Gary R., Jon S, Edwina, John S, List,
Keeping in mind the distinction that Peirce makes between metaphysical cosmology and physical cosmology, let me again stress a point made earlier. Instead of assuming that, at any point in his inquiries, Peirce typically affirmed one answer to each of the main questions in metaphysical cosmology, I tend to think that he explored a fairly wide range of possible answers. In any given text, he often does spend more effort on one set of hypotheses and less on others. And, over the course of his career, he often does reassess the options he has considered up to that point. As a result of the inquiries, he does give greater weight to the plausibility of some metaphysical hypotheses as compared to others. In many cases where he might seem to be "taking a position", I find that he is merely pointing to defects in some of the hypotheses. Most of the hypotheses offered in the cosmological metaphysics of his time failed in some degree to explain phenomena that clearly called out for explanation (e.g., why does our common experience of time involve 1 ordered dimension and our experience of space involve 3 dimensions?) In some cases, the problematic hypotheses might have been amended to remedy such defects. I tend to think that Peirce was remarkably sanguine about the fact that the big questions in metaphysics like "What is the origin of all things?" and "How did the universe evolve from such beginnings?" are the kinds of questions that get answered over the course of millennia by whole communities of inquirers and not by any individual during the course of a lifetime. As such, I am cautious about proclaiming that Peirce's position on these types of questions was, at some particular point in his career, "X" or that his final mature position was "Y". Rather, I think that he took his own advice on questions of metaphysics and tended to hold some metaphysical hypotheses as more plausible than others because they offered better explanations of the phenomena at hand or as worthy of our attention because they were easier to test. I find it more interesting to articulate the reasons he offers for holding that one hypothetical explanation is better than other than to insist, on textual grounds, that some answer to a question was his considered and mature view. Clarity about the conceptions employed in the rival hypotheses comes from understanding those reasons and especially from seeing what we might do to put the rival explanations to the test. So, here is a question. Consider two hypotheses: (a) the four dimensions of space and time that are characteristic of the world in which we live evolved by a process of an increase from a one-dimensional continuum and (b) the four dimensions of space and time that are characteristic of the world in which we lived are the result of a process of decrease from an objectively vague state having an infinite number of dimensions. What is the general trend: an increase in dimensions from 1 to 4, or a decrease in dimensions from infinity to four? How might the rival metaphysical hypotheses be tested? Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, August 27, 2019 3:00:16 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang Gary R., List: One correction--CP 1.412 is from 1887-1888, not 1891, so it reflects an even earlier stage of Peirce's thinking on these matters than what he wrote in the Monist series. Whether particular comments are snide, unprofessional, and/or insulting is in the eye of the beholder. John Sowa and Gary Fuhrman suggested a couple of good List practices almost exactly a year ago, which I have tried (but sometimes failed) to employ ever since. JFS: Avoid the word 'you'. Every occurrence of the word 'you' shifts the focus from the statement to the person who made the statement. This immediately puts that person on the defensive--and the result is an escalating round of ad hominem attacks and defenses. GF: Do not take offense. If nobody takes offense, nobody can give offense, even if they are trying to. Those who are defensive about their own statements, on the other hand, will often take offense when none is intended. If we can avoid this, the impulse to give offense is likely to dry up, because the would-be offender will not succeed in getting the reaction he seeks. Since you understandably (but mistakenly) thought that Edwina "actually quoted" me, for the record--yet again--here is what I actually said. JAS: Rational people are open to persuasion, rather than dogmatically maintaining their predetermined views regardless of the evidence. Credible scholars ground their opinions about a past author in what his texts actually say, rather than projecting their predetermined views on him. I always encourage others to draw their own conclusions after evaluating the various arguments. JAS: At this point, I have to wonder why I bothered spending so much time and effort explaining myself (again, and again, and again) to someone who is so obviously determined not to understand, or perhaps is simply incapable of understanding. Frankly, I am not sure which of these is the more charitable alternative. JAS: I apologize for the tone of the second quote, which reflects my frustration in the heat of the moment. The truth is that both of us are quite relentless in our own ways, but from my standpoint, our latest dispute was never about my opinion being right and yours being wrong--it was about a plain-sense reading of Peirce's own