Jeff, List,
GR: "Who, besides Peirce (besides some theologians) have mused on how our Universe came into being?" JD: I take most major philosophers to recognize a need to address the question: what is the origin of all things. How will it end? A range of answers have been considered by the likes of Plato and Aristotle, Hume and Kant, Quine to Plantinga. Perhaps I should have stipulated "scientific philosophers." I wasn't thinking of the musings of Plato, Aristotle, Hume and Kant in this matter as valuable as their thought is in the consideration of the origins and ends of things. As for Quine, this, in my thinking, rather summarizes his metaphysics: A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put into three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: 'What is there?' It can be answered, moreover, in a word—'Everything'—and everyone will accept this answer as true. "On What There Is," The Review of Metaphysics, 1948. Platinga fares somewhat better, but while not seeing science and religion as necessarily at odds, he has been widely viewed as an advocate of "intelligent design," to which he's responded in most excellent manner: Like any Christian (and indeed any theist), I believe that the world has been created by God, and hence "intelligently designed". The hallmark of intelligent design, however, is the claim that this can be shown scientifically; I'm dubious about that. "Evolution, Shibboleths, and Philosophers," The Chronicle of Higher Education, April 11, 2010. While I applaud his embrace of science, I don't see much science in his own work. So, I still would maintain that Peirce's work in this area is one-off. Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 10:26 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, List, > > > You ask: "Who, besides Peirce (besides some theologians) have mused on > how our Universe came into being?" I take most major philosophers to > recognize a need to address the question: what is the origin of all > things. How will it end? A range of answers have been considered by the > likes of Plato and Aristotle, Hume and Kant, Quine to Plantinga. > > > Some say that the history of the cosmos goes back in time with no > beginning, and that it will continue without end. Others say that it had a > beginning and that it will have an end in time. Empirically minded > philosophers have argued that metaphysical questions of this sort have no > positive answers--one way or the other--that can be put to the test. Kant > considers these opposing answers to be antinomies in the Dialectic of the > first *Critique. *He suggests that we are lead by Reason to address > questions concerning the absolute--and that we need to tease out where > Reason might be leading us astray. > > > I take Peirce's explorations in the last lecture of RLT to be entirely > consonant with what he says here: > > > Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is Third.†4 > Mind is First, Matter is Second, Evolution is Third. Such are the > materials out of which chiefly a philosophical theory ought to be built, > in order to represent the state of knowledge to which the nineteenth century > has > brought us. Without going into other important questions of philosophical > architectonic, > we can readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would appropriately be > constructed from those conceptions. Like some of the most ancient and some > of the most recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic Philosophy. It > would suppose that in the beginning -- infinitely remote -- there was a > chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being without connection or > regularity would properly be without existence. This feeling, sporting > here and there in pure arbitrariness, would have started the germ of a > generalizing tendency. Its other sportings would be evanescent, but this would > have a growing virtue. Thus, the tendency to habit would be started; and > from this, with the other principles of evolution, all the regularities > of the universe would be evolved. At any time, however, an element of > pure chance survives and will remain until the world becomes an > absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at > last crystallized in the infinitely distant future. (CP 6.32-33) > > The idea of our cosmos starting in a condition of absolute chaos of > unpersonalized feeling, and then ending in a state of absolutely perfect > order seem to be limiting sorts of ideas. As with an asymptotic function in > calculus, we can see that the series we are tracing seems to converge as > things head off infinitely far in each direction. It is a mistake, however, > to think that it actually does converge at some definite point in that > series. In this case, I think a better analogy than a function in > calculus is the conception of the absolute in projective geometry. It is > better because the idea of convergence is a matter of proportion involving > continuous magnitudes that may have an indeterminate metrical character. > Proportions are preserved, but not scalar values. > > > As far as I can see, Peirce appears to be drawing on the ideas of the > beginning and ending points of inquiry--as those are worked out in a > speculative rhetoric (methodeutic)--and he is treated them as principles > having an objective character in his metaphysical cosmology. The analogy > is: (A) the starting point of inquiry is to (B) the origin of all things > as (C) the ending point of inquiry is to (D) the end of all things. > So, A:B::C:D. Similarly, A:C::B:D. > > > As Peirce suggests in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties...", the > starting point of a process of cognition can be thought of as triangle > touching the surface of water in a glass. The starting point of > inquiry--the tip of the triangle--is a kind of limiting idea. > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Thursday, August 29, 2019 4:50 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang > > Jeff, Jon, List, > > Jeff concluded: > > JD: In saying that the dimensions of space, time and quality were > potential and not actual, I do not take him to be saying that the > dimensions were not real. Possibles may, on Peirce's account, be real > things. > > > It seems to me that possibles (1ns) are potentially real enough in the > ur-continuity (3ns). Continuity as 3ns involves 1ns as those, shall we say, > "selected" possibilities which *will *ultimately be realized as the > qualities which *can* come into existence. That is, they are > possibilities which become real qualities when they are embodied in > existential things (2ns). > > JD: I take this starting point, which is explicated in terms of > a conception of vague potentiality, as a kind of limiting idea. One thing > he is trying to accomplish in clarifying such a limiting idea is to arrive > at something that doesn't call out for further explanation. If someone > asks, why does the original vague potentiality have the characteristics it > does? His answer is: that doesn't need a further explanation. > > > I would question your use of the expression "a kind of limiting idea" > here. Beyond limiting "further explanation" (which sounds like a very > un-Peircean as Peirce's methodology argues against such a cessation of > inquiry). Would you explain what you mean by "limiting idea" here (unless > all you mean is that Peirce wholly uncharacteristically intended to stop > further inquiry into the matter)? > > And the question "why does the original vague potentiality have the > characteristics it does" doesn't seem to me to catch the richness of the > analogy, the blackboard diagram. In Peirce's presentaiton the blackboard > per se represents *only *what I've termed the ur-continuity *upon which *these > "possibles" will be drawn, chosen, as it were, from an infinite number of > possibilities. As Jon has commented, that* something* is scribed upon the > blackboard suggests that there is a scriber (it may not be able to avoid > theology in *that* interpretation, although I don't think it's the only > one possible--although it should be recalled that Peirce was a theist), and > out of these unlimited possibilities only some were scribed. Peirce writes > of our existing world's origins: > > . . .we must suppose that as a rule the continuum has been derived from a > more general continuum, a continuum of higher generality. > > From this point of view we must suppose that the existing universe, with > all its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary > determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world. . . CP 6.191- 92 > > > Again, there was "a Platonic world" 'before', so to speak, the existing > world came into being: > > The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the > existing universe, but rather a process by which the very Platonic forms > themselves have become or are becoming developed. CP 6.194 > > > And here we are reminded that Peirce has his own "multi-universes" theory: > > At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the > existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are, > therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and > subordinated to one another; until finally out of one of these Platonic > worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in > which we happen to be. CP 6.208 > > > JD: Some philosophers might claim that Peirce is wrong to think the > original vague potentiality doesn't need a further explanation, but I take > that to be the view he is exploring in this last lecture. > > > What sort of "explanations" of "the original vague potentiality" have > other philosophers entertained? Who are the philosophers making these > claims of the inadequacy of Peirce of Peirce's thinking on the earliest > situation of the cosmos? Who, besides Peirce (besides some theologians) > have mused on how our Universe came into being? > > It would appear that most astrophysicists simply accent the singularity of > the Big Bang without questioning how something as vast as a cosmos could > arise out of nothing (or they posit truly vague and undeveloped ideas, > such as "bouncing universes" and "quantum fluctuation" theories). > > In my view, Peirce's musings of the origin of the universe is *sui > generis*, highly stimulating from both scientific and philosophic > (including metaphysical) standpoints, and the furthest any > philosopher-scientist (whom I know of at least) has gone into considering > the possible situation at our cosmic origin, pre-Big Bang (if one > subscribes to that view) While in Peirce's view, the earliest cosmos took > form "before time was." > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > > > On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 5:58 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon S, Gary R, List, >> >> >> On my reading of the last lecture of RLT, I think it is an error to >> suggest that he is making *measurement *intrinsic to the definition