John, List: JFS: Although Jon prefers to quote other passages, Peirce never denied CP 1.412.
I have never claimed that Peirce denied CP 1.412. What I have maintained is that we should interpret it in light of later passages, which presumably reflect Peirce's more considered views. Besides, upon careful examination of what that text actually says, it turns out to be fully consistent with those subsequent writings. CSP: Our conceptions of the first stages of the development, before time yet existed, must be as vague and figurative as the expressions of the first chapter of Genesis. Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Though time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the first, because resulting from it. Then there would have come other successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the tendency to take them ever strengthening themselves, until the events would have been bound together into something like a continuous flow. We have no reason to think that even now time is quite perfectly continuous and uniform in its flow. The quasi-flow which would result would, however, differ essentially from time in this respect, that it would not necessarily be in a single stream. (CP 1.412, EP 1:278; 1887-1888) The situation "before time yet existed," whatever that could mean, was "the womb of indeterminacy"--i.e., a *symbol *as 3ns (cf. EP 2:322; 1904). The "principle of habit"--i.e., the law of mind (CP 6.23; 1891), also 3ns--was *already *operative, which is why there could be "a second flash ... resulting from" the first one. Peirce explicitly acknowledged this aspect in a manuscript draft for "A Neglected Argument," crediting Ogden Rood with bringing it to his attention. CSP: At the same time, as well as I can make out, it is impossible to form any rational philosophy of cosmology without admitting that violations of the true laws of nature, in swarms [of] numberless though excessively minute violations, are happening every second of time. In the years 1891-3, I defended this position in six articles in the *Monist* under the name of *tychism*; but only in one of the six did I allude to any other conception of them than that [of] events occurring by absolute chance. I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my original hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless determinations of single events, under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming, conjoined with *a survival of the fittest*; the fitness of habits, or "laws," of things consisting in their growth not essentially tending to produce characters which would necessarily remove any objects that should come to possess them from the sphere of experience. The supposed tendency to take habits, that is to say, to repeat former modes of action would itself grow by virtue of itself into a stronger habit of habit-forming. It will at once be seen that this could very well have been the way in which some laws of nature might have originated, and that it is a hypothesis well worthy of examination whether all laws may not have come to pass in this way. But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis first suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty features of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others and have struck me in my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked that my theory was not so much *evolutionary* as it was *emanational*; and Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some original tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis; while I myself was most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence in time, if I proposed to make all laws develope from single *events*; since an event already supposes Time. (R 842:111-114[125-128]; 1908) Peirce's cosmology requires the "tendency to take habits," the psychical law, to be *original*--i.e., primordial--rather than something that *arose*. This is the very explanation that the physical law itself calls for (cf. CP 6.613; 1893). Moreover, "an event already supposes Time," so from that standpoint it is problematic to treat the *beginning *of time as an *event*--i.e., a singularity. Instead, Peirce consistently held that it did not have any *definite* beginning. JFS: For the relationships of cosmology, physics, metaphysics, and religion, see the attached cspscience.jpg, which shows Peirce's classification of the sciences of discovery. This is very disappointing--despite all of the recent on-List complaints about attributing views to someone apart from verbatim quotations, the attachment still falsely claims that it presents *Peirce's *classification of the sciences. As I pointed out several months ago, it does not--there is no passage whatsoever where he employed the term "Formal Semeiotic," and also no passage whatsoever where he situated *any *aspect of Semeiotic under Phenomenology. Instead, Peirce *consistently* treated Semeiotic--including all three of its branches--as a generalization of Logic under Normative Science; most notably, within the very text cited as the diagram's alleged source. CSP: Phenomenology is, at present, a single study. Normative Science