I wonder whether the following article by Jaime Nubiola may offer some guidance in the current discussion of Peirce's metaphysics:
https://www.academia.edu/19624309/What_a_Scientific_Metaphysics_Really_Is_According_to_C._S._Peirce *Ben Novak* 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 Telephone: (814) 808-5702 Mobile: (814) 424-8501 *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 7:48 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeff, Jon, List, > > It’s true that my suggestion of a radical split between the universes of > discourse of physics and metaphysics oversimplifies the issues, as it tends > to ignore not only the variety of metaphysical assumptions among physicists > but also the variety and tentativity of Peirce’s own cosmological > hypotheses. I’m looking forward to further inquiry along the lines Jeff has > proposed. > > Right now the only suggestion I can contribute is that a concept of time > as a true topological continuum would be independent of scale, while any > concept of *historical* time does have a fixed scale, which assigns the > origin of the earth to around 5 billion years ago, the Big Bang to about > 13.8 billion years ago, etc. You can’t have a scale in a temporal continuum > without marking events in it and comparing the length of time between > events, and those marks appear as discontinuities. To visualize an > explanation of why we can’t locate the origin of “the universe” in > *continuous* time, I sometimes use the analogy of “zooming in” on a > representation of the Mandelbrot set: you can zoom in on any region forever > (or you could if you had infinite computing power) without reaching an > (“innermost”) end. (I wonder how the possibility of fractal dimensions > would affect Jeff’s idea about the reduction of dimensions over time.) > > I haven’t read the Quanta article yet and have a busy weekend ahead so > this very rough sketch is all I can offer for awhile. > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 23-Aug-19 12:46 > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang > > > > Jon S, Gary F, John S, List, > > > > Peirce engages in inquiries that fall under the headings "cosmological > metaphysics" and "cosmological physics." (see, for example, CP 6.213, As > we know, he is drawing on a number of resources including mathematics, > phenomenology and semiotics for the sake of directing the inquiries in > cosmological metaphysics. In turn, those philosophical inquiries are being > put to the test in physics. > > > > Both the metaphysical and the physical inquiries in cosmology are > attempting to address many of the same basic types of questions. What is > the origin of the universe? What explains the historical development of the > cosmos? One of the big differences between the two types of inquiries is > that metaphysics draws on the common observations of ordinary experience, > while physics draws on special observations in order to put its theories to > the test. > > > > As far as I am able to see, most cosmologists--ranging from Aristotle and > Leibniz to Einstein and Hawking--draw on both philosophical and > physical resources when framing the key questions and giving shape to their > leading ideas. For the purposes of a science of review, Peirce thinks it is > important to separate the two types of inquiry. Otherwise, we will run the > risk of getting things out of order in ways that might bias and prejudice > our inquiries. > > > > Having said that much, I agree with John S in thinking that most of > Peirce's explanations in his metaphysical and his physical inquiries in > cosmology have the character of tentative hypothesis. What is more, Peirce > often seems to be considering a wide range of hypotheses, many of which > appear to be competing with each other. Some of the metaphysical hypotheses > fit better with the best physical science of his day, but he is well aware > that those theories were filled with vague ideas, had enormous gaps, > and would likely be amended or replaced with better theories as inquiry > proceeded. We might try to rate the key explanations he offers in > his metaphysical and physical cosmological theories. For this purpose, we > might employ the rating system he used in his inquiries in speculative > grammar. > > > > With respect to the conceptions employed and conceptual divisions made in > the hypotheses under consideration at his time, we could label them in the > following way: > > > > i. {d} for {délos}), > clear apprehension of some, > > ii. {s} for {schedon}, > almost clear, > > iii. {m} for {metrios}, > and a tolerable but not thoroughly tried conception of others > > iv. {ch} for {chalepös} > hardly better than {a}). > > v. {a} for {adélos}an > unsatisfactory and doubtful notion of others, > > > > For my part, I would put a mark of a, ch, m or s to most of the > conceptions that figure prominently in the hypotheses he offers, I and > would put a mark of d to only a small number--at least as far as my own > understanding of those conceptions goes. > > > > If we compare Peirce's cosmological hypotheses to those that are under > consideration today, then we have our work cut out for us. As far as I am > able to tell, there appear to be a remarkable diversity of cosmological > hypotheses that have been put forward for consideration by the community of > physical cosmologists. In fact, there are so many that rest on such widely > differing conceptions (e.g., of the nature of space and time), that it is > hard to sort out the metaphysical assumptions implicit in the competing > hypotheses. > > > > As such, let's focus our discussion here on two hypotheses: (a) the idea > that the origin of the universe is in a singularity that changed abruptly > at an event called the Big Bang and (b) the idea that the origin of the > universe involves no such singularity and that the evolution of the cosmos > from its origins involved a relatively smooth expansion of space over time. > Let us call (a) the Hawking-Penrose abrupt change hypothesis and (b) the > Hartle-Hawking smooth change hypothesis. Here is a popular summary of the > two. > > > > > https://www.quantamagazine.org/physicists-debate-hawkings-idea-that-the-universe-had-no-beginning-20190606/ > > > <https://www.quantamagazine.org/physicists-debate-hawkings-idea-that-the-universe-had-no-beginning-20190606/> > > Quanta Magazine > <https://www.quantamagazine.org/physicists-debate-hawkings-idea-that-the-universe-had-no-beginning-20190606/> > > www.quantamagazine.org > > A recent challenge to Stephen Hawking’s biggest idea — about how the > universe might have come from nothing — has cosmologists choosing sides. > > For those who are interested, the summary provides a link to the paper in > which Hartle and Hawking formulated (b). > > For the sake of comparing Peirce's cosmological hypotheses to (a) and (b), > I'd be interested in looking more closely at the metaphysical explanations > developed the last lecture of RLT. In this lecture, Peirce draws on > mathematical conceptions of continuity as they are developed in the > topology of his time for the sake of examining questions about the possible > evolution of the dimensions of space and time from the early origins of the > universe. Peirce formulates a hypothesis that the number of dimensions of > the universe in its origins may have been infinite. Over time, the number > of dimensions decreased to those we have today. > > > > How does Peirce's hypothesis compare to (a) and (b) above on the question > of the possible change in the number of dimensions of the universe as space > evolved over time? One interesting suggestion I have seen in a journal > article (that I am not able to locate at present) is that the differences > between (a) and (b) might not be as big as they as might appear at first > glance. What might appear to be a discontinuity in (a) as the singularity > erupts in a big bang in a relatively lower-dimensional space, would, in the > framework of a relatively higher-dimensional space and time, be a > continuous process of change. > > > > That gives rise to an interesting question: if there is a change in the > number of dimension of space and time from the origins of the universe to > the present time, what might explain the general direction of those > changes? > > > > --Jeff > > > > > > > > > > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Friday, August 23, 2019 8:42 AM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang > > > > Gary F., List: > > > > As I have already stated, I do not see how Peirce's synechistic and > hyperbolic cosmology is compatible with the hypothesis of a singularity > (discontinuity) at the beginning of the universe, especially since he > affirmed more than once that time began "infinitely long ago" as whatever > preceded it--whatever that could mean--"gradually and continuously > developed into time" (NEM 4:149; 1898). Moreover, the Big Bang theory is *not > *testable by means of physical observations, since it rests on an > untestable *assumption *that the laws of nature have remained essentially > unchanged ever since almost immediately after the beginning of the > universe--which, again, Peirce *denied *in accordance with his > "thorough-going evolutionism." > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >
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