Robert, List: For the record, I am the one who mentioned <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-04/msg00125.html> the hermeneutic principle of charity and linked to the Wikipedia article about it. I believe that we should all consistently apply it to everyone else in accordance with the "generosity of attitude" that Gary R. advocates as the List moderator. By contrast, John Sowa has asserted <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-04/msg00180.html>, "In logic and mathematics, there is no such thing as charity ... No amount of charity can correct a mistake in logic or mathematics ... When it comes to logic and mathematics, charity does not apply." As I pointed out in my response <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-04/msg00191.html> at the time, we rarely (if ever) engage in rigorous "proofs" on the List; the discussion is mostly about philosophy, including the *philosophy* of logic and the *philosophy *of mathematics, where charity surely *does *apply. I also noted recently <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00017.html> that according to Peirce, logic and mathematics are by no means exempt from fallibility, so I believe that charity *does *apply even in these rigorous fields.
In my post <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00117.html> yesterday, I was not referring to any particular *definition *of a sign, but rather Peirce's 1903 *taxonomy *of ten classes of signs (CP 2.243-265, EP 2:291-297). It should not be controversial at all to say that it is based on three trichotomies--for the sign itself (S) as qualisign/sinsign/legisign, for its dyadic relation with the object (Od-S) as iconic/indexical/symbolic, and for its dyadic relation with the interpretant (S-If) as rheme/dicisign/argument--arranged in logical order as S → Od-S → S-If. This is not my personal opinion, it is what Peirce himself presents in the referenced passage. Please note, the arrows here do not have anything to do with involution or presupposition, only determination as the *logical *relation between the different trichotomies for sign classification, such that "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908). I agree that in his later taxonomies, Peirce clearly affirms that the object determines the sign and that the sign determines the interpretant. This is in no way inconsistent with the 1903 taxonomy, since it does not yet include trichotomies for the object and interpretant *as correlates*; or rather, for the *two *objects and *three *interpretants as correlates. It is not until 1908 that Peirce states, "the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant" (ibid). No one disputes that dynamoid=dynamical for the object and effective=dynamical for the interpretant, but there is ongoing disagreement about whether destinate=final and explicit=immediate (as I maintain) or vice-versa. On the other hand, within the *process *of semeiosis "determines" has a *different *sense, describing each sign's relations with its object and interpretant. CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410, 1907) I happen to agree with Mats Bergman that this "is one of Peirce’s finest sign definitions" (*Peirce's Philosophy of Communication: Rhetorical Underpinnings of the Theory of Signs*, p. 117). More specifically, my current view is that an "event of semeiosis" takes place when an *individual *dynamical object determines an *individual* sign token to determine an *individual* dynamical interpretant. This is what I have in mind when I say that only a symbolic sign can determine a further sign (logical interpretant), while an indexical sign typically determines an exertion (energetic interpretant) and an iconic sign can only determine a feeling (emotional interpretant). However, such a *discrete *occurrence is strictly an artifact of analysis, because real semeiosis is a *continuous *process--the entire universe as a vast argument that is constantly "working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 5:25 AM Robert Marty <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon Allan, List, John Sowa > > > > Jon Allan, List, John Sowa > > > > I apply the principle of charity > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_charity> mentioned by John > Sowa not long ago ... I like it … I also want it applied to me ... > > > > JAS > Unfortunately only the "valency" table is correct and relevant, > since the second and third trichotomies of Peirce's 1903 taxonomy are not > for the (dynamical) object and (final) interpretant as *correlates *(2.2.1 > and 3.3.1), but rather for their dyadic *relations *with the sign (2.2.2 > and 3.3.2). Hence the logical order of determination is S → Od-S → S-If, > which we use to obtain the familiar ten classes of signs. > > > > RM > First, you would have to specify what definition of 1903 you were > referring to, since that year there was a product 11 according to my > research; but it doesn't matter very much. > > > > What is important is the last sentence in which I completely reject the > logical order and therefore at least as much the use of the term "familiar" > by which you introduce the idea that what you are saying is what everyone > says and even that is what Peirce would say. I'd rather have seen > "personal" instead. That is why I will use the word "aberration" about > this sentence and of course I am arguing. > > > > The original sin (forgive me the metaphor) is here*:* > > *S → Od-S* : we immediately see a problem because we see twice S and > then when we read we see that S *determines his own relationship with Od * > ... If the line you put between Od and S (don't know what it represents) > is a determination what is the common rule, then you say that S determines > his determination… it is therefore a recursive definition of the sign > which is a great novelty whose empirical basis is not seen… then I will > not accuse you of blocking the path of research as is done almost daily on > this list but only of sitting by the side of the road in 1903. Indeed from > 1905 it is clear in 20 definitions that O determines S and even (def 30 > below, which can be found at number 66 among n.d ) that O(=B) is purely > active in its relationship with S (=A). Moreover, these texts are > interesting because they show that for Peirce the sign S(=A) is > active-passive: active in its relation with the interpreter (C) and passive > in its relation with the object (B). So there's no reason to part with OàS > àI but you can always get up and take a bifurcation. > > > > > > > > > *"30 - 1905 - SS p.192-3. Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably July > 1905 . So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman > (not a priman element generally) and we might define a sign as follows: > A "sign" is anything, A, which, (1) in addition to > other characters of its own, (2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, > to a purely active correlate, B, (3) and is also in a triadic > relation to B for a purely passive correlate, C, this triadic relation > being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic relation, µ, to B, the > relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the relation Þ."* > > JAS > Note that this has nothing whatsoever to do with which classes of > signs can be *determined *(in a different sense) by other signs. In > fact, only a symbolic sign can determine a further sign as its dynamical > interpretant. An indexical sign can only produce an exertion or a feeling, > and an iconic sign can only produce a feeling. > > > > RM > Again, there's a language problem: classes of signs that are defined > with O,S and I could be determined by simple signs that you don't specify ? > It's inconsistent ... > > > > For the rest I have nothing to say since I write has pretty much the same > for 30 years. >
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