Helmuth, Gary, list
1. In response to Helmuth I wonder what tree structure he refers to since
there is not even a structure in his scheme. No relationship between levels
is defined and the levels themselves are not.
What Helmuth does is simply to consists simply of operating on sets of
n-tuples to make sets of (n+1)-tuples by applying the following rule:
X = {1,2,3}, to any n-tuple (xn 1.x,x2, ....., xn) of Xn we associate all
(n+1)-tuples (x1,x2, ....., xn, xn'1) of Xn+1 that check the condition xn+1
≤x
If we call T this operator we obtains, starting from the set {3} and the
arbitrary initial condition (posed by Helmuth)
T ({(3)} = {(1),(2),(3)}
and following
T({(1),(2),(3)} ) = {(1.1); (2.1), (2.2); (3,1). (3,2), (3,3)}
And so on....
This is to show that Helmuth only makes sets and that there is no natural
tree. If there is no tree there is no tree problem ... Helmuth therefore
generates sets of possible n-adic signs.
2- On the other hand Jon wants to introduce bifurcations in the
continuation of the determinations of a decasign, what make up real
trees... I was able to show him that this is a lot of problems even though
I think it can be done ; because the freedom of researchers is limitless.
It remains to give meaning and usefulness to this epistemological adventure
which seems to me quite difficult although the adage "no pain, no gain" is
still valid ...
3- The bridge
However I am able to build a formal bridge between this way of obtaining
classes of n- signs and my algebraic formalization based on protosigns
which, I think, correspond well to the representamens of Peirce (but this
is another debate). Here's his diagram (in which I bold the "levels" and I
put in bold italic class numbers
*1* (3) *1*
*2* (1), (2), (3) *3*
*3* (1.1); (2.1), (2.2); (3,1). (3,2), (3,3) *6*
*4* (1.1.1); (2.1.1); (2.2.1), (2.2.2); (3.1.1); (3.2.1) (3.2.2).
(3.3.1), (3.3.2), (3.3.3) *10*
The precision that Helmuth brings in his following message will help me a
lot to understand what is happening, that Gary's message illustrates also
and I also I am thinking on this occasion of the works of Priscila Farias
and Joao Queiroz (
https://www.academia.edu/557626/A_diagrammatic_approach_to_Peirces_classifications_of_signs?email_work_card=view-paper)
:
Helmuth quote : "I *meant the composition of a triad of sign. I assume the
structure of the trees applies to composition, not classification. The 6,
10, 28, 66, or how many sign classes are class compositions (possible) at a
certain level of analysis."*
A remark on the first sentence that is valid only at level 4. The second
evokes a "tree structure" that does not seem to me to meet any definition.
However, it has the merit of saying that this method does not concern the
classifications, that is to say, I think, the relationships (called
affinities by Peirce) between classes of signs.
In fact what he calls "compositions" are protosigns (pure forms) with
forgetting the determinations and his method is a way to operate a
trichotomic machine as I do, but invisibly and forgetting the
determinations : the invisible hand ... These classifications are implicit
in all diagrams produced in large quantities by researchers ; because the
trichotomic machine operate within the back office, producing valid classes
of signs.
This is because in the definition of 1,542 which seems to be a widely
shared reference :
*"My definition of a representamen is as follow : A REPRESENTAMEN is a
subject of a triadic relationship TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a
third, called is INTERPRETANT, this triadic relationship being such that
the REPRESENTAMEN determines* * its interpretant to stand in the same
triadic relationship to the same object for some interpretant"*
there is only one determination mentioned. But I have shown a long time ago
that, from 1905, Peirce has incorporated in almost all its definitions the
fact that the object O determines the sign S which determines the
Interpretant I, so as to put I in relation to O. Formally this supports
this idea that it's the composition of these two determinations that create
the triad.
My principle of explanation for proposing the construction of a bridge will
be:
Starting from triads that are represented - following Peirce- by
triangles with
the categories in the corners I consider the oblique sides as
determinations, like this one for example, with an arrow of 3 to 2 and
other of 2 to 1 (that I can not or do not know how to do but that you can
imagine !).
