Gary R., Edwina, List: I agree that Peirce was not at all a Platonist, but nevertheless uses the expression "Platonic idea" in a peculiar way. The passages that come to my mind are where he describes Platonic ideas as the constituents of the first universe of experience.
CSP: Some words shall herein be capitalized when used, not as vernacular, but as terms defined. Thus, an "idea" is the substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy; but "Idea,"--nearer Plato's idea of *ἰδέα*,--denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it. ... Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another *might *give local habitation and a name within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them, saves their Reality. (CP 6.452&455, EP 2:434&435, 1908) They are thus *real *possibilities (1ns), but not forms that *exist *in some immaterial realm. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 26, 2020 at 4:41 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, List, > > Edwina wrote: Thanks for the paper, Gary - I'll have to print it out and > read it more thoroughly.// But I'm not sure if it will change my mind! I > don't, for example, understand Firstness as comparable to the Platonic idea. > > Thank you for considering reading my paper, Edwina. As for changing your > mind, well, I don't expect to do that in any significant way on topics > we've discussed in the past. > > However, as to how Peirce uses the expression "Platonic idea," well maybe, > just *maybe*, I can make a little headway in that. Well, at most a dent. > OK, a dimple :-) But it will take more time than I've available this > weekend, so this will be the briefest of sketches. > > Suffice it to say for starters that, as Joe Ransdell and many others have > argued, Peirce was *not *a Platonist; and I certainly agree. He was, > rather, and as he explicitly saw himself, principally Aristotelian in his > basic philosophical outlook, that is, he saw himself as essentially a > scientist and logician, and he deplored Platonism in pretty much all its > forms as nominalistic. > > Parenthetically, Joe also argued, well I think, that there were deep > Socratic veins in Peirce's philosophy: the *dialogic* aspect of it, so > crucial to his notion of a scientific community. See: Ransdell's paper: > "Sciences as Communicational Communities" > https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/PHYSICS.HTM > > But that's a topic for another time; and it should go without saying that > "Socratic" in Joe's sense is not "Platonic" in the nominalist's sense. > > Yet, in various places in his work in semeiotic as well as in mathematics > and metaphysics, Peirce used the expression "Platonic idea" in a > particular, one might even say 'peculiar', way given his general distaste > for Platonism. For example, takes this passage: > > CSP: The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, > not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have > sometimes called the ground of the representamen. "Idea" is here to be > understood in a sort of Platonic sense. . . (CP 2.228, in a fragment dated > c. 1887). > > > GR: And he not infrequently comments, as in this snippet, to the effect > that there is a "Platonic world of pure forms with which mathematics is > always dealing" (CP 4.118). > > GR: Also, in some of his late metaphysical musing he reflects that from a > certain "point of view we must suppose that the existing universe, with all > its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary > determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world. . ." (CP 6.192) > > GR: So what I'm suggesting is, that as opposed to nominalistic Platonism > which he abhorred -- and whether or not you agree with any of the > particular ideas set forth in the snippets above -- that Peirce had a > specific use for the term "Platonic idea" by which he means, as a technical > term suggest by the snippets above, the 'world' "of pure forms in which > mathematics" deals, the *qualisignific *and *iconic *in semeiotic, the > "ground" of a sign in his earliest semeiotic explorations, etc. One perhaps > it such ways can get a sense or an image of what Peirce means by a > "Platonic idea." > > GR: Well, whether I've changed our mind in this matter at all, it's the > way I see it: Peirce was certainly not a Platonist, but used the term > "Platonic idea" in the special sense just described. > > ET: And I simply don't see that representamen, can function in a mode of > Firstness, - other than as a qualisign - where all three nodes/relations > are in the categorical mode of Firstness. Of the ten classes, this is the > only one where the representamen/sign is in that mode of Firstness. > > GR: We will *never* agree on this, I am quite certain. I just argued it > in consideration of my table of trikons, so I won't repeat myself here. I > will only add for now that a Sign when seen as a *possibility*, which > Peirce will remark that it is, is an expression of 1ns as, almost > immediately (so to speak), will be its Interpretant Sign, etc., etc. A Sign > is a possibility, possibilities are 1nses, therefore. . . > > ET: I don't see how the sign/representamen, which has an enormous 'Mind' > task to do in the semiosic process could 'add' information all on its own, > if it's just in that mode of Firstness….to produce and Interpretant in a > mode of Thirdness! That's adding a whole lot of energy/information! Where > does it get it from? // Usually, within the triadic semiosic process - the > output [Interpretant] has the same of less data/information than the input > [Object]. > > GR: This is something else we are likely never to agree upon. Your > input/output model has always seemed to me to be idiosyncratic. Now > there's nothing inherently wrong with that, as Ben Udell has convinced me; > although I don't see other semeioticians -- including biosemioticians -- as > having picked up and employed your model (please correct me if I'm wrong). > Much more importantly, I consider it to be mechanistic/energetic (2ns) and > temporal, never fully semeiotic, that is, never essentially logical. We've > discussed this so often that I really have nothing to add to what I've > already argued ad nauseam. And I know your arguments well as well. > > In any event, I always hope, and despite our deep disagreements on certain > aspects of Peirce's philosophy, that there are some things that we do agree > on or, even better, will come to agree upon. > > Best, > > Gary R > "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 6:59 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Thanks for the paper, Gary - I'll have to print it out and read it more >> thoroughly. >> >> But I'm not sure if it will change my mind! I don't, for example, >> understand Firstness as comparable to the Platonic idea. >> >> And I simply don't see that the mediative 'node', the sign/representamen, >> can function in a mode of Firstness - other than as a qualisign - where >> all three nodes/relations are in the categorical mode of Firstness. Of the >> ten classes, this is the only one where the representamen/sign is in that >> mode of Firstness. >> >> I don't see how the sign/representamen, which has an enormous 'Mind' task >> to do in the semiosic process could 'add' information all on its own, if >> it's just in that mode of Firstness….to produce and Interpretant in a mode >> of Thirdness! That's adding a whole lot of energy/information! Where does >> it get it from? >> >> Usually, within the triadic semiosic process - the output [Interpretant] >> has the same of less data/information than the input [Object]. >> >> Obviously, I am also understanding the modal categories within a view as >> to how much data/information they provide; how it has been transformed by >> the mediative process etc. >> >> I'll try to see how you come to your conclusion under Sign Relations >> that, for example, the Sign is always a Firstness etc. I simply don't >> 'see' it as you do. >> >> Edwina >> >
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