has three widely separated divisions: (i) *Esthetics*; (ii) *Ethics*; (iii) *Logic*. Esthetics is the science of ideals, or of that which is objectively admirable without any ulterior reason. I am not well acquainted with this science; but it ought to repose on phenomenology. Ethics, or the science of right and wrong, must appeal to esthetics for aid in determining the *summum bonum*. It is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, conduct. Logic is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, thought; and as such, must appeal to ethics for its principles. It also depends upon phenomenology and upon mathematics. All thought being performed by means of signs, Logic may be regarded as the science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches: (l) *Speculative Grammar*, or the general theory of the nature and meanings of signs, whether they be icons, indices, or symbols; (2) *Critic*, which classifies arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of each kind; (3) *Methodeutic*, which studies the methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of truth. Each division depends on that which precedes it. (CP 1.191, EP 2:260; 1903) In *Peirce's *classification of the sciences, Phenomenology is a single study, and thus has no branches at all. Logic as the third branch of Normative Science is "the science of the general laws of signs"--i.e., Semeiotic--and depends on Ethics (which depends on Esthetics), as well as Phenomenology and Mathematics. Speculative Grammar, which I assume corresponds to "Formal Semeiotic," is the first branch of Logic. Anyone is welcome to hold, advocate, and defend the *personal opinion* that it belongs under Phenomenology instead, but no one can legitimately ascribe such a view to *Peirce*. JFS: Note that metaphysics depends on mathematics and phenomenology for its principles. Metaphysics also depends on Logic for its principles, since "Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being" (CP 1.487; c. 1896). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 10:49 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F, Jeff, Edwina, Ben, Gary R, Jerry, Helmut, and Jon, > > When talking about cosmology, we should remember that Benjamin P. > was a professor of math *and* astronomy. Charles learned both at > his father's knee, and his first real job was as an astronomer. > > That led to the research for the only book he published in his > lifetime. When writing about cosmology, Peirce brought insights > from every aspect of his philosophy, but he always depended on his > background in mathematics, physics, and astronomy for the details. > > GF > > I don’t see how Peirce’s cosmology, which is essentially > > metaphysical (i.e. based on logical principles), has any bearing > > on the Big Bang theory, which is strictly a physical hypothesis > > testable only by means of physical observations.... I don’t think > > it would necessitate a modification of his cosmology, nor would > > his cosmology imply a denial that the Big Bang happened at the > > beginning of the physical universe as we know it. > > For Peirce's version of the Big Bang, see CP 1.412 copied below. > Although Jon prefers to quote other passages, Peirce never denied > CP 1.412. It's consistent with modern science. His guidelines > of synechism, tychism, and evolution are also consistent with > most of the modern hypotheses. > > For the relationships of cosmology, physics, metaphysics, and > religion, see the attached cspscience.jpg, which shows Peirce's > classification of the sciences of discovery. > > Note that metaphysics depends on mathematics and phenomenology for > its principles. But the content of experience includes everything > observed, felt, or imagined in any way. Therefore, the contents of > the physical, psychical, and practical sciences influence metaphysics. > Since Peirce classified religion as a practical science, religion > also influences metaphysics. > > JBD > > Peirce often seems to be considering a wide range of hypotheses, > > many of which appear to be competing with each other. Some of the > > metaphysical hypotheses fit better with the best physical science > > of his day, but he is well aware that those theories were filled > > with vague ideas, had enormous gaps, and would likely be amended > > or replaced with better theories as inquiry proceeded. > > I agree. Your citations to Peirce and to modern physicists support > Gleiser's remark about cosmology: "we humans are like a fish in > a bowl trying to figure out the nature of the ocean." Even though > Peirce's guesses are better than most, he called them guesses. None > of us can claim anything stronger than a guess. > > JBD > > Peirce engages in inquiries that fall under the headings "cosmological > > metaphysics" and "cosmological physics." See, for example, CP 6.213 > > Yes. Note the following excerpt from that paragraph: > > The subject of mathematical metaphysics, or Cosmology, is not so very > > difficult, provided it be properly expanded and displayed. It deeply > > concerns both physicist and psychist. The physicist ought to direct > > his attention to it, in order that he may be led to contemplate