3 1
2
The bridge here it is:
I resume the suite of "compositions" by simply making a lag without impact
by starting at level 0 instead of level 1 (I change origin, they are
ordinals)
*0 * (3) *1*
* 1 * (1), (2), (3) *3*
*2 *(1.1); (2.1), (2.2); (3,1). (3,2), (3,3) *6*
* 3* (1.1.1); (2.1.1); (2.2.1), (2.2.2); (3.1.1); (3.2.1) (3.2.2).
(3.3.1), (3.3.2), (3.3.3) *10*
And now I write the protosigns of length 1 , 2, and 3 (length 0 is a
0-tuple does not yet make sense):
*1* A1
*2 *A1àA2
*3* A1 àA2àA3
I press the button of the trichotomic machine on each line:
*1 **A1* result A1.3àA1.2àA1.1 *3 **classes *but ordered
*2* A1àA2 result A1.3àA2.3 ; A1.3àA2.2 ; A1.3àA2.1 ; A1.2àA2.2 ; A1.2àA2.1
; A1.1àA2.1 *6* classes but ordered (see "the trichotomic machine, figure
18)
A1 àA2àA3 see the generator of Patrick Benazet for n=3
http://patrick-benazet.chez-alice.fr/treillis_en_ligne/lattices/index.htm?3
*10 classes * but ordered
and so on, ad infinitum... just change the number and click Ok...
The differences come from the arrows that are the determinations inside the
triadic sign while Helmuth gets only a set of classes of signs ...
Everyone I think understood the advantage of not only getting classes of
signs regardless of the number of triplet trichotomies of morphisms but
also the immanent logical relationships they maintain. These triplets are
called natural transformations of functors, and each of the 3 morphisms
wich compose it is a relationship of presupposition (or involution) defined
between the categories. You can see them on the lattice of the 10 classes
of signs at the end or beginning of the videos below. These videos are true
visual evidences that show that all correct classificatory attempts,
regardless
of the number of trichotomies chosen,, 3, 6, 10 is isomorphic to the
corresponding lattice even when determinations are forgotten.
The bridge it is set for n=3 in these two videos
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tSfICQynu6A
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hc1b_KJEN8o (reverse)
there are 30 lines in this morphing (as for a suspension bridge!) that link
the numbers "in the corners" of each triangle to the corresponding figure
in the lattice in the same order SàOàI. These correspondences materialize
what is called a faithful and full functor between the two structures. For
some approaches, such as Helmuth's, it also acts as a forgetting functor of
determinations.
To Gary's attention, I think he will consider with kindness that I could
have chosen his theoretical grammar and his trikonic diagrams to get the
same result ...
As far as the choice of trichotomies is concerned, it is a battlefield that
does not affect the lattice structures. When you chose yours trichotomies, the
machine gives you the classes of signs you have created and their
relationships.
However, I will make a proposal on the 10 trichotomies and 66 classes which
is still an open question. I justified this assertion in:
https://www.academia.edu/40493861/The_trichotomic_machine_brings_order_among_the_interpretants
I will also show how to use the lattice of the 10 classes of signs to make
a semiotic analysis of a concrete case chosen in the Covid-19 news.
Le dim. 26 avr. 2020 à 23:41, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> a
écrit :
> Edwina, List,
>
> Edwina wrote: Thanks for the paper, Gary - I'll have to print it out and
> read it more thoroughly.// But I'm not sure if it will change my mind! I
> don't, for example, understand Firstness as comparable to the Platonic idea.
>
> Thank you for considering reading my paper, Edwina. As for changing your
> mind, well, I don't expect to do that in any significant way on topics
> we've discussed in the past.
>
> However, as to how Peirce uses the expression "Platonic idea," well maybe,
> just *maybe*, I can make a little headway in that. Well, at most a dent.
> OK, a dimple :-) But it will take more time than I've available this
> weekend, so this will be the briefest of sketches.
