operose, solicitous, and distractious," implies that all things are done > miraculously and none of them by an inward principle of their own, and is > incon-sistent with the slow and gradual development of nature and with its " > errors and bungles." It is not wonderful that few should have been convinced > by such arguments. Nothing can be toilsome to omnipotence or perplexing to > omniscience. It is not more difficult to believe the life and motions of the > universe due to the immediate action of God than the life and motions of the > secondary agent which Cudworth imagined to animate nature and " drude-ingly > to execute a part of the work of Providence." An unconscious and " > necessitated plastic power" cannot remove from the creator of it the blame of > any " errors or bungles " it may commit. Cudworth's hypothesis became in > 1703-4 the subject of an interesting controversy between Bayle and > Leclerc,—the former maintaining, and the latter denying, that it was > favourable to the atheistical inference. It has been recently reproduced by > Joseph John Murphy in his work on Habit and Intelligence. What Cudworth > designated " plastic nature" is almost identical with what Murphy calls " > unconscious intelligence." It was descended from the anirna mtindi of Plato, > and is still represented in the Unbeiousste of Von Hartmann. > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or > "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but > to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of > the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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