Edwina, List: ET: So- there is not only a 'universal tendency towards habit-forming' - but a universal tendency towards chance/sporting/deviation - and a universal tendency to instantiation into discrete units. ALL Three are 'universal tendencies'.
Thanks for confirming that 3ns is fundamental in the constitution of being, as I have maintained all along. Any* tendency *is 3ns, and the reality of any *universal *tendency reflects the primordiality of 3ns. If in fact there is "a universal tendency toward chance/sporting/deviation" and "a universal tendency to instantiation into discrete units," then this reflects the "really commanding function" of 3ns with respect to 1ns and 2ns, respectively (CP 6.202; 1898). The resulting evolution of states is an ongoing and continuous process (3ns) away from the ideal limit of "unpersonalized feeling" (1ns) in the infinite past and toward the ideal limit of "dead matter" (2ns) in the infinite future. On the other hand, we should acknowledge that when Peirce *himself *discussed cosmology, he *only *applied the term "universal tendency" to habit-taking and generalization (CP 6.209 and CP 7.515; both 1898)--paradigmatic examples of 3ns. ET: To consider that only 3ns is primordial moves one, I think, close to necessitarianism [see 6.59 etc for Peirce's argument against this view]. Nonsense, no one is denying the *reality *of 1ns, which is what Peirce specifically addressed in that paragraph. Moreover, saying that 3ns is primordial in no way entails that 1ns and 2ns are *reducible to* 3ns, which was the error of Hegel (cf. CP 6.218; 1898), or that 1ns and 2ns are otherwise dispensable. Instead, as Gary R. already noted, 1ns and 2ns are *involved in* 3ns and can be *prescinded from* 3ns. The entire universe is a continuum (3ns), with parts that are indefinite (1ns), unless and until they are actualized (2ns). Within our *existing* universe, the sequence of events is such that "Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not have anything upon which to operate" (CP 6.202; 1898). ET: After all - to say that 'womb of indeterminacy' is a symbol and therefore, describes 3ns, is not an infallible reading. As a metaphor, the linguistic phrase is certainly a symbol, but the physical action of a 'flash' is most certainly not a symbol but an indexical physical act. "Womb" is a metaphor, but "indeterminacy" is not. The "linguistic phrase" is indeed a symbol, but according to Peirce, so is its *object*. CSP: If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing ... Not determinately nothing ... Utter indetermination. But a symbol alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute beginning, is a symbol. That is the way in which the beginning of things can alone be understood. (EP 2:322; 1904) The "flash" comes *from *"the womb of indeterminacy," so the latter (3ns) must be primordial relative to the former (1ns/2ns). The parallel is with gestation, the situation prior to birth. Switching to Peirce's later diagram (CP 6.203-208; 1898), as I have said before, there cannot be any chalk marks (1ns/2ns) without a blackboard on which to draw them (3ns). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 8:30 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R > > I'll continue to support my reading of Peirce - which disagrees with your > outline. I know that some on this list have, graciously, defined me as > 'intelligent' - but, alas, also declared that my being intelligent does not > necessarily include the ability to Understand Peirce. However, I'll stand > by my own admittedly fallible assessment that I can understand Peirce. > > I continue to read Peirce's 1.412, not as 'incomplete and misleading' [I > have been accused of such an assessment of this passage] but as a valid > explanation of Peirce's cosmology - and fitting in quite well with his > other outlines in 6.193-217 etc.See also 7.514-5. > > Therefore - I disagree with your view that 3ns is primordial. I read > Peirce in my own admittedly fallible readings, that 'in the infinitely > distant past in which there were no laws" 7.514, and 'the initial > conditions, before the universe existed, was not a state of pure abstract > being. On the contrary, it was a state of just nothing at all, not even a > state of emptiness, for even emptiness is something" 6.215. > > My reading of the above is that Nothing - none of the three categories - > is primordial. All three are necessary and one can't conclude that any one > of them is 'more necessary' than the other. Therefore - as he outlines in > 1.412, 'out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have > come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. > Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second > flash....etc" > > I don't read the above to mean that any one of the three categories is > primordial; all three emerged and co-developed at the same time..as time > began. Before this - there was - Nothing. Therefore - I don't read that > 3ns is 'presupposed' - all three are necessary to life. So- there is not > only a 'universal tendency towards habit-forming' - but a universal > tendency towards chance/sporting/deviation - and a universal tendency to > instantiation into discrete units. ALL Three are 'universal tendencies'. To > consider that only 3ns is primordial moves one, I think, close to > necessitarianism [see 6.59 etc for Peirce's argument against this view]. > > After all - to say that 'womb of indeterminacy' is a symbol and therefore, > describes 3ns, is not an infallible reading. As a metaphor, the linguistic > phrase is certainly a symbol, but the physical action of a 'flash' is most > certainly not a symbol but an indexical physical act. After all - the > phrase 'rosy-fingered dawn' is another metaphor and thus, a linguistic > symbol, but the physical act of the sun's 'rising' is not a symbol but a > physical action. > > Peirce's outline of Firstness [see 1.302 and on] as not being determined, > 'that which has not another behind it, determining its actions" [ie > indeterminate] - that is, indeterminate means that there is no "prospect of > its sometime having occasion to be embodied in a fact, which is itself not > a law or anything like a law" 1.304. Then, Secondness introduces > determination, 'causation and statical force' 1.325. Causation includes > determination, where one force affects and determines results of another. > Thirdness introduces not indeterminacy or determinacy but continuity. ..and > such terms as "generality, infinity, continuity, diffusion, growth, and > intelligence" 1.340. > > I think that these interpretations - my own which sees all three > categories as necessary and none as primordial, and yours and others which > sees Thirdness as primordial - are obviously incompatible. I will suggest > that we can only continue the exploration of Peirce - even within these two > opposing views - but that we do not, on this forum at least, insist that > one or the other is the FINAL TRUTH. > > Edwina >
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