of >> those dimensions of either time, space or quality. Rather, the thrust of >> the argument is to start with mathematical conceptions and then use them >> for the sake of developing hypotheses in metaphysical cosmology. In >> doing so, he moves from the consideration of metrical geometries, to >> projective geometry to topology. >> >> >> In doing so, he is setting metrical considerations to the side and >> focusing primarily on topological matters. It is clear that the >> topological points--including those about the possible dimensions of a such >> a malleable space in which such things straigntness, length and degree >> of angle are not preserved across transformations--are being used to >> clarify a mathematical conception of continuity. He is then putting that >> refined notion of continuity to use as he engages with questions about >> the origins and evolution of the universe. The questions he is trying to >> answer include the following. How many dimensions of time, space and >> quality where there early in the history of the universe? How many >> dimensions of each are there now. How did the number of dimensions change >> over time? >> >> >> Jon quoted two passages in that last lecture: >> >> >> CSP: A continuum may have any discrete multitude of dimensions >> whatsoever. lf the multitude of dimensions surpasses all discrete >> multitudes there cease to be any distinct dimensions. I have not as yet >> obtained a logically distinct conception of such a continuum. >> Provisionally, I identify it with the *uralt * [Ger., ancient], vague >> generality of the most abstract potentiality. (NEM 3:111, RLT 253-254; 1898) >> >> >> CSP: Let the clean blackboard be a sort of diagram of the original vague >> potentiality, or at any rate of some early stage of its determination. This >> is something more than a figure of speech; for after all continuity is >> generality. This blackboard is a continuum of two dimensions, while that >> which it stands for is a continuum of some indefinite multitude of >> dimensions. This blackboard is a continuum of possible points; while that >> is a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or is a continuum of >> possible dimensions of a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or >> something of that sort. There are no points on this blackboard. There are >> no dimensions in that continuum. (CP 6.203, RLT 261; 1898) >> >> >> >> Consider the following sentence from the second passage: "This >> blackboard is a continuum of possible points; while that is a continuum of >> possible dimensions of quality, or is a continuum of possible dimensions of >> a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or something of that sort." >> >> >> For the sake of engaging in inquiry in cosmological metaphysics, I would >> make a distinction between the dimensions of real *space* at some point >> in the evolution of the cosmos, and the dimensions of the *qualities* of >> the objects in space. As far as I can tell, he is offering a hypothesis >> about the number of dimensions of (1) time, (2) space and (3) of the >> various qualities that were present early in the history of the cosmos. It >> looks to me like he is arguing that each started with a dimensions that >> were vague in character and not distinctly separated--one from another. >> Over time, as the cosmos evolved, those dimensions became (a) more >> determinate and (b) fewer in number. >> >> >> If we go back far enough, we arrive at a vague potentiality as a kind of >> hypothetical "beginning of all things." This vague conception of >> potentiality functions as a kind of starting point in the explanations >> being offered. My assumption is that, in this vague potentiality, there >> might have been--for instance--potential energy, but there was no kinetic >> energy. That potential energy might have taken different qualities, such >> as a particular charge or a particular spin, but there was no actual object >> having any determinate charge or spin. There might have been a potential >> for space and time having dimensions, but there were no actual things >> moving around in space and time. How many dimensions did this potential >> have? An indefinite vague multitude. The dimensions were continuous. There >> were uncountable, to say the least. >> >> >> In saying that the dimensions of space, time and quality were potential >> and not actual, I do not take him to be saying that the dimensions were not >> real. Possibles may, on Peirce's account, be real things. I take this >> starting point, which is explicated in terms of a conception of vague >> potentiality, as a kind of limiting idea. One thing he is trying to >> accomplish in clarifying such a limiting idea is to arrive at something >> that doesn't call out for further explanation. If someone asks, why does >> the original vague potentiality have the characteristics it does? His >> answer is: that doesn't need a further explanation. It can be illustrated >> using diagrams. He is offering analogy to the effect that the vague >> potentiality is like an empty chalkboard before any chalk streaks have been >> drawn on its surface. Some philosophers might claim that Peirce is wrong to >> think the original vague potentiality doesn't need a further explanation, >> but I take that to be the view he is exploring in this last lecture. >> >> >> --Jeff >> >> >> >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Thursday, August 29, 2019 1:24 PM >> *To:* Peirce-L >> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang >> >> Jon, Jeff, List, >> >> This message is meant to solicit clarification on what seems to be the >> thrust of Jon's argument in support of a dimensionless ur-continuity. My >> question is: Am I clearly grasping what you're getting at, Jon? You wrote >> near the end of your post: >> >> JAS: What I notice is that *measurement *is evidently intrinsic to the >> definition of dimension, except for the particular mathematical usage >> mentioned in the first one, where "the idea of measurement is quite >> extraneous." >> >> >> Again, I would tend to strongly with your suggestion that: >> >> >> JAS: ". . . *discrete *dimensions are arbitrary and artificial creations >> of thought for that purpose, rather than *real *characters of space-time >> in itself." >> >> >> You continued: >> >> >> JAS: [. . .] The linked video [which Jeff earlier provided] about higher >> numbers of dimensions employs the same "bottom-up" analytic approach, using >> the real number line--what Peirce called a "pseudo-continuum"--as the basis >> for *defining *each individual dimension. >> >> >> I would take it, then, that "pseudo-continuua," are most certainly of >> *analytical* value as long as one remembers, as you have been positing >> recently (and I agree) that: >> >> JAS: . . .*discrete *dimensions are arbitrary and artificial creations >> of thought for that [analytical] purpose, rather than *real *characters >> of space-time in itself. >> >> >> You then asked if dimensionality would even apply in a "top-down" >> approach and suggested that it may not, offering a Peirce quotation in >> support of your suggestion : >> >> JAS: What might it look like to adopt a "top-down" synthetic approach >> instead? Would the familiar notion of dimensions even apply? Maybe not, >> according to Peirce. >> >> CSP: A continuum may have any discrete multitude of dimensions >> whatsoever. lf the multitude of dimensions surpasses all discrete >> multitudes there cease to be any distinct dimensions. I have not as yet >> obtained a logically distinct conception of such a continuum. >> Provisionally, I identify it with the *uralt * [Ger., ancient], vague >> generality of the most abstract potentiality. (NEM 3:111, RLT 253-254; 1898) >> >> >> You then quoted Peirce on the 'blackboard' as a metaphor for the >> original, or, ur-continuum: >> >> CSP: Let the clean blackboard be a sort of diagram of the original vague >> potentiality, or at any rate of some early stage of its determination. This >> is something more than a figure of speech; for after all continuity is >> generality. This blackboard is a continuum of two dimensions, while that >> which it stands for is a continuum of some indefinite multitude of >> dimensions. This blackboard is a continuum of possible points; while that >> is a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or is a continuum of >> possible dimensions of a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or >> something of that sort. There are no points on this blackboard. There are >> no dimensions in that continuum. (CP 6.203, RLT 261; 1898) >> >> >> JAS: Rather than "a vague infinity of dimensions," there are no >> *distinct *dimensions-- no *defnite *dimensions--no *discrete *dimensions >> at all in the original continuum that is fundamental to the constitution of >> being. >> >> >> So, finally getting back to my question: Are you suggesting that it is* >> only* in the in the aboriginal (from Latin >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin> *ab >> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/ab#Latin> origine >> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/origine#Latin> --*“from the beginning”) >> continuum that there are *no discrete dimensions*? That makes sense to >> me; and, of course, it has significant implications for what you and I have >> been arguing regarding Peirce's late view of the situation of the earliest >> cosmos; namely, that ur-continuity is quasi-necessarily primal in the >> constitution of reality, including, of course, existential being on "time >> is." >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 10:12 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Jeff, List: >>> >>> JD: Peirce provides definitions for dimension, dimensional and >>> dimensionality in the Century Dictionary. >>> >>> >>> Thanks for pointing this out; it did not occur to me to look there ( >>> http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=02&page=741). >>> Here is his first definition of "dimension." >>> >>> CSP: Magnitude measured along a diameter; the measure through a body or >>> closed figure along one of its principal axes; length, breadth, or >>> thickness. Thus, a line has one dimension, length; a plane surface two, >>> length and breadth; and a solid three, length, breadth, and thickness. The >>> number of dimensions being equal to the number of principal axes, and that >>> to the number of independent directions of extension, it has become usual, >>> in mathematics, to express the number of ways of spread of a figure by >>> saying that it has two, three, or *n* dimensions, although the idea of >>> measurement is quite extraneous to the fact expressed. The word generally >>> occurs in the plural, referring to length, breadth, and thickness. (CD 1621) >>> >>> >>> Here is his second definition of "dimension." >>> >>> CSP: A mode of linear magnitude involved (generally along with others) >>> in the quantity to which it belongs. (*a*) In *alg*., a variable >>> factor, the