Jeff, List:

Thanks for your comments.  I agree that the contemporary field of
mathematics still seems to be mostly wedded to the set-theoretical
approach, although I wonder if category theory offers an alternative more
conducive to Peirce's late "topological" conception of continuity; Fernando
Zalamea, for one, seems to think so.  I tried to learn more about it a
while back, but in all honesty, I never managed to attain a firm grasp of
it.  As is presumably evident from my history of posts, personally I am
more interested in your second and third questions.  From that standpoint,
the possibility that set-theoretical notions might be sufficient for
mathematically *modeling *continuity strikes me as largely beside the point.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 6:37 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
[email protected]> wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> In the opening remarks of the last lecture in RLT, Peirce frames three
> questions. Let me restate them in my own words.
>
>
>    1.  What conception of continuity is needed for mathematics?
>    2. What conception of continuity is needed for a philosophical theory
>    of critical logic and the larger theory of semiotics?
>    3. What conception of continuity is needed for metaphysics?
>
>
> We could add, what conception of continuity is needed for the special
> sciences, including the physical sciences as well as the human sciences?
>
> Focusing on the first question, I don't think the ongoing disputes about
> what conception of continuity is needed, for instance, to ground the
> hypotheses that lie at the basis of the calculus are "much ado about
> nothing". In the late 19th and early 20th century, many mathematicians and
> philosophers tried to defend a general approach that grounds the calculus
> on set-theoretical notions concerning the limit. Peirce, on the other hand,
> argued that the conception of the infinitesimal is more fundamental and
> less problematic--logically speaking. Those questions have continued to
> call out for more inquiry in the latter part of the 20th century and the
> first part of the 21st.
>
> I was in the audience when Matthew Moore delivered that presentation in
> Bogota. He seemed to be suggesting that set-theoretical notions involving
> certain types of infinity will suffice for all of mathematics. Given the
> fact that much inquiry in topology from the time of Poincaré to the
> present has moved in the direction of treating continuous paths and
> surfaces as point-sets, there are strong arguments that can be marshaled in
> support of this general approach to analyzing the mathematical conception
> of continuity as being sufficient for topology as well as for the calculus.
>
> I don't buy those arguments, but they are probably the majority opinion in
> most mathematics departments in the U.S.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
>>
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