>
> Suffice it to say for starters that, as Joe Ransdell and many others have
> argued, Peirce was *not *a Platonist; and I certainly agree. He was,
> rather, and as he explicitly saw himself, principally Aristotelian in his
> basic philosophical outlook, that is, he saw himself as essentially a
> scientist and logician, and he deplored Platonism in pretty much all its
> forms as nominalistic.
>
> Parenthetically, Joe also argued, well I think, that there were deep
> Socratic veins in Peirce's philosophy: the *dialogic* aspect of it, so
> crucial to his notion of a scientific community. See: Ransdell's paper:
> "Sciences as Communicational Communities"
> https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/PHYSICS.HTM
>
> But that's a topic for another time; and it should go without saying that
> "Socratic" in Joe's sense is not "Platonic" in the nominalist's sense.
>
> Yet, in various places in his work in semeiotic as well as in mathematics
> and metaphysics, Peirce used the expression "Platonic idea" in a
> particular, one might even say 'peculiar', way given his general distaste
> for Platonism. For example, takes this passage:
>
> CSP: The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object,
> not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have
> sometimes called the ground of the representamen. "Idea" is here to be
> understood in a sort of Platonic sense. . . (CP 2.228, in a fragment dated
> c. 1887).
>
>
> GR: And he not infrequently comments, as in this snippet, to the effect
> that there is a "Platonic world of pure forms with which mathematics is
> always dealing" (CP 4.118).
>
> GR: Also, in some of his late metaphysical musing he reflects that from a
> certain "point of view we must suppose that the existing universe, with all
> its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary
> determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world. . ." (CP 6.192)
>
> GR: So what I'm suggesting is, that as opposed to nominalistic Platonism
> which he abhorred -- and whether or not you agree with any of the
> particular ideas set forth in the snippets above -- that Peirce had a
> specific use for the term "Platonic idea" by which he means, as a technical
> term suggest by the snippets above, the 'world' "of pure forms in which
> mathematics" deals, the *qualisignific *and *iconic *in semeiotic, the
> "ground" of a sign in his earliest semeiotic explorations, etc. One perhaps
> it such ways can get a sense or an image of what Peirce means by a
> "Platonic idea."
>
> GR: Well, whether I've changed our mind in this matter at all, it's the
> way I see it: Peirce was certainly not a Platonist, but used the term
> "Platonic idea" in the special sense just described.
>
> ET: And I simply don't see that representamen, can function in a mode of
> Firstness, - other than as a qualisign - where all three nodes/relations
> are in the categorical mode of Firstness. Of the ten classes, this is the
> only one where the representamen/sign is in that mode of Firstness.
>
> GR: We will *never* agree on this, I am quite certain. I just argued it
> in consideration of my table of trikons, so I won't repeat myself here. I
> will only add for now that a Sign when seen as a *possibility*, which
> Peirce will remark that it is, is an expression of 1ns as, almost
> immediately (so to speak), will be its Interpretant Sign, etc., etc. A Sign
> is a possibility, possibilities are 1nses, therefore. . .
>
> ET: I don't see how the sign/representamen, which has an enormous 'Mind'
> task to do in the semiosic process could 'add' information all on its own,
> if it's just in that mode of Firstness….to produce and Interpretant in a
> mode of Thirdness! That's adding a whole lot of energy/information! Where
> does it get it from? // Usually, within the triadic semiosic process - the
> output [Interpretant] has the same of less data/information than the input
> [Object].
>
> GR: This is something else we are likely never to agree upon. Your
> input/output model has always seemed to me to be idiosyncratic. Now
> there's nothing inherently wrong with that, as Ben Udell has convinced me;
> although I don't see other semeioticians -- including biosemioticians -- as
> having picked up and employed your model (please correct me if I'm wrong).
> Much more importantly, I consider it to be mechanistic/energetic (2ns) and
> temporal, never fully semeiotic, that is, never essentially logical. We've
> discussed this so often that I really have nothing to add to what I've
> already argued ad nauseam. And I know your arguments well as well.