number of dimensions of an expression being the number of >>> variable factors in that term for which this number is the largest. (*b*) >>> In *phys*., a linear measure of length, time, mass, or any kind of >>> quantity regraded as a fundamental factor of the quantity of which it is a >>> dimension. (*ibid*) >>> >>> >>> Here is his first definition of "dimensional." >>> >>> CSP: Pertaining to extension in space; having a dimension or >>> dimensions; measurable in one or more directions: used in composition: as, >>> a line is a one-*dimensional*, a surface a two-*dimensional*, and a >>> solid a three-*dimensional *object. (*ibid*) >>> >>> >>> Finally, here is his only definition of "dimensionality." >>> >>> CSP: The number of dimensions of a quantity. (*ibid*) >>> >>> >>> He provides two other definitions for "dimension," and a second one for >>> "dimensional," but they do not strike me as relevant to this discussion. >>> >>> >>> JD: Nothing jumps out at me in the definitions offered, but it is worth >>> noting that he does make a distinction between the dimensions of a >>> mathematical space and that of a physical space. >>> >>> >>> Where exactly do you see Peirce making that specific distinction? The >>> word "space" appears only once, in a way that seems applicable to both the >>> mathematical and physical senses. What I notice is that *measurement *is >>> evidently intrinsic to the definition of dimension, except for the >>> particular mathematical usage mentioned in the first one, where "the idea >>> of measurement is quite extraneous." This is consistent with my suggestion >>> that *discrete *dimensions are arbitrary and artificial creations of >>> thought for that purpose, rather than *real *characters of space-time >>> in itself. >>> >>> Moreover, the second definition hints at why we typically count >>> dimensions with whole numbers--we begin with "linear magnitude," and then >>> build up *additional *discrete dimensions from there. The linked video >>> about higher numbers of dimensions employs the same "bottom-up" analytic >>> approach, using the real number line--what Peirce called a >>> "pseudo-continuum"--as the basis for *defining *each individual >>> dimension. What might it look like to adopt a "top-down" synthetic >>> approach instead? Would the familiar notion of dimensions even apply? >>> Maybe not, according to Peirce. >>> >>> CSP: A continuum may have any discrete multitude of dimensions >>> whatsoever. lf the multitude of dimensions surpasses all discrete >>> multitudes there cease to be any distinct dimensions. I have not as yet >>> obtained a logically distinct conception of such a continuum. >>> Provisionally, I identify it with the * uralt *vague generality of the >>> most abstract potentiality. (NEM 3:111, RLT 253-254; 1898) >>> >>> >>> The first three statements reflect his mistaken "supermultitudinous" >>> conception of continuity, but his later "topological" (or "topical") theory >>> would similarly require the dimensions (parts) of a perfect continuum to be >>> *indefinite* unless and until they are "marked off." Nevertheless, the >>> development of "point-set topology" indicates that the lure of discreteness >>> remains strong in contemporary mathematics, even within the branch that >>> Peirce described as "the full account of all forms of Continuity" (NEM >>> 2:626; 1905). The fourth statement brings us back to the subject of this >>> thread, obviously anticipating what "the clean blackboard" represents later >>> in the same lecture--primordial 3ns, or what Gary R. has called "the >>> ur-continuity." >>> >>> CSP: Let the clean blackboard be a sort of diagram of the original >>> vague potentiality, or at any rate of some early stage of its >>> determination. This is something more than a figure of speech; for after >>> all continuity is generality. This blackboard is a continuum of two >>> dimensions, while that which it stands for is a continuum of some >>> indefinite multitude of dimensions. This blackboard is a continuum of >>> possible points; while that is a continuum of possible dimensions of >>> quality, or is a continuum of possible dimensions of a continuum of >>> possible dimensions of quality, or something of that sort. There are no >>> points on this blackboard. There are no dimensions in that continuum. (CP >>> 6.203, RLT 261; 1898) >>> >>> >>> Rather than "a vague infinity of dimensions," there are no *distinct >>> *dimensions--no >>> *definite *dimensions--no *discrete *dimensions at all in the original >>> continuum that is fundamental to the constitution of being. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 3:48 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon S, Gary F, List, >>>> >>>> Peirce provides definitions for dimension, dimensional and >>>> dimensionality in the Century Dictionary. Nothing jumps out at me in the >>>> definitions offered, but it is worth noting that he does make a distinction >>>> between the dimensions of a mathematical space and that of a physical >>>> space. >>>> >>>> For the sake of understanding the points made in the last lecture of >>>> RLT, the discussion of topological dimensions in the EM and >>>> the NEM are particularly helpful resources. There, Peirce describes the >>>> various ways that a particle can be moved from a point, a filament from a >>>> line, etc. This is consonant with the contemporary way of talking about >>>> the dimensions of a topological space in terms of the degrees of freedom >>>> that something can be moved. >>>> >>>> Those