the > > intellectual side of his own science. Especially the chemist, whose > > attention is forced to theory, needs above all to study the theory > > of theorizing. Psychologists have not yet dropped their excellent > > habit of studying philosophy; but I venture to think that they are > > not fully alive to all the value for their science of certain higher > > mathematics and to the virtues of mathematical thinking... > > CP 6.214 ff are also important. Note the excerpt from CP 6.216: > > Religion is a practical matter. Its beliefs are formulae you will > > go upon. But a scientific proposition is merely something you take > > up provisionally as being the proper hypothesis to try first and > > endeavor to refute... It is a damnable absurdity indeed to say that > > one thing is true in theology and another in science. But it is > > perfectly true that the belief which I shall do well to embrace in > > my practical affairs, such as my religion, may not accord with the > > proposition which a sound scientific method requires me provisionally > > to adopt at this stage of my investigation. > > Religion may be useful for inspiration (as in the Neglected Argument), > but it has no observable facts that could contradict the physical > aspects of cosmology. > > ET > > Interesting - that Hawking proposed a cosmology where the universe > > emerged 'out of nothing'. This seems similar to the outline of Peirce > > in 6.217 - the nothing that is 'absolutely undefined and unlimited > > possibility - boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and no law. > > It is boundless freedom". > > Yes. But note that there is no sudden discontinuity. It's > consistent with CP 1.412 and with synechism. The paragraphs > from CP 6.214 to 216 are also relevant. (Copies below) > > BN > > the following article by Jaime Nubiola may offer some guidance in > > the current discussion of Peirce's metaphysics: > > > https://www.academia.edu/19624309/What_a_Scientific_Metaphysics_Really_Is_According_to_C._S._Peirce > > GR > > I have long followed Nubiola's work ... [and] have especially > > benefited from reading his papers on science, logic (esp., the > > logic of abduction) and metaphysics, but also on such diverse > > topics as the relationship of Peirce to Whitehead, to > > Wittgenstein, and to Searle among others. > > Yes. I first met him at a conference on Peirce & Whitehead in > 1999. His comparison of Peirce and Whitehead is also useful for > this thread: https://philarchive.org/archive/NUBPAWv1 > > > JFS: An amazing event occurred around 13.8 billion years ago. > > There are many hypotheses about what it might have been, but > > no physicist or astronomer seriously claims that it didn't happen. > > > > JLRC: This claim is not true. One issue is the nature of time. > > The postulate of the cyclic nature of cosmological events is > > equally valid, according to many. > > Hypotheses about cycles don't rule out some major event that > occurred about 13.8 billion years ago in our current cycle. > > JLRC > > If one reads CSP more carefully, one finds strands of science, > > especially math and chemistry, in almost every sentence. The unity > > of his thinking appears to me to be the bedrocks from which his > > sentences take form. > > Yes. As an example, I would cite "Man's Glassy Essence" (EP 1:334- > 351, CP 6.238-271). Peirce wrote a good summary of physics and > chemistry as they were known in 1890. > > His insights in logic and semeiotic are as valid as ever. But > in biology and neuroscience, so much more has been discovered in > the past century that his vague analogies aren't convincing. > > HR > > Maybe, when the universe becomes too big, its shape becomes unstable, > > and it calves, or separates into smaller universes, and in each smaller > > universe it looks like there has been a big bang, but has not?" > > Physicists have proposed and analyzed hypotheses that are similar > to that. In an interview "Science’s Path From Myth to Multiverse", > Steven Weinberg, who won a Nobel Prize for some of those theories, > discusses them: > > https://www.quantamagazine.org/steven-weinberg-on-the-history-of-physics-20150317/ > > In effect, a multiverse is a universe in which there are many big bangs, > each of which produces one space-time region that contains a kind of > subuniverse that is isolated from all the others. > > The analogy with soap bubbles is very good. The entire multiverse is > like a foam of a large number of bubbles. Some are tiny and survive > for just an instant (according to some Multiverse Universal Time, MUT). > Others, like our universe, may be huge and last for a very long time > according to MUT. And some may be huge, but misshapen lumps that > explode very quickly. See that interview with Weinberg or just > Google "multiverse". > > JAS > > the (untestable) assumption that the laws of nature have remained > > unchanged over all that time... > > The most widely accepted theories about the Big Bang make strong > predictions that the laws of nature evolved very rapidly during > the first second. They don't rule out small changes since then, > and many physicists have developed methods for testing those > assumptions. So