>
> In any event, I always hope, and despite our deep disagreements on certain
> aspects of Peirce's philosophy, that there are some things that we do agree
> on or, even better, will come to agree upon.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
> "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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>
> On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 6:59 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Thanks for the paper, Gary - I'll have to print it out and read it more
>> thoroughly.
>>
>> But I'm not sure if it will change my mind! I don't, for example,
>> understand Firstness as comparable to the Platonic idea.
>>
>> And I simply don't see that the mediative 'node', the sign/representamen,
>> can function in a mode of Firstness - other than as a qualisign - where
>> all three nodes/relations are in the categorical mode of Firstness. Of the
>> ten classes, this is the only one where the representamen/sign is in that
>> mode of Firstness.
>>
>> I don't see how the sign/representamen, which has an enormous 'Mind' task
>> to do in the semiosic process could 'add' information all on its own, if
>> it's just in that mode of Firstness….to produce and Interpretant in a mode
>> of Thirdness! That's adding a whole lot of energy/information! Where does
>> it get it from?
>>
>> Usually, within the triadic semiosic process - the output [Interpretant]
>> has the same of less data/information than the input [Object].
>>
>> Obviously, I am also understanding the modal categories within a view as
>> to how much data/information they provide; how it has been transformed by
>> the mediative process etc.
>>
>> I'll try to see how you come to your conclusion under Sign Relations
>> that, for example, the Sign is always a Firstness etc. I simply don't
>> 'see' it as you do.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>> On Sat 25/04/20 5:07 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Helmut, Edwina, List,
>>
>> Helmut asked: (is it agreed now, that sign is 1ns, object 2ns, and
>> interpretant 3ns?)
>>
>> And Edwina responded:
>>
>> I certainly don't agree that the sign/representamen is [always?] in a
>> categorical mode of 1ns, the object in 2ns, the interpretant in 3ns.
>>
>> Do you mean the order of the semiosic process? This has nothing to do
>> with the categories, for, as Peirce outlined in the ten classes, the
>> triadic 'nodes' can be in any of the modal categories. How about a Sign
>> in 1-1-1, a rhematic iconic qualisgin, where all three nodes are in a mode
>> of 1ns?
>>
>> Edwina and I have disagreed on this matter forever, it would seem. I see
>> things very differently than she does. Consider the chart below beginning
>> by noting its three diagrams: Sign Elements at the top left; 9-adic Sign
>> Relations at the bottom left; 10-adic Classification of Signs being the
>> entire right hand side of the chart.
>>
>> [image: Blocked image]
>> https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm
>>
>> Each of these three involves, firstly, trikons arranged categorially such
>> that 1ns is represented at the top of each triangle, 2ns at the bottom of
>> each, and 3ns to the right.
>>
>> SIGN ELEMENTS:
>>
>> The trikon diagram at the top left of the chart abstracts only the three
>> 'elements' of a sign and can be read thusly: the sign itself is a 1ns, the
>> object is 2ns, the interpretant is 3ns.
>>
>> [Here, I believe, lies the basis of Edwina's and my disagreement. For
>> when we consider the 10 Classes of Signs below, in this analysis, each
>> and every one of them will involve a Sign as 1ns, an Object as 2ns and
>> an Interpretant as 3ns)].
>>
>> SIGN RELATIONS:
>>
>> SIGN: Now if one then looks at the trikon diagram on the bottom left one
>> sees that each of these just considered -- viz.,
>> sign/object/interpretant -- can be tricategorially analyzed such that for
>> the Sign itself: qualsign = 1ns, sinsign = 2ns, legisign = 3ns. So one
>> observes that while the Sign itself is always a 1ns at this level of
>> abstract analysis, its categorial 'modes' can be in any of the three.
>>
>> OBJECT: Moving to the bottom of the diagram, similarly, the Object can
>> famously be tricategorially analyzed: icon = 1ns, index = 2ns, symbol =3ns;
>> yet qua Object it is always 2ns .