mathematical ideas can be applied to physical space by asking >>>> questions about how something like an atom or a sub-atomic particle might >>>> be able to move. My sense is that Peirce is thinking in terms of >>>> continuous spatial fields as being more fundamental than discrete >>>> particles. >>>> >>>> Cosmologically speaking, the permanence of something like a Hydrogen >>>> atom is explained in terms of the parts (e.g., the proton) of that whole >>>> evolving from something more basic. So, if we consider something like >>>> an extremely high-temperature plasma in which the particles (e.g., the >>>> quarks, leptons and bosons) are moving relatively freely in relation to one >>>> another, then it is helpful to think of those "particles" as spread areas >>>> of charge in a field. >>>> >>>> If we think of the laws of physics as evolving in the early stages of >>>> the development of the universe, how might we envision gravity, and >>>> the strong and weak forces operating in a relatively dense plasma? More to >>>> the point, how might we envision the laws of time and space evolving where >>>> the universe is comprised of a dense plasma of charged areas in a >>>> multi-dimensional field? >>>> >>>> In order to conceive of the evolution of time and space as involving a >>>> trend having a decrease in number from a vague infinity of dimensions to a >>>> more determinate number (e.g., from more than 100, to 12, to 10 to 4), we >>>> need some kind of tools to picture how this might work. Two of the >>>> resources that Peirce worked with in his various studies of topology, >>>> projective geometry and metrical geometries are Riemannian manifolds and >>>> Klein groups. >>>> >>>> Those probably give us what we need for thinking, at least in broad >>>> terms, about the character of the dimensions of a space that are (1) vague >>>> and (2) infinite. Setting aside metrical considerations (which will >>>> naturally make things more vague), the question becomes a matter of >>>> explaining how a topological space (which may be folded, knotted and >>>> twisted in many ways) might evolve into a space that has projective >>>> characteristics (where there is "straightness" or homoloidal properties, >>>> but no preservation of angles or lengths under transformations). >>>> >>>> If you will, let me think out loud using very rough terms about how >>>> some of the characteristics of sub-atomic particles in a plasma might >>>> change as those particles move through a space of high dimensions. What >>>> follows is conjectural in character. In the case of a real physical >>>> space that is highly folded, knotted and twisted, where the "particles" are >>>> charged areas that move through the space, how should we conceive of the >>>> dimensionality of such a space in the initial phases where the laws of time >>>> and space themselves are evolving as the number of dimensions of that space >>>> decrease? >>>> >>>> It helps, I think to distinguish between the global character of such a >>>> space and its local character. Locally speaking, I imagine that the charged >>>> areas might "break up" into smaller areas as they move through different >>>> "branches" (i.e., handles, like a hole in a torus) that may twist >>>> (i.e., cross caps, as with a Mobius band) and that are knotted >>>> together and then recombine with other moving charged areas. >>>> >>>> We tend to think of subatomic particles (e.g., quarks) as having >>>> relatively fixed masses (voltages). Neutrinos, on the other hand, have mass >>>> values that are simply less than a particular voltage value. This seems to >>>> imply that they have an amount of energy that may vary, perhaps up to some >>>> limit. Furthermore, I suspect the value of the charge and perhaps the value >>>> of the spin (the angular momentum) of the charged areas moving through a >>>> field may change as the charged area moves through a twist in the space. >>>> >>>> How might we study something as complex as a highly folded, twisted and >>>> knotted space? As with any kind of relatively complex topological space, it >>>> helps to decompose that space into its component parts. As such, we >>>> can focus on one simpler two-dimensional surface at a time, and then think >>>> about the various ways such surfaces might be connected. What is more, we >>>> can think of the possible paths that things might travel on that surface as >>>> edges in a graph. Those, I suspect, are kinds of the techniques we might >>>> profitably employ to study the question of how the dimensions of space and >>>> time might have evolved in the early history of the cosmos. >>>> >>>> Thanks for your patience as I've tried to talk out loud. In order to >>>> make any progress in cosmological metaphysics, we will need to make a >>>> transition from these sorts of conjectural musings on matters of >>>> cosmological physics to something that is easier to get one's mind >>>> around. As such, in a future post, I'd like to take up some >>>> graph-theoretical explorations of how we might think about the >>>> dimensions of space and time. In doing so, the aim will be to create some >>>> kind of diagram that helps to picture how time and space might be evolving >>>> from a vague infinity of dimensions to a more determinate and smaller >>>> number of dimensions. >>>> >>>> --Jeff >>>> Jeffrey Downard >>>> Associate Professor >>>> Department of Philosophy >>>> Northern Arizona University >>>> (o) 928 523-8354 >>>> >>>>>
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