far, they have concluded that some changes may > be occurring even today, but if so, they are below the threshold > of sensitivity of currently available tests. > > JAS > > Peirce declined to assign any date to the "beginning" at all, > > based on his assumption of "thorough-going evolutionism." ... > > The definite and discontinuous parts that are thus created are > > not real constituents of the continuum in itself. > > Physicists today have many hypotheses about cosmology that are > consistent with Peirce's version of continuity and evolution. > Nobody knows what he might have said if he had seen the > data and theories of the 20th and 21st centuries. > > The newer instruments are able to get data from earlier and more > distant parts of the universe. Each new data set serves as a test > of the old hypotheses and suggests new ones. They *never* assume > that the laws of nature don't evolve. > > See the interview with Weinberg, for example. Read Hawking's > book about the first few seconds after the Big Bang. And there > are many more publications since Hawking died. > > Short summary: Peirce had an amazing insight into many of the > issues, but he always insisted that his hypotheses had to be > tested against observations. His intuitions about synechism, > tychism, and evolution are still good guidelines. > > But they are too vague to predict the details or to show clear > preferences among the many wildly different modern hypotheses > that are consistent with his intuitions. > > To repeat Gleiser's warning, we are like fish swimming in a bowl > who are trying to imagine the ocean outside. > > John > ________________________________________________________________ > > CP 1.412. Our conceptions of the first stages of the development, > before time yet existed, must be as vague and figurative as the > expressions of the first chapter of Genesis. Out of the womb of > indeterminacy we must say that there would have come something, by > the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the > principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Though > time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense > after the first, because resulting from it. Then there would have > come other successions ever more and more closely connected, the > habits and the tendency to take them ever strengthening themselves, > until the events would have been bound together into something like > a continuous flow. We have no reason to think that even now time > is quite perfectly continuous and uniform in its flow. The quasi- > flow which would result would, however, differ essentially from time > in this respect, that it would not necessarily be in a single stream. > > > CP 6.214. Metaphysics has to account for the whole universe of being. > It has, therefore, to do something like supposing a state of things > in which that universe did not exist, and consider how it could have > arisen. However, this statement needs amendment. For time is itself > an organized something, having its law or regularity; so that time > itself is a part of that universe whose origin is to be considered. > We have therefore to suppose a state of things before time was > organized. Accordingly, when we speak of the universe as "arising" > we do not mean that literally. We mean to speak of some kind of > sequence, say an objective logical sequence; but we do not mean > in speaking of the first stages of creation before time was organized, > to use "before," "after," "arising," and such words in the temporal > sense. But for the sake of the commodity of speech we may avail > ourselves of these words. > > 215. The initial condition, before the universe existed, was not > a state of pure abstract being. On the contrary it was a state > of just nothing at all, not even a state of emptiness, for even > emptiness is something. If we are to proceed in a logical and > scientific manner, we must, in order to account for the whole > universe, suppose an initial condition in which the whole universe > was non-existent, and therefore a state of absolute nothing. > > 216. You must not let this interfere with or be interfered > with by any religious belief. Religion is a practical matter. > Its beliefs are formulae you will go upon. But a scientific > proposition is merely something you take up provisionally as > being the proper hypothesis to try first and endeavor to refute. > The only belief you -- as a purely scientific man -- have about > it is that it is adopted in accordance with a method which must > lead to the truth in the long run. It is a damnable absurdity > indeed to say that one thing is true in theology and another in > science. But it is perfectly true that the belief which I shall > do well to embrace in my practical affairs, such as my religion, > may not accord with the proposition which a sound scientific > method requires me provisionally to adopt at this stage of my > investigation. Later, both the one proposition and the other may > very likely be modified; but how, or which comes nearer to the > ultimate conclusion, not being a prophet or a magician, I cannot > yet say. >
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