>>
>> INTERPRETANT: So also for the Interpretant sign: rheme (term, or better,
>> propositional function) = 1ns, dicisign (proposition) = 2ns, argument =
>> 3ns; yet qua Interpretant it is always 3ns.
>>
>> CLASSIFICATION OF SIGNS:
>>
>> Finally, turning to the right portion of the entire diagram, here the
>> famous Classification into 10 classes is trikonically represented. Here one
>> finds that each of the 10 classes is also tricategorially analyzed based
>> on the division of 9 (3 x 3) just given (bottom left of the chart).
>>
>> In verbally presenting each of the 10 classes at CP 2.254 - 264, in order
>> to highlight the notion that the interpretant involves the object* and
>> the object involves the sign itself, so beginning at the interpretant as
>> Peirce does in the CP passages just noted, commencing at the interpretent,
>> one moves through the object, to the sign itself. So, for simple example,
>> the 4th sign of the 10 classes (bottom left in that diagram) is called by
>> Peirce a Dicent(ic) (2ns) Indexical (2ns) Sinsign (2ns), and the example he
>> gives is a weathercock (I trust that I don't have to spell out its
>> dicentic, indexical, sinsignific characters: see, CP 2.257).
>> *More accurately, one ought say that the Interpretant involves both the
>> Object and the Sign itself.
>>
>> This kind of involutional analysis holds for each and every Sign Class of
>> the 10. However, it ought to be obvious that the Classification of Signs
>> (and, so, every element in the entire chart which, btw, is itself
>> trikonic) is highly abstracted.
>>
>> So, for example, several signs cannot occur on their own but must be a
>> part, so to speak, of other signs. For prime example, the very first sign
>> (top left), the Qualisign (and one reads in CP 2.254 - 264 why some signs
>> can be abbreviated, so that there is no need to refer to a 'rhematic iconic
>> qualisign'-- simply 'Qualisign' will do) never appears alone, can not
>> appear alone, and yet can be analyzed as a Sign. (So 'red' as a
>> qualisign occurs within some thing or idea which involves redness.)
>>
>> [NB: This just given is a very different analysis than the one Edwina
>> offers in the second passage quoted above: "How about a Sign in 1-1-1, a
>> rhematic iconic qualisgin, where all three nodes are in a mode of 1ns?"]
>>
>> But again, the Classification of Signs is just that, an abstract
>> classification and is not meant to represent semeiosis at all (contra
>> Edwina, also in her second comment quoted at the top). Indeed, when
>> semeiosis is considered, matters can become infinitely more complex. One
>> need only note by way of abstract example, that for semeiosis Peirce
>> analyzes 2 objects (immediate and dynamic) and at least 3 interpretants.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>>
>>
>> "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox
>>
>> Gary Richmond
>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>> Communication Studies
>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> [image: Blocked image]
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>>
>> On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 2:42 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Helmut, you wrote:
>>>
>>> (is it agreed now, that sign is 1ns, object 2ns, and interpretant 3ns?)
>>>
>>> I certainly don't agree that the sign/representamen is [always?] in a
>>> categorical mode of 1ns, the object in 2ns, the interpretant in 3ns.
>>>
>>> Do you mean the order of the semiosic process? This has nothing to do
>>> with the categories, for, as Peirce outlined in the ten classes, the
>>> triadic 'nodes' can be in any of the modal categories. How about a Sign in
>>> 1-1-1, a rhematic iconic qualisgin, where all three nodes are in a mode of
>>> 1ns?
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat 25/04/20 2:11 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Supplement: Please click on "full view" or synonym, otherwise the table
>>> does not work.
>>>
>>> List,
>>>
>>> I still do not understand, why the tree-structure should not be able to
>>> be applied to the sign characters, meaning, there are more than three
>>> interpretants due to the level of analysis. Starting from level 1, where
>>> you have one class/character, a thirdness, on level two you have three, and
>>> so on:
>>>
>>> level
>>> characters
>>> number of characters
>>>
>>> 1
>>> (3)
>>> 1
>>> 2
>>> (1);(2);(3)
>>> 3
>>> 3 (1.1); (2.1),(2.2);
>>> (3.1).(3.2),(3.3)
>>> 6
>>> 4 (1.1.1); (2.1.1); (2.2.1),(2.2.2); (3.1.1); (3.2.1).(3.2.2);
>>> (3.3.1),(3.3.2),(3.3.3) 10
>>>
>>> The number of classes/characters is the former number of characters plus
>>> the number of the new level. At level 7 you have 28 characters, and at
>>> level 11 you have 66.