texts, specifically CP 6.24-25. The truth is that both of us are also quite intelligent, as our List participation indicates, but that is not the same thing as being capable of understanding--especially when a previously settled belief is challenged. At issue in that thread was not Peirce's cosmology as described in various ways over two-plus decades, but rather his (objective) idealism as explicitly spelled out in one particular passage and repeated in other contemporaneous ones (1891-1892). Since Edwina evidently considers being "determined not to understand" as "the more charitable alternative," at this point I will simply agree with your concluding statement addressed to her. GR: And for the record, I do not think that you lack the "capacity to understand" but, rather, that you are doggedly determined not to change you attitude regarding a matter on which you have long held a position even when, as in this case, the evidence suggests that good pragmatic practice suggest strongly you ought at least consider doing so, say, by re-reading the last lecture in RLT and everything Peirce wrote on the topic in the 20th century. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 3:20 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Edwina, List, We are most certainly in disagreement in this matter as we always have been and, most likely, always will be. For if this passage doesn't convince you that Peirce, and by his own admission, either changed his mind or further developed his thought. . . Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked that my theory was not so much evolutionary as it was emanational [that is, Peirce's earlier suggestion that 1ns just sprung forth "out of utterly causeless determinations of single events" made his theory "emanational"]; and Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some original tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my [1891-92] hypothesis; while I myself was most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the law of sequence in time, if I proposed to make all laws developed from single events; since an event already supposes Time ["before time yet existed"] (1908, most emphasis is mine). . . .then nothing will. It seems to me likely that you will stick to your position even if it does not represent, as in this case, Peirce's mature reflections, indeed re-thinking of the matter. You may disagree with his late analysis, but your own is at strictly at odds with it. Again: Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some original tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my [1891-92] hypothesis. . . . and Peirce agrees with Rood that he was in error in not clearly seeing and stating that original 'tendency' to take 'habits' (discussed in posts of Jon's as themselves words implying 3ns). And not only does he agree that he did not clearly see the need to valorize this habit-taking tendency (3ns), but he also explicitly agrees with Montgomery that he was in error to see the earliest cosmos in terms of "developments out of utterly causeless determinations of single events" (1908), that is, in terms of the "causeless" sporting of 1nses. You may argue the contrary until you're blue in the face, but this is clearly Peirce's position in 1908. Should you ever attempt an analysis of Peirce's late thoughts on the genesis of the cosmos, say, the 1898 blackboard in RLT, and include excerpts from it -- which I assume you will find supportive of your own position -- I would be both surprised and delighted to continue this inquiry with you. But I am almost certain that that will not happen and that you will continue to principally cite the 1891 passage as proof positive that you are correct. You, it seems, will have the last word on what Peirce thought in this matter rather than he. And by "last word" I mean here what Peirce had to say from at least 1898 on which has been discussed here at length, and which valorizes continuity as 3ns from the get-go. Whom, may I ask (besides John Sowa, apparently), maintains your position today? Certainly no contemporary scholar immersed in Peirce's mature views regarding continuity. In addition, a remark about the manner of your response to my post. You concluded. ET: I think that this kind of discussion has to be allowed - without snide comments about whether our opponents have the 'capacity to understand' or not. A casual reader might think that here -- and elsewhere in your post on more substantive matters such as "the womb of indeterminacy" passage -- that you were referring to me as having made (in the snippet just quoted) what you characterized as "snide comments." Snide or not, it was Jon and not I who made the 'capacity to understand' comment. So, I would appreciate it that in the future, when you are pointing to list member's words, that you identify that person, especially, as in this case, when you have actually quoted him. And for the record, I do not think that you lack the "capacity to understand" but, rather, that you are doggedly determined not to change you attitude regarding a matter on which you have long held a position even when, as in this case, the evidence suggests that good pragmatic practice suggest strongly you ought at least consider doing so, say, by re-reading the last lecture in RLT and everything Peirce wrote on the topic in the 20th century.. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
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