Gary R., List: I apologize for the (unintended) distraction. What I was trying to emphasize was not that all possibilities are real, but rather that the reality of a possibility does not depend upon its eventual actualization. Again, according to Peirce, the *only *requirement for something to be real is that it is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it. I *think *we agree on these two points, so we can get back to more relevant discussions.
Regards, Jon S. On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 12:16 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > JAS: Peirce clearly affirmed that *some *possibilities are real, not > merely "potentially real"; that is why Max Fisch called him "a > three-category realist" as of 1897. In fact, there are real possibilities > that *never *become actualized, such as the resistance to scratching of a > diamond that burns up before ever being tested. "Indeed, it is the reality > of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon" > (CP 5.453, EP 2:354; 1905). > > > I note your italicizing 'some' in the first sentence above. I will > continue to suggest that if one claims that at the very 'earliest' stages > of a proto-Universe *perhaps *coming into being (there are many factors > at work--see the quotations below), where* all *Platonic possibilities > are real (which I think you're claiming), then Peirce's notion that *some* > possibilities are real becomes utterly meaningless. > > Max Fisch's comment about Peirce being a "three-category realist" refers, > as I believe Robert Lane's conception does as well, to *some *possibilities > being real in *this* Universe (yes, *in this universe *the unscratched > diamond has the characters which it has whether you or I, etc.) But I'd > conjecture that at best one might say, regarding a proto-Universe, is that > *some > *of the Platonic possibilities are real in that situation--they really > *could *come into being. But not all of them. (I suppose that they are > real enough if in some other possible universe they should come into being; > still, I doubt that all of them ever would, but only God knows). > > GR: And here we are reminded that Peirce has his own "multi-universes" > theory: > > At the same time all this, be it remembered, *is not of the order of the > existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are, > therefore, to conceive that there are many*, both coordinated and > subordinated to one another; *until finally out of one of these Platonic > worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in > which we happen to be*. CP 6.208 > > > If there are many Platonic worlds (perhaps even an infinite number of > them, as Peirce suggests elsewhere), let alone an infinity of possibles > ostensibly inhabiting the sum total of these Platonic worlds (of course, > all very loose language for that earliest stage of *some *one universe > potentially coming into being), then I think it strains the idea of "real > possible" to apply this expression to even those which do *not* 'stick' > in order to 'combine' in ways which result in a universe, ours in the case > under consideration. Those which are "unselected" seem to me not to be real > possibles since they are excluded in the creation of *this *universe and > could never be realized. > > Here is the passage above with the surrounding paragraphs. > > Many such reacting systems may spring up in the original continuum; and > each of these may itself act as a first line from which a larger system may > be built, in which it in turn will merge its individuality. CP 6.207 > > At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the > existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are, > therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and > subordinated to one another; until finally out of one of these Platonic > worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in > which we happen to be. CP 6.208 > > There is, therefore, every reason in logic why this here universe should > be replete with accidental characters, for each of which, in its > particularity, there is no other reason than that it is one of the ways in > which the original vague potentiality has happened to get differentiated. > CP 6.209 > > > Again, even in this earliest stage of the cosmos, it would seem to me > that some possibles -- but not all -- are real. If all are real, then the > idea of 'real possibles' as applying in our universe (as Peirce applies the > concept) becomes meaning. > > I think we may be straining the notion of "real possibles" here, and I > really think that it is possibly not all that important -- we may just be > playing with words here. So I'll cede the last word in the matter to you as > I've rather forgotten what the thrust of my earlier posts in this thread > was given this distraction. > > Best, > > Gary R > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 11:56 AM Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> Thank you for clarifying. As Peirce stated in the first Additament to "A >> Neglected Argument" ... >> >> CSP: In that state of absolute nility, in or out of time, that is, >> before or after the evolution of time, there must then have been a >> tohu-bohu of which nothing whatever affirmative or negative was true >> universally. There must have been, therefore, a little of everything >> conceivable. (CP 6.490; 1908) >> >> >> And as he said in the published article itself ... >> >> CSP: Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first >> comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, >> pure mathematician, or another *might *give local habitation and a name >> within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being >> consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually >> thinking them, saves their Reality. (CP 6.455, EP 2:435; 1908) >> >> >> What makes an Idea real is its "mere capability of getting thought," and >> the situation "before" the beginning of our existing universe was "a little >> of everything conceivable." Calling these inexhaustible possibilities >> "real" just means that they are as they are regardless of what any >> *individual >> *mind or *finite *group of minds thinks about them; it does not preclude >> them from being as they are because of how an *infinite *mind conceives >> them. >> >> CSP: The general indefinite potentiality became limited and >> heterogeneous. Those who express the idea to themselves by saying that the >> Divine Creator determined so and so may be incautiously clothing the idea >> in a garb that is open to criticism, but it is, after all, substantially >> the only philosophical answer to the problem. Namely, they represent the >> ideas as springing into a preliminary stage of being by their own inherent >> firstness. But so springing up, they do not spring up isolated; for if they >> did, nothing could unite them. They spring up in reaction upon one another, >> and thus into a kind of existence. This reaction and this existence these >> persons call the mind of God. (CP 6.199, RLT 259; 1898) >> >> >> This *preliminary* kind of existence is obviously not what we mean by >> "our existing universe," so I still find it misleading to suggest that >> there "are possibilities which [only] become real qualities when they are >> embodied in existential things." On the contrary, they must *first *be >> real possibilities/qualities in order to be *capable *of such >> existential embodiment. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon S. >> >> On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 11:44 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, List, >>> >>> You quoted me then disagreed with my suggestion. >>> >>> >>> GR: It seems to me that possibles (1ns) are potentially real enough in >>> the ur-continuity (3ns). Continuity as 3ns involves 1ns as those, shall we >>> say, "selected" possibilities which *will *ultimately be realized as >>> the qualities which *can* come into existence. That is, they are >>> possibilities which become real qualities when they are embodied in >>> existential things (2ns). >>> >>> >>> JAS: I disagree. Peirce clearly affirmed that *some *possibilities are >>> real, not merely "potentially real"; that is why Max Fisch called him "a >>> three-category realist" as of 1897. In fact, there are real possibilities >>> that *never *become actualized, such as the resistance to scratching of >>> a diamond that burns up before ever being tested. "Indeed, it is the >>> reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist >>> upon" (CP 5.453, EP 2:354; 1905). >>> >>> >>> I think that you are confusing apples ('before' this, our, existential >>> Universe) with oranges ('after' the creation of this Universe). >>> >>> While I certainly do agree that "there are real possibilities that never >>> become actualized," yet even your example of the scratching of a diamond >>> occurs, *necessarily* I would say, in the created, the existential >>> universe, and not the one "before time is." ('after' creation). >>> >>> As I quoted Peirce: >>> >>> >>> At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the >>> existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are, >>> therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and >>> subordinated to one another; until finally out of one of these Platonic >>> worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in >>> which we happen to be. CP 6.208 >>> >>> >>> The real possibles that are *not* 'chosen' from the Platonic world are >>> 'real' only in a quite peculiar sense that has little or nothing to do with >>> "real possibilities that *never *become actualized" in out existential >>> world. One really ought to rather strictly distinguish what I thought we >>> were discussing, that world in which neither matter nor time exists, from >>> the actual existential world we inhabit. Only after there is an existent >>> word is it possible to speak of "real possibilities that *never *become >>> actualized." Perhaps only for the Scriber can know of such "real" >>> possibilities *before* time and space are. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> >>> On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 11:23 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Jeff, Gary R., List: >>>> >>>> Supplementing what I just posted ... >>>> >>>> JD: On my reading of the last lecture of RLT, I think it is an error >>>> to suggest that he is making measurement intrinsic to the definition of >>>> those dimensions of either time, space or quality. >>>> >>>> >>>> I said that measurement seems intrinsic to most of the definitions for >>>> "dimension," "dimensional," and "dimensionality" that Peirce provided in >>>> the Century Dictionary. I then suggested that the familiar notions >>>> associated with these words might *not *apply once we adopt a >>>> "top-down" synthetic approach, rather than a "bottom-up" analytic >>>> approach. Although Peirce was still very much in his "supermultitudinous" >>>> phase in 1898, I think that there are already hints of his eventual shift >>>> to the topical theory in that last lecture. >>>> >>>> JD: In saying that the dimensions of space, time and quality were >>>> potential and not actual, I do not take him to be saying that the >>>> dimensions were not real. >>>> >>>> >>>> I agree. In fact, I take Peirce to be saying that the *only *real >>>> parts of a perfect continuum are potential parts. Any part that is >>>> *actualized *is a topical singularity that *interrupts *the continuum, >>>> rendering it *imperfect*. The actualized part is still *real*, of >>>> course, but it is no longer a material part of the continuum. >>>> >>>> GR: It seems to me that possibles (1ns) are potentially real enough in >>>> the ur-continuity (3ns). Continuity as 3ns involves 1ns as those, shall we >>>> say, "selected" possibilities which *will *ultimately be realized as >>>> the qualities which *can* come into existence. That is, they are >>>> possibilities which become real qualities when they are embodied in >>>> existential things (2ns). >>>> >>>> >>>> I disagree. Peirce clearly affirmed that *some *possibilities are >>>> real, not merely "potentially real"; that is why Max Fisch called him "a >>>> three-category realist" as of 1897. In fact, there are real possibilities >>>> that *never *become actualized, such as the resistance to scratching >>>> of a diamond that burns up before ever being tested. "Indeed, it is the >>>> reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist >>>> upon" (CP 5.453, EP 2:354; 1905). >>>> >>>> JD: One thing he is trying to accomplish in clarifying such a limiting >>>> idea is to arrive at something that doesn't call out for further >>>> explanation. >>>> >>>> >>>> GR: I would question your use of the expression "a kind of limiting >>>> idea" here. Beyond limiting "further explanation" (which sounds like a very >>>> un-Peircean as Peirce's methodology argues against such a cessation of >>>> inquiry). >>>> >>>> >>>> Peirce indeed argued against blocking the way of inquiry by >>>> "maintaining that this, that, or the other element of science is basic, >>>> ultimate, independent of aught else, and utterly inexplicable" (CP 1.139, >>>> EP 2:49; 1898). However, he also recognized that not everything >>>> *demands* an explanation. Jeff is suggesting that "the original vague >>>> potentiality" is the kind of thing that does not call for any further >>>> explanation. However, my response is that just as a "scriber" is needed to >>>> draw the chalk marks on the blackboard, likewise a "creator" is needed >>>> to make the blackboard in the first place; and accordingly, I suggest >>>> instead that the Reality of *Ens necessarium* is the kind of thing >>>> that does not call for any further explanation. >>>> >>>> JD: In this case, I think a better analogy than a function in calculus >>>> is the conception of the absolute in projective geometry. It is better >>>> because the idea of convergence is a matter of proportion involving >>>> continuous magnitudes that may have an indeterminate metrical character. >>>> Proportions are preserved, but not scalar values. >>>> >>>> >>>> How does this square with Peirce's contention that *topical *geometry >>>> (or *Topics*) is the proper branch for mathematically investigating >>>> continuity, rather than *projective *geometry (or *Graphics*)? >>>> >>>> JD: As Peirce suggests in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties...", >>>> the starting point of a process of cognition can be thought of as triangle >>>> touching the surface of water in a glass. The starting point of >>>> inquiry--the tip of the triangle--is a kind of limiting idea. >>>> >>>> >>>> I quoted and commented on that entire passage very early in this thread >>>> as the sort of reasoning that Peirce might apply to the starting point of >>>> the universe, as well. If the downward-pointing apex of the triangle is >>>> the *beginning*, then what would correspond to the *end*--of >>>> cognition, or of inquiry, or of the universe? >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>>>
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