>>>
>>> Apart from sign classes and sign characters (is it agreed now, that sign
>>> is 1ns, object 2ns, and interpretant 3ns?) this tree-structure according to
>>> Peirce also applies for consciousness (Primisense, Altersense, Medisense),
>>> analysed by him up to the 3d level.
>>>
>>> This eternal tree-structure should be possible to apply to all things
>>> that underly the categories, otherwise the categories would not be
>>> categorical, and thus not categories, I think.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Helmut
>>>
>>>
>>> 25. April 2020 um 02:51 Uhr
>>> "Jon Alan Schmidt"
>>> wrote:
>>> Robert, List:
>>>
>>> To clarify, I agree with what you say below and did not mean to imply
>>> otherwise. I sincerely appreciate your scholarship, even though we have
>>> reached some different conclusions when it comes to the details. Also,
>>> the "moral injunction" with which I concluded was not based on anyone's
>>> authority, just Peirce's own words as quoted.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Jon S.
>>>
>>> On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 4:49 AM robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon, List :
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Peirce asks himself questions and only questions to know which
>>>> trichotomies of which virtual or abstract thought objects (ie the Ai
>>>> of my protosigns) he could choose to place them in the 10 places. At this
>>>> moment they are trichotomies independentes of any determination
>>>> between these objects. There are actually 59049. It's enough to impress
>>>> Lady Welby and William James!
>>>>
>>>> But once this choice is made we would obviously fall back on the usual
>>>> 66 classes.
>>>>
>>>> This is not the first time he has evaluated his task:
>>>>
>>>> Peirce: CP 5.488 Cross-Ref:†† 488. I here owe my patient reader a
>>>> confession. It is that when I said that those signs that have a logical
>>>> interpretant are either general or closely connected with generals, this
>>>> was not a scientific result, but only a strong impression due to a
>>>> life-long study of the nature of signs. My excuse for not answering the
>>>> question scientifically is that I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or
>>>> rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I
>>>> call semiotic, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and
>>>> fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast,
>>>> the labor too great, for a first-comer. I am, accordingly, obliged to
>>>> confine myself to the most important questions. The questions of the same
>>>> particular type as the one I answer on the basis of an impression, which
>>>> are of about the same importance, exceed four hundred in number ; and
>>>> they are all delicate and difficult, each requiring much search and much
>>>> caution. At the same time, they are very far from being among the most
>>>> important of the questions of semiotic. Even if my answer is not exactly
>>>> correct, it can lead to no great misconception as to the nature of the
>>>> logical interpretant. There is my apology, such as it may be deemed."
>>>> (dated
>>>> v.1936)
>>>>
>>>> 400 is much less than 59049!
>>>>
>>>> However, anyone can declare themselves an explorer today, this is the
>>>> condition of any free search. As far as I am concerned, I constantly
>>>> control that my explorations stick to Peirce's fundamental writings,
>>>> paragraph by paragraph, word by word.
>>>>
>>>> You end with a moral injunction based on the authority of John Sowa:
>>>>
>>>> "That is why I insist on faithfulness to Peirce's own writings when
>>>> employing his terminology and seeking to apply his ideas today. Otherwise,
>>>> we do not actually "build on and extend his work," but rather create
>>>> something new of our own invention and wrongly attribute it to him."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I wonder who it can apply to and I don't feel concerned. On the other
>>>> hand, I fear that there is still much to clear in the forest and that there
>>>> is not yet time to plant trees on the freed parts won.
>>>> Le ven. 24 avr. 2020 à 04:15, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> a écrit :
>>>>
>>>>> Robert, List:
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree that pursuing a tree structure effectively abandons the quest
>>>>> for exactly 66 classes of signs, since that number depends directly on a
>>>>> linear arrangement of the ten trichotomies. Perhaps that is why Peirce
>>>>> made the following remarks in draft letters to Lady Welby and William
>>>>> James, respectively.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> CSP: On these considerations I base a recognition of ten respects in
>>>>> which Signs may be divided. I do not say that these divisions are enough.
>>>>> But since every one of them turns out to be a trichotomy, it follows that
>>>>> in order to decide what classes of Signs result from them, I have 3^10, or
>>>>> 59,049, difficult questions to carefully consider; and therefore I will
>>>>> not
>>>>> undertake to carry my systematical division of Signs any farther, but will
>>>>> leave that for future explorers. (EP 2:482, 1908 Dec 24-28)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> CSP: I might have drawn more than ten distinctions; but these ten
>>>>> exhibit all the distinctions that are generally required in logic; and
>>>>> since investigation of these involved my consideration,--virtually at
>>>>> least,--of 59,049 questions, still leaving me on the portico of logic, I
>>>>> thought it wise to stop with these. (EP 2:501, 1909 Dec 25)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Note that he wrote both of these passages after his famous statement
>>>>> that "instead of making 59,049 classes, these will only come to 66" (EP
>>>>> 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). Perhaps he was already reconsidering that assessment
>>>>> a couple of days later, resulting in the first quote, while the second one
>>>>> comes a few weeks after the Logic Notebook entry in which he sketched out
>>>>> the hierarchical approach.
>>>>>
>>>>> In any case, we are now among the "future explorers" for whom Peirce
>>>>> left various follow-up tasks to undertake, including further investigation
>>>>> of alternatives for a "systematical division of Signs." As John Sowa
>>>>> quoted him earlier today, "One generation collects premises in order that
>>>>> a
>>>>> distant generation may discover what they mean" (CP 7.87, 1902); but if we
>>>>> get the premisses wrong, then the conclusions that we derive from
>>>>> them will also be wrong. That is why I insist on faithfulness to Peirce's
>>>>> own writings when employing his terminology and seeking to apply his ideas
>>>>> today. Otherwise, we do not actually "build on and extend his work," but
>>>>> rather create something new of our own invention and wrongly attribute it
>>>>> to him.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Apr 23, 2020 at 12:02 PM robert marty <
>>>>> robert.mart...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> "The designations here are the same as above, although the reference
>>>>>> is to a longer entry in the Logic Notebook written a few days later. As
>>>>>> Bellucci summarizes, "the ten trichotomies are arranged in a
>>>>>> tree-structure, not as a linear succession," but "Peirce never
>>>>>> managed to apply to his tenfold taxonomy of signs the new step-by-step
>>>>>> method." Bellucci does not attempt to do so himself; and as far as I
>>>>>> know,
>>>>>> no one else has tried yet either."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If you put a tree structure on the ten trichotomies you can say
>>>>>> probably goodbye to the 66 classes of signs which are coextensive with a
>>>>>> linear series of successive determinations.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> what will you do if you finish by a fork ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Exemple with a final fork :
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A1--> A2--> A3--> A4--> A5-->A6-->A7 -->A8
>>>>>> |
>>>>>> V
>>>>>> A9
>>>>>> |
>>>>>> V
>>>>>> A10
>>>>>> you have in fact 2different suites of 8 objects :
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A1--> A2--> A3--> A4--> A5-->A6-->A7 -->A8
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A1--> A2--> A3--> A4--> A5-->A6-->A9-->A10
>>>>>>
>>>>>> the number of classes of signs obtained is [(9*10)/2]*2=90
>>>>>>
>>>>>> it is easy to see that the cases with equal branches give the
>>>>>> following numbers of classes according to the length n of the common
>>>>>> core:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> n=2, 56 ; n=4 , 72 ; n=6 , 90; n=8, 110
>>>>>>
>>>>>> but maybe you see things differently ?